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Abstract
Two current trends in the automotive industry are the increasing number of connected
vehicles and automated driving. The former enables the use of different applications
within the vehicle. These applications might be restricted to vehicles with certain
features such as manufacturer or model.
To enable automated driving, the vehicle needs information about the road ahead.
This information might be provided by an application. In order to keep the street
information up to date connected vehicles share their sensor data. This data is then
aggregated on a central server. Furthermore, it has a restricted spatial and temporal
validity. Therefore, the vehicles also need to provide the corresponding time and
position information.
When reporting position data, it is possible, for example, to generate movement
profiles or to identify sensitive locations. Hence, it is critical which information
different applications reveal about the corresponding vehicles.
Therefore, in this thesis we propose four different schemes which restrict the infor-
mation applications can obtain from vehicles. The first scheme addresses the prob-
lem how a vehicle can authenticate itself privacy preserving based on attributes at an
application without revealing all its attributes. The second scheme provides a solu-
tion for the question how two vehicles can authenticate each other for an application
and exchange confidential data without disclosing their identity. The third scheme
obfuscates the identity of a vehicle while sharing sensor data with a central server.
The fourth scheme is related to the question how data can be distributed by a central
server to all vehicles equipped with a particular application and located within a cer-
tain area without tracking the vehicles and knowing their subscribed applications. In
addition, we outline how these schemes can be combined.
We demonstrate that each scheme is practical by presenting prototype implemen-
tations. Additionally, we simulate the second and third scheme in order to assess the
impact on the vehicles privacy.

Zusammenfassung
Zwei aktuelle Trends in der Automobilindustrie sind einerseits die zunehmende Ver-
netzung der Fahrzeuge und andererseits das automatisierte Fahren. Durch ersteres
wird es ermöglicht, verschiedene Anwendungen im Fahrzeug zu nutzen. Diese An-
wendungen können auf Fahrzeuge mit bestimmten Eigenschaften wie Hersteller oder
Modell beschränkt sein.
Das automatisierte Fahren benötigt Informationen über die voraus liegende Stre-
cke, welche über eine Anwendung bereitgestellt werden. Um die Straßeninforma-
tionen auf aktuellem Stand zu halten, stellen die vernetzten Fahrzeuge Sensordaten
bereit, die schließlich auf einem zentralen Server gesammelt werden. Da diese Daten
eine begrenzte räumliche und zeitliche Gültigkeit haben muss das Fahrzeug auch die
zugehörigen Zeit- und Positionsinformationen bereitstellen
Durch die Weitergabe von Positionsdaten können jedoch beispielsweise Bewe-
gungsprofile erstellt oder sensible Orte identifiziert werden. Daher ist es ein kri-
tischer Aspekt, welche Informationen die verschiedenen Anwendungen über die
Fahrzeuge preisgeben.
Deshalb werden in dieser Arbeit vier Verfahren vorgestellt, um die weitergegebe-
nen Informationen gezielt einzuschränken: Das erste Verfahren beschäftigt sich mit
der Frage, wie sich ein Fahrzeug bei gleichzeitiger Wahrung der Privatsphäre, ba-
sierend auf Attributen für eine Anwendung, authentifizieren kann, ohne alle seine
Eigenschaften zu offenbaren. Das zweite Verfahren erlaubt es, dass sich zwei Fahr-
zeuge gegenseitig für eine Anwendung authentifizieren und vertrauliche Daten aus-
tauschen, ohne ihre Identität zu offenbaren. Das dritte Verfahren verschleiert die
Identität eines Fahrzeuges, welches Sensordaten an einen zentralen Server sendet.
Das vierte Verfahren ermöglicht es einem Server, Informationen an alle Fahrzeuge
mit einer speziellen Anwendung in einem bestimmten Gebiet zu senden, ohne den
Standort der Fahrzeuge oder die installierten Anwendungen zu kennen. Zusätzlich
zeigen wir, wie diese Verfahren miteinander kombiniert werden können.
Mithilfe prototypischer Implementierungen demonstrieren wir, dass jedes dieser
Verfahren praxistauglich ist. Für das zweite und dritte Verfahren führen wir zur
Beurteilung der Auswirkungen auf die Privatsphäre zusätzlich Simulationen durch.
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1 | Introduction
’The auto industry is poised for more change in the
next five to ten years than it’s seen in the past 50’
Marry Barra, 2015
Marry Barra gave this statement as CEO of General Motors at the 2015 Code
Conference. Among others, connected vehicles and automated driving will drive this
change. However, both introduce privacy risks for the driver which have to be solved.
In this thesis we propose solutions to protect the privacy. Before outlining these risks,
we will first describe the terms connected vehicles and automated driving.
A connected vehicle is able to communicate with entities located in the Inter-
net. First, vehicles provided simple services like driving directions or emergency
assistance via mobile networks [GM 01]. Nowadays, vehicles provide all kinds of
services like real time traffic information, advanced diagnostics, news, or Internet
access [BMW], [GM]. Some systems allow drivers to even install applications form
a marketplace [GM14].
These marketplaces allow users to install convenience, entertainment, or even
safety applications. Convenience applications might allow the passengers to, e.g.,
reserve parking lots, get periodic diagnostic reports, or pay automated at tolling sta-
tions [CON15b] [GM] [ETS09b]. Entertainment applications enable music stream-
ing, web browsing, or even video on demand services. Applications to enhance the
safety might provide weather hazard warnings, traffic jam information, or wrong
way driver warnings [ETS09b] [JH11].
When a vehicle takes partly or fully control of driving, it is called automated
driving [VDA15]. Different levels of automated driving exist, from assisted to full
automation. Some development vehicles with a high level of automation already
exist [ZBS+14], [Urm14]. One important source of information for automated driv-
ing vehicles are up-to-date high-precision maps. They contain detailed information
about the curves, lanes, traffic signs, road works, or traffic lights. Therefore, all these
vehicles will be equipped with an application, in order to get this information from a
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Figure 1.1.: Current and future example applications of connected vehicles
central server. Some provider for detailed up to date map data already exist [HER16].
However, the map data needs to be kept up to date. Old data might increase
the number of unclear situations a vehicle encounters. This increases the risk of
accidents. To keep the data up to date, built in sensors like camera or wheel sensor
of the vehicle can be exploited. A camera can for example detect changed traffic
signs or lane marks. A wheel sensor can detect changes in the surface. Detected
changes can then be send to a central server. The server can aggregate the data
received from different vehicles. Afterwards, it might send the changed information
to all vehicles located in the relevant area [Dub15].
Finally, future vehicles will support users in basic driving tasks by automation
but also in strategic driving efficiency and convenience areas, e. g. by parking lot
reservation services or entertainment. This way, automatic driving in combination
with connected vehicle will change future driver experience. Different current and
future applications used by connected vehicles are illustrated in Figure 1.1.
In the sequel, we first motivate why the solutions to protect the privacy of vehicles
and drivers proposed in this thesis are necessary. Afterwards we outline the require-
ments of the vehicles and central servers on such a system. Finally, we conclude the
introduction with the outline of the thesis and our contributions.
1.1. Motivation
Automated driving and connected vehicle applications provide great potentials to
improve traffic safety and driving convenience. However, they also introduce privacy
risks on sensible information about the vehicle and driver. These risks originate both
from direct communication between vehicles and from communication to central
servers.
2 Anonymous Authenticated Car-to-X Communication
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Figure 1.2.: Communication system
To enable a direct communication between vehicles a special Wireless Local Area
Network (WLAN), called Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC) can be
applied. For the communication with a central server mobile networks or DSRC via
infrastructure might be exploited. A vehicle equipped with multiple communica-
tion technologies might always select the most suitable one if multiple are available.
Possible factors which influence the selection are the provided Quality of Service
and transmission costs [WK13]. If vehicles communicate with other vehicles, the
infrastructure, and central servers it is called Car-to-X (C2X) communication. Sys-
tems that allow this kind of communication are part of Intelligent Transportation
Systems (ITS). Each vehicle participating in the system is called ITS Vehicle Sta-
tion (IVS), the server of an application ITS Central Station (ICS). This communica-
tion system is illustrated in Figure 1.2.
Different areas of applications exist: convenience, entertainment, and safety. The
exchange of data for safety applications between IVSs via DSRC has already been
well studied [ETS09b] [sim13] [DRI14]. In contrast, we focus in this thesis on the
distribution of non-safety data between IVSs and the general communication with
ICSs.
Some applications might restrict their usage to IVSs with certain attributes like a
specific brand or charge a fee for service usage. In order to support these restrictions,
the application or the marketplace needs to validate the attributes of the IVSs. These
attributes might include sensible data like the brand, model, sensors or even the
production date of the IVS. A naive solution to validate the attributes would be that
the application or marketplace is aware of all attributes of an IVS.
An application might be interested in sensor data of its subscribed IVSs to update
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the map information it provides. Later on it aggregates this data and distributes the
results to other IVSs in the relevant geographic area. The data to be reported, like
road works or changed traffic signs, has to be recognized by the built in sensors of the
IVS first. Afterwards, the IVS authenticates itself at the ICS and sends the reported
data to it. Each detected change in the provided street data is spatial and temporal
limited. A weather hazard or the start of road works are for example restricted to
a fixed point. Furthermore, these events are only relevant for a limited period of
time. Danger from an icy road in the morning might for example disappear if the
temperature increases during the day. Therefore, an IVS needs to send the location
and time of the detected change together with the changed information to the ICS.
Furthermore, the ICS needs to ensure the data is sent from a valid IVS. Therefore,
the data needs also to be authenticated.
After the ICS received the changed data, it distributes information updates to all
IVSs located in the relevant geographic area. A common means to identify the
right recipients for message dissemination is to keep track of the location of all
IVSs [JRX11] [FWZ12]. Each time data has to be distributed, the sender looks
up all IVSs located in this area and transmits the data to them.
To get up to date data IVSs might also exchange data directly with each other. This
communication needs also to be authenticated. Otherwise an IVS will not trust the
data. This data may influence automated driving maneuvers and therefore the safety
of the driver and his environment. The authentication might be done by applying
certificates and digital signatures. Furthermore, some data might be confidential and
require additional protection.
If an application or marketplace is aware of all attributes of an IVS this informa-
tion might be exploited in order to harm the driver. An application provider might
for example charge a higher price for the same application to drivers of more expen-
sive vehicles [HSL+14]. An attacker could also exploit this information to identify
certain vehicle models he is aiming to steal. The transmitted sensor data furthermore
contains sensible information. Without a suitable protection this data might be ac-
cessed and misused by third parties. Since the data is only valid for a small area, it
is tagged with a geographic location. Additionally, the data includes the collection
time. Even if the data is not tagged with a time, an ICS could record the point in time
when it received the data. Subsequently, the ICS is able to record the visited loca-
tions of the reporting IVS. In addition, the distribution of data in certain geographic
areas may also leak the position of the IVSs.
A vehicle is a personal object, which is taken to sensible locations like home, work
or hospitals. If position data is sent to or collected by an ICS, it is possible to create
movement profiles of the driver or to identify often visited locations [Kru07]. If the
location samples are furthermore tagged with time, other sensible information like
speeding can be detected [Lae15].
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An attacker might also misuse the identity included in the authenticated messages
exchanged directly between IVSs to track an IVS.
Hence, it is critical, which information IVSs reveal. Attributes as well as their
identity or location and time information might be exploited in order to harm the
driver. However, the attributes of an IVS or the reported position data do not neces-
sary need to be linked to the identity of the IVS. More sophisticated mechanisms as
the outlined above might be applied in order to prevent the described risks.
We propose different schemes to limit the information third parties can get from
an IVS in this thesis. These schemes protect the privacy of the IVSs and ensure the
authenticity of the transmitted data at the same time. We developed a system, where
an IVS can authenticate for applications based on attributes by only revealing the
necessary ones. Furthermore, we propose a mechanism to hide the originating IVS
of reported sensor data. We also present a scheme which allows the dissemination
of data to all IVSs running a specific application and located in a certain geographic
region without tracking the IVS. In addition, we propose an anonymous authenti-
cated key agreement protocol which allows two IVSs to authenticate each other and
exchange confidential data without revealing their identity.
1.2. Requirements and Challenges
In the sequel we outline the most important requirements of the ICS and IVS in the
detailed communication system.
For an ICS it is important that all data received from IVSs is authenticated. If the
data is not authenticated, it would not be possible to determine how trustworthy it
is. If sensor data is reported from an IVS the ICS needs to know its exact position in
order to process it. The communication needs also be secured in a way that no third
entity is able to extract the transmitted data. Another requirement of the ICS is the
reception of up to date data. Therefore, the end-to-end delay for the communication
should be minimized. If the transmission delay is lower, the ICS is able to distribute
the data fast enough to other IVSs in the relevant geographic area. To disseminate
data to all subscribed IVSs present in the area a suitable mechanism is necessary. In
order to encourage a possible ICS to offer an application it is necessary to provide
a way to bill the subscribed IVSs for their application usage. Some ICSs might fur-
ther aim in offering their application only to IVSs with certain properties. Possible
properties are the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM), brand, and sensor avail-
ability. Furthermore, information like the IVS manufacturing date are of interest to,
e. g., give special offers to new IVSs. Therefore, the system must offer some kind of
service to enable an ICS to check the attributes of the IVSs. To get more subscribers,
the ICS aims in a simple, efficient mechanism to advertise its applications. Further-
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more, the system should be able to scale for a huge amount of IVSs as receivers of
messages. ITS applications can be of interest for several millions of IVSs.
One very important requirement of the IVS is its privacy. Different privacy types
exist [FWF13]. Several of them are relevant in the outlined system: identity, commu-
nication, location and space, and association. The IVS aims in hiding its identity to
every entity, which does not require it. An ICS which offers for example a weather
application does not need to know the identity of the subscribed IVSs. The iden-
tity also includes its characteristics like sensors and features. Whenever applications
require certain attributes of the IVSs, only the necessary information should be pro-
vided to the ICS. The communication shall also ensure the privacy of the IVS. An
attacker shall not be able to get the payload transmitted between the IVS and an ICS.
Furthermore, the privacy of location and space is important for the IVS. An ICS
should not be able to track an IVS by its reported data or require periodic location
samples. All functions should be designed in a way that this is not possible to track
an IVS. The last relevant privacy aspect of the IVS to the outlined system is the
privacy of association. It shall not be possible for any entity to obtain information
of the applications which an IVS is subscribed to. Because of cost pressure current
IVSs feature only a limited computational power. Therefore, only the necessary op-
erations should be executed on the IVS. All other operations should be offloaded
to static entities with more computational power, if possible. In order to identify
new applications of interest, an IVS should be able to search for new applications.
Another requirement of the IVS is the possibility to ensure that it is really communi-
cating with the ICS. Otherwise an attacker might send false information to IVSs or
an IVS might send confidential data to an attacker.
The ICS requires up to date authenticated data only relevant in a small area. Fur-
thermore, mechanisms to restrict the subscribers by certain attributes and dissemi-
nate data to IVSs located in a certain area are required. On the other hand, the IVS
requires privacy, which includes hiding of the own identity, location and space, and
associations. Therefore, the requirements of the ICS and IVS are conflicting. This
introduces different challenges to the communication system:
C.1 How can the ICS ensure that an IVS features certain attributes, while an IVS
aims in hiding its attributes?
C.2 How can the data sent from IVSs be authenticated, and their identities be pro-
tected at the same time?
C.3 How can the visited locations of an IVS be protected, while reporting sensor
data tagged with location information to an ICS?
C.4 How can data be distributed to IVSs located in a specific geographic area,
without tracking their movements?
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Table 1.1.: Aligned and conflicting requirements of ICS and IVS
ICS IVS Challenge
Confidentiality Privacy of communication -
Application advertising Search for applications -
Restriction by attributes Privacy of the identity C.1
Authenticated data Privacy of the identity C.2
Location tagged data Privacy of location and space C.3
Geographical data dissemination Privacy of location and space C.4
However, some of the requirements are also aligned. The ICS requires for exam-
ple a mechanism to offer services and the IVS a mechanism to search for services.
Both entities also aim in a secured communication. A summary of the aligned and
conflicting requirements is given in Table 1.1. In this thesis we provide solutions to
the outlined challenges without violating the other requirements.
1.3. Structure and Contributions
Basic knowledge of different security algorithms, protocols, and mechanisms is pro-
vided in Chapter 2. It furthermore gives an introduction to C2X communication and
the Multimedia Broadcast Multicast Service (MBMS).
Chapter 3 reviews the state of the art for the proposed schemes.
The following four chapters propose different solutions to the outlined challenges.
Each scheme protects a different communication scenario: the privacy preserving
authentication at an application, the secure authenticated communication between
IVSs, the reporting of data without leaking the originating IVS, and the anonymous
distribution of data from an ICS to all registered IVSs located in a geographic area.
In Chapter 4 we propose a system which allows an IVS to authenticate at an ICS
anonymously based on attributes. This system allows an IVS to prove the possession
of attributes while protecting its identity (Challenge C.1). Furthermore, it allows an
IVS to authenticate at an ICS while hiding its real identity (Challenge C.2). The sys-
tem applies Anonymous Credentials (ACs) to obtain Authentication Tickets (ATs)
from a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for a specific application. ACs allow to re-
strict the IVSs exploiting an application by attributes. An ICS defines the attributes
which an IVS must possess in order to obtain ATs for the application. When an IVS
wants to get ATs for this application, it proves them by its AC, without revealing
the other attributes or its identity. These ATs might then be exploited to authenticate
for this application. Furthermore, no entity is able to figure out the identity of the
IVS employing the ATs. These tickets are issued in a way that it is not possible to
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exploit them at any other application than the intended one. All other applications
will reject the ATs. Furthermore, the system supports different methods to bill the
usage of applications. We evaluate its suitability by a prototype implementation. In
summary, the scheme protects the privacy of the IVS and enables at the same time
authentication and access restriction by attributes.
When confidential data is exchanged between two IVSs both have to authenticate
each other for the application first. However, they aim at hiding their identity at the
same time (Challenge C.2). We present in Chapter 5 a novel anonymous authenti-
cated key agreement protocol to enable a confidential exchange of data between two
IVSs exploiting the same application while hiding their identity. It is based on the
Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES) and ring signatures. ECIES
is exploited to agree on a symmetric encryption key between the IVSs to exchange
confidential application data. Ring signatures are applied to hide the identity during
authentication. To authenticate each other for the application the IVSs exploit the
ATs introduced in the previous chapter. We show by simulation that ring signatures
prevent an attacker from identifying the participating IVSs. Furthermore, we cre-
ated a prototype implementation to evaluate the protocol on real vehicles. Therefore,
this chapter solves the challenge of a privacy preserving confidential data exchange
between two IVSs.
When an IVS reports data to an ICS it aims at protecting its privacy of location
and space. The ICS might however require sensor data tagged with location and
time (Challenge C.3). In Chapter 6 we exploit the protocol outlined in Chapter 5
to exchange recorded sensor data between IVSs prior to sending them to an ICS.
By exchanging the sensor data, it is no longer possible for the ICS to determine the
origin IVS of the data. Therefore, it is no longer possible to assign the data to a
specific IVS and, e. g., track an IVS or create movement profiles. We propose two
different strategies on how to exchange the data between IVSs before sending it to
the ICS. Furthermore, we created a simulation scenario to assess the impact on the
privacy. In addition, we successfully run one strategy on real vehicles. This scheme
enables an IVS to report sensor data tagged with time and position to an ICS while
protecting its privacy of location and space.
ICSs aim at distributing data to all registered IVSs located in a certain geographic
area. The IVSs however do not want to reveal their positions (Challenge C.4). In
Chapter 7 we outline an anonymous geocast scheme which solves this challenge.
This scheme allows an ICS to send messages to all IVSs running a particular appli-
cation and located in a certain geographic region. This is done without the knowl-
edge of the IVSs present in the target area. Furthermore, this scheme does not track
the applications installed by an IVS. Moreover, it supports different communication
technologies like Long Term Evolution (LTE) and DSRC for distribution. We also
implemented it on real devices to show its suitability on real world scenarios. There-
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fore, it enables an ICS to distribute data to all registered IVSs located in a specific
geographic area without hurting their privacy.
Finally, Chapter 8 concludes this thesis with a summary and identifies areas of
future research.
All developed concepts have already been published by the author of this thesis.
The relevant publications for each scheme are cited in the respective chapter. In ad-
dition to the publications this thesis outlines how the different schemes relate to each
other and can be combined. Furthermore, enhancements, additional evaluations, and
more detailed descriptions are presented in this thesis. Text passages taken out of
cited own publications are original work of the author of this thesis.
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2 | Foundations
In this chapter we first define the term privacy and describe the privacy aspects we
aim to protect in this thesis. Afterwards, we briefly describe the security mechanism
employed in this thesis. Then, for the application of these mechanisms we give an
introduction in C2X communication. Finally, we describe how multicast messages
can be distributed in LTE.
2.1. Privacy
Different definitions of privacy exist [WB90][Wes67][FWF13]. In general privacy
can be seen as the right to determine which personal information are shared with
which entities. Companies are interested in this personal information to process
and get a benefit out of it. However, the information belongs to the user. Because
this information can be exploited to harm the user, he is not willing to provide it.
Therefore, the privacy has to be protected. In order to properly protect the privacy of
an individual it hast to be determined how the privacy is threatened first.
The authors of [FWF13] categorize privacy in seven different types: privacy of
the person, privacy of behaviour and action, privacy of communication, privacy of
data and image, privacy of thoughts and feelings, privacy of location and space, and
privacy of association (including group privacy). They are defined by the authors as
follows:
The privacy of the person covers the protection of body functions and
characteristics like genetic codes and biometrics. The protection of per-
sonal sensitive topics like political activities, religious practices, or sexual
preferences and habits are encompassed by the privacy of behavior and
action. Privacy of communication intents to prevent communication in-
terception, the use of bugs, directional microphones, or the recording and
access to transmitted data. Privacy of data and image aims in giving peo-
ple control over their data and make it not automatically available to other
individuals and organizations. The right of people not to share and reveal
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their thoughts and feelings is covered by the privacy of thoughts and feel-
ings. The privacy of location encompasses the right to move in public
space without being tracked, identified, or monitored. Individuals right to
associate with anyone without being monitored is covered by the privacy
of association (including group privacy).
The relevant types of privacy for the outlined system are the privacy of the person,
privacy of communication, privacy of location and space, and privacy of association.
In the sequel we outline, why they are relevant for the outlined system.
Even if an IVS is not a person, the privacy of the person can still be applied. Most
of the time an IVS is operated by the same person. Moreover, the IVS possesses
attributes, which need to be protected from third parties. In addition to the definition
in [FWF13] we also consider the privacy of the identity as part of the privacy of the
person. Therefore, an IVS also aims in hiding its identity from third parties which
do not require to know it.
In the outlined system sensitive, confidential, and even private data might be trans-
mitted between the different entities. Therefore, the privacy of communication has to
be protected. A third party with access to this data might exploit it in order to harm
the different entities.
If an entity gets location samples of IVSs, it can create movement profiles. Fur-
thermore, IVSs are taken by the driver to sensitive locations like home, work place,
or medicals. From this information it is possible to derive the identity of the driver.
The obtained information might then be exploited to harm the driver. Therefore, the
privacy of location and space is important in the outlined system.
The driver of an IVS can install applications for additional services like parking
lot reservation, toll payment, or music streaming. This can be seen as the association
to the group of users of this application. A third entity might exploit this information
in order to discriminate the user by, e.g., charge higher prices for other services or
excluding him from offers. Therefore, the privacy of the driver can be harmed in the
outlined system, if the privacy of association is not protected.
For each considered communication scenario in this thesis we outline the affected
types of privacy. Furthermore, we also describe how the proposed schemes protect
each affected type of privacy.
k-Anonymity
It is difficult to decide based on given data whether an entity is anonymous or not.
To overcome this issue Sweeney defined in [Swe02] K-ANONYMITY as follows:
k-anonymity is a metric for the anonymity of an entity, where k denotes
the number of entities it is indistinguishable from.
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We exploit this metric in order to measure the anonymity of the IVSs in our de-
veloped schemes.
2.2. Security and Cryptography
Whenever a communication needs to be secured, cryptographic mechanisms are
necessary. Two different types of cryptography exist, SYMMETRIC and ASYMMET-
RIC [Buc04]. They can be defined as follows:
When applying symmetric cryptography, the same key is applied to en-
crypt and decrypt the data. Therefore, the key needs to be kept private.
Asymmetric cryptography uses different keys for encrypting and decrypt-
ing data, called private and public key. They are mathematically related to
each other. The public key is applied to encrypt the data. This key is public
available. The private key is exploited to decrypt cypher text encrypted
with the corresponding public key. This key is kept private. Everyone with
access to this key can decrypt the data.
An attacker with access to the public key is not able to derive the corresponding
private key.
Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Crpytography
The advantages of symmetric over asymmetric cryptography is the more efficient
calculation. When applying asymmetric cryptography complex and resource expen-
sive operations are necessary. Therefore, the calculation takes longer or more pow-
erful hardware is necessary. However, the disadvantage of symmetric cryptography
is the key exchange. The applied key has to be exchanged over a secure channel.
Everyone eavesdropping the key is able to decrypt the exchanged data. When asym-
metric cryptography is applied no secure channel is necessary. There the public key
is no sensitive information. Another disadvantage of symmetric cryptography is the
key management. Because the same key is applied for encryption and decryption, a
unique key is necessary for each communication partner. If a system consists of n
participants, n(n−1)/2 keys are necessary when everyone wants to communication
with everyone else. When asymmetric cryptography is applied, only the own private
and the public key of each communication partner is necessary.
Therefore, asymmetric cryptography is normally applied to exchange a symmetric
encryption key between two entities. The exchanged data is then encrypted with this
symmetric key. In this way the key exchange problem is solved by asymmetric cryp-
tography and the communication partners can benefit from the lower computational
overhead of symmetric cryptography. In this thesis Advanced Encryption Stan-
dard (AES) [NIS] is always applied as the symmetric encryption algorithm. Asym-
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metric algorithms based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) feature a shorter key
length in comparison to other cryptographic problems while maintaining the same
level of security. In order to further reduce the signature size, elliptic curve point
compression [VMA00] can be applied. Because the channel capacity in C2X com-
munication is very limited ECC is exploited when possible. Therefore, algorithms
based on ECC are preferred in this thesis.
Digital Signatures
Besides confidentiality, which is ensured by encryption, it is also desirable to authen-
ticate a communication and ensure its integrity. For this, DIGITAL SIGNATURES can
be used [Buc04]. They can be defined as follows:
Digital signatures are based on asymmetric cryptography. In compar-
ison to encryption the private key of an entity is exploited by the signer in
order to create the digital signature. A verifier can then validate the signa-
ture by applying the public key. After validating the signature, the verifier
is convinced of the authenticity that the message is from the sender, and
integrity that the message was not altered, of the message.
A common algorithm for digital signatures based on ECC is Elliptic Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [JMV01]. When applying symmetric cryptography,
a Message Authentication Code (MAC) can be created in order to ensure the integrity
of the transmitted data.
Digital Certiﬁcates
When applying asymmetric cryptography, it is necessary to ensure that a public key
belongs to a certain entity. The identity of a public key owner cannot be derived from
the key itself. This can be however achieved by DIGITAL CERTIFICATES [Buc04].
They can be defined as follows:
In order to assigning a public key to an entity, the public key is
signed together with identity information, like an email address, from
a trusted third party. The information together with the signature is
called digital certificate.
Then everyone who trusts the third party can verify that the public key belongs
to the claimed entity. Besides the identity a digital certificate can also contain other
information about the entity.
Public Key Infrastructure
It is difficult to decide if a third party issuing a certificate is trustworthy. In principle
everyone can issue a digital certificate containing a public key with any identity. In
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Entity
Intermediate CA Intermediate CA
Root CA
Figure 2.1.: Structure of a PKI
order to better decide whether an issuer of a certificate is trustworthy PKIS can be
used [Buc04]. They can be defined as follows:
PKIs are trustworthy third parties issuing certificates. They verify if a
public key belongs to the claimed identity.
The basic structure of an PKI is depicted in Figure 2.1. They consist of different
entities where each is called a Certificate Authority (CA). One of them is called
Root CA. This is the so called trust anchor. Generally, an entity trusts this Root CA.
Normally, this CA issues digital certificates for so called Intermediate CAs. These
Intermediate CAs issue certificates either to other Intermediate CAs or to be certified
entities. Since a verifier of a digital certificate trusts the Root CA, he also trusts the
Intermediate CAs. When the Intermediate CAs are trusted, their issued certificates
are also trusted for the same reason. The expansion of the trustworthiness from a
Root CA to the single entities is called chain of trust.
Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme
Whenever two communication partners know and trust the public keys of each other
but do not possess a symmetric encryption key for confidential communication, they
can exploit ECIES [IEE04].
ECIES allows two parties with the help of their trusted public keys to
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agree on a symmetric encryption key.
The initiator of ECIES needs besides his own key pair the public key of the re-
ceiver. From this information he derives a key. This key is applied to encrypt a sym-
metric encryption key and create a MAC for validation. Its own public key (V ), the
MAC (T ), and the encrypted key (C) are then passed to the other party. The receiver
needs only the provided information and his own private key in order validate the
MAC and decrypt the symmetric encryption key. Afterwards both parties can start
a confidential communication encrypted with the symmetric encryption key. In this
thesis ECIES is always applied as specified for C2X communication in [IEE13b].
Blind Signatures
BLIND SIGNATURES can be defined as follows:
When applying blind signatures, the creator disguises the content of
the message to be signed before forwarding it to the signer. Therefore, the
signer of the message does not know the actual content of the message he is
signing. The resulting signature over the blinded message can be however,
applied to verify the blinded message as well as the original message.
Blind signatures were introduced in [Cha82]. When applying blind signatures, the
creator and signer of a message are two different entities.
An example use case for blind signatures is digital money. There, the customer
sends a blinded message to the bank. The bank then signs this message on reception
and deposits the bank account of the customer. Later on the customer can apply the
received signature to show that it is valid for the message he possesses to a shop
owner and pay for products. The shop owner can then exchange the message with
its signature into money at the bank. The bank only knows that it is valid money but
is not able to link it to the customer it was issued for.
Ring Signatures
RING SIGNATURES can be defined as follows:
A ring signature hides the creator of a digital signature. A verifier
cannot distinguish between n possible signers.
In order to create a ring signature, the signer takes his private key and the public
keys of n−1 others. Afterwards, the signer sends the signature together with its own
public key and the n− 1 public keys of the others to the verifier. The verifier takes
all public keys as input in order to verify the signature. As result the verifier learns
if the signature is valid or not. However, the verifier cannot identify the signer of the
message. He only learns that the signer is in possession of at least one private key
corresponding to an applied public key, but not which. Therefore, ring signature are
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applied to hide the identity of the signer in a group of possible signers. Ring sig-
natures were introduced in [RST01]. In this thesis we exploit the variant proposed
in [LLZ+07]. This variant is based on ECC, which is also applied in C2X commu-
nication. Therefore, IVSs will feature hardware, which allows fast calculations of
elliptic curve operations.
Anonymous Credential Systems
ANONYMOUS CREDENTIAL SYSTEMS were introduced by Chaum in [Cha85]. They
can be defined as follows:
Anonymous credential systems are the digital equivalent of an id, bank,
or library card. These cards have in common that they only reveal the
attributes necessary for the purpose.
An id card consists of information like the name of the holder, place and date of
birth, and address. A bank card only reveals the name and banking account of the
holder, while a library card might only reveal the library id of the user besides his
name.
An anonymous credential system allows an entity to decide which attributes are
revealed to a verifier, called partial information disclosure. A trustworthy issuer
provides an AC to all entities in the system. These ACs denote a set of attributes
certified by the issuer. An attribute consists of a key and a value. Possible attributes
for an IVS are the color, type, brand, production date, and features and sensors like
an electric engine, traffic sign recognition, or Bluetooth.
With this AC the entity can prove to a verifier that he or she possesses certain
attributes certified in the credential. To convince the verifier, the entity derives a
token that only contains the subset of attributes it wants to prove, called minimum
information disclosure. So, the verifier learns only the necessary attributes of the
entity. An entity can also prove that the content of a cipher text produced for a third
party is the value of a certain attribute without revealing the attribute to the verifier.
It is possible to prove predicates like or, and, greater than, smaller than and equals
over the attributes. ACs also provide multi-show unlinkability. Several proofs of the
same attributes cannot be linked to the same entity. Each time another token is being
derived.
As an example, Equation 2.1 shows how one may check if an IVS is manufactured
by GM, but without leaking the brand of the IVS. This is realized by checking for
all GM brands, if the attribute brand equals to the name of the brand. The derived
token then indicates, if the equation is true or false and therefore reveals only the
manufacturer and not the brand to the verifier.
brand = ”Opel”∨brand = ”Chevrolet”∨brand = ... (2.1)
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Equation 2.2 can be applied to prove that an IVS is not older than x days. From
the result a verifier learns that the IVS is manufactured less than x days ago, but not
the exact date.
production_date > today− x (2.2)
So called accumulators can be exploited to enable revocation for Anonymous Cre-
dentials [CKS09]. An accumulator stores the identifiers of all valid ACs. If an
Anonymous Credential shall be revoked, the identifier of this AC is removed from
the accumulator. Each time an entity creates a proof it also proves that the identifier
of its AC is stored in the accumulator.
Two different implementations of anonymous credential systems exist. U-Prove
from Microsoft [PZ13] and idemix from IBM [CVH02]. In this thesis we exploit
idemix. It supported at the time of implementation multi-show unlinkability and se-
lective information disclosure, which is necessary for the considered use case. How-
ever, U-Proove did not support this features.
2.3. Car-to-X Communication
In future vehicles will not only get information from central servers.
In addition to the information obtained from central servers, vehicles
will exchange information directly with nearby vehicles, called Car-to-
Car (C2C) communication, and the infrastructure like traffic lights or traf-
fic signs, called Car-to-Infrastructure (C2I) communication. If vehicles
communicate with both, other vehicles and the infrastructure, it is called
C2X communication. Systems that allow this kind of communication are
called ITS. Each vehicle participating in the system is called IVS, the
server of an application ICS, and communicating infrastructure ITS Road-
side Station (IRS). If all of the stations - vehicle, roadside, or central - are
meant it is simply called ITS station.
The data exchanged between IVSs include their current position, direction, and
speed [ETS11a]. Also warnings about, e.g., hard breaking vehicles, slow vehicles,
or traffic jams ahead are exchanged [ETS10b]. The information exchanged with
IRSs includes the phase and timing of traffic lights [CEN15b] and information about
speed limits [CEN15a]. The thereby created ad-hoc network is called Vehicular Ad-
hoc NETwork (VANET). Because of the high mobility of the IVSs the topology of
the network changes frequently. Whenever IRSs are in communication range, they
are part of the ad-hoc network.
The infrastructure does not only consist of single IRSs. In fact, multiple IRSs can
be grouped into a so called IRS Network. All IRSs within this network are connected
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with each other to exchange data. Furthermore, the IRSs can be connected to the
Internet.
The applications of C2X communication can be safety or non-safety applications.
Examples for safety applications are the traffic jam ahead warning, wrong way driver
warning, weather hazard warning, or emergency electronic break light [ETS09b].
Examples for non-safety applications are the reservation of parking lots, payment of
toll, or music streaming. For applications which do not require a short time delay
mobile communication like Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS)
or LTE might also be exploited.
The communication between IVSs and between the IRSs and IVSs is based on
IEEE 802.11p [IEE10]. There exist dedicated communication channels for safety
and non-safety applications as well as for control information.
The communication is called DSRC in North America [AST10]. In Europe this
name was already introduced for tolling [CEN04]. Therefore, the communication
is named according to its frequency band ETSI ITS G5 A/B [ETS09a] whereas A
stands for the channels applied for safety applications and B for non-safety applica-
tions respectively.
The applied network to application layer standards also differ between the regions.
In North America the layers above IEEE 802.11p are specified by the IEEE 1609
family as Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments (WAVE) [IEE13a]. The ap-
plications are standardized in SAE J2735 [SAE16a]. For non-safety communica-
tion IPv6 [DH98] with TCP or UDP [Pos81][Pos80] can also be applied. The
development of the standards is driven by the Crash Avoidance Metrics Partner-
ship (CAMP).
In Europe different standards for C2X communications are substantially created
by European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI). They define the so,
called GeoNetworking [ETS10c]. Within this, different transport protocols like
BTP [ETS14b] and extensions for IPv6 [ETS11c] might be exploited. The applica-
tions are standardized individually [ETS11a][ETS10b][ETS10a]. For identification,
each application has a unique Application ID (AID). The further development is
driven by the Car-2-Car Communication Consortium (C2C-CC).
The different communication stacks for north America and Europe are illustrated
in Figure 2.2. This thesis focuses on the European standards. However, this does not
mean that the proposed schemes cannot be applied in North America. Furthermore,
if we talk about DSRC, we mean the C2X Communication and not tolling.
In the remainder of this section we first describe the structure of GeoNetwork-
ing. Afterwards we describe the format of the applied digital certificates. Then, we
describe the structure and working of an PKI for C2X communication. Finally, we
briefly describe the important messages standardized for safety communication.
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Figure 2.2.: C2X communication stacks in North America and Europe
2.3.1. GeoNetworking
Safety relevant use cases in VANETs like a traffic jam ahead warning or weather
hazard warning do not address a single IVS as a recipient of the message. Instead, a
geographic region where the message shall be disseminated is specified. If a region
is specified as destination, all IVSs in this geographical region are the recipients of
the message. For non-safety use cases, it is necessary to address a single receiving
IVS. Routing mechanisms in VANETs furthermore have to consider the frequent
topology changes caused by the high mobility of the IVSs.
To address these challenges, a routing mechanism called GEONETWORKING has
been developed and standardized in [ETS14a].
To be identifiable by other entities in the VANET, each IVS has a unique
GeoNetworking address. A IVS sending a GeoNetworking message always
includes its own GeoNetworking address and geographic position in the
message. If the message shall be sent to a single IVS, the last known po-
sition and GeoNetworking address of the receiving IVS is also included in
the message. When the message is relevant for all IVSs in a region, the ge-
ographical region where the message shall be distributed is also encoded
in the GeoNetworking message. The sender may also specify a maximum
hop limit to reach the receiver.
The structure of a GeoNetworking message is defined in [ETS14a]. It consists of
a Basic Header (BH) and a Secured Packet (SP). The Secured Packet can be further
divided in Header Fields (HF), Payload Fields (PF), and Trailer Fields (TF). The
Payload Fields are composed of a Common Header (CH), Extended Header (EH),
Transport Protocol (TP), and the actual Payload (P) of the GeoNetworking message.
This message structure is illustrated in Figure 2.3.
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Figure 2.3.: GeoNetworking message format
A more detailed view of the message format is given in Figure 2.4. It shows the
detailed message structure for all parts, except the Extended Header. The Extended
Header defines, if the message is Unicast or Broadcast. We describe the meaning
of each filed in the following. Afterwards we present the detailed structure of the
Extended Header for Broadcast and Unicast messages.
The Basic Header specifies the version (VERSION) of the GeoNetworking proto-
col, the next header (NH), the lifetime of the packet (LT) and the remaining hop limit
(RHL). For secured GeoNetworking messages the next header is always set to 2.
The Secured Package [ETS13] starts with the Secure Package Information (SPI),
which includes the protocol version (VERSON) followed by the applied security pro-
file (PROFILE) and length of the header fields (HF LENGTH). The security pro-
file defines the contents of the header, payload and trailer fields. Three profiles
defined by the standard. One for Cooperative Awareness Messages (CAMs), one
for Decentralized Environmental Notification Messages (DENMs), and one generic
profile. All of them contain payload and a signature as trailer field. Figure 2.4 shows
the generic profile. In the Header Fields it consists of the certificate of the sender
(SIGNER INFO), the generation time of the message (GENERATION_TIME), and
the generation location (GENERATION_LOCATION) of the sending IVS. To cor-
rectly parse the Payload Fields, the length of the fields and the type of each single
field is given as Payload Field Information (PFI) first. The payload type can be either
unsecured, signed, encrypted, signed_external, or signed_and_encrypted.
The Common Header is applied as standardized in [ETS14a]. The next header
(NH) is in general set to the Basic Transport Protocol (BTP-A) [ETS14b]. The
header type (HT) defines the routing of the message which corresponds to the type
of the Extended Header. The header sub type (HST) determines the shape of the
dissemination area defined in the Extended Header. It can be defined according the
application requirements as a circle, rectangle or ellipsoid. The Common Header
also includes the applied traffic class (TC), different flags (FLAGS), the length of the
GeoNetworking payload (PL) and the maximum hop limit (MHL).
The Extended Header can have different type. As mentioned previously, each of
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Figure 2.4.: Detailed GeoNetworking message format, without Extended Header
them as its own structure. We describe the structure of the Geographically-Scoped
Unicast (GUC) and Geographically-Scoped Broadcast (GBC) later.
For the Transport Protocol different choices such as the Basic Transport Protocol
(BTP) and IPv6 exist. However, in general the BTP is applied as illustrated. It con-
sists of a source (SOURCE_PORT) and a destination port (DESTINATION_PORT).
The Payload (PAYLOAD) contains the actual content of the message. The concluding
Trailer Fields contain the length of the trailer fields (TF LENGTH) and a signature
(SIGNATURE) over the complete Secured Package. The signature is applied using
ECDSA with National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) curve P256 and
SHA-256 as hash function.
Geographically-Scoped Unicast
The content of the Extended Header of a GUC message is given in Figure 2.5. It
contains of a sequence number (SN), to detect duplicate GeoNetworking packets
and indicate the index of the sent packet. Furthermore, it contains the position of
the source (SO PV) as Long Position Vector and the destination (DE PV) as Short
Position Vector [ETS14a].
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Geographically-Scoped Broadcast
The Extended Header of an GBC message also contains a sequence number (SN) and
the position of the source (SO PV) as Long Position Vector. It furthermore consists
of the description of the geographic area the message shall be distributed as defined
in [ETS11b]. The area is defined by the latitude (GEOAREAPOS_LATITUDE) and
longitude (GEOAREAPOS_LONGITUDE) of its geographic center, two distances
(DISTANCE_A and DISTANCE_B) to describe the size, and a rotation angle (AN-
GLE). This structure is illustrated in Figure 2.6.
2.3.2. Certiﬁcate Format
ITS stations exploit a special certificate format [ETS13] for C2X communication
over DSRC. Because of the limited channel capacity, it is optimized to have a small
size.
Three different profiles for certificate types are defined in [ETS13]. The types are
ATs, Enrolment Credentials (ECs), and CA certificates. ATs and ECs are exploited
by IVSs. The CA certificates are used by the different CAs of the PKI.
ECs are valid for a long time period. They are like an identifier of an IVS. Nor-
mally this certificate is generated at production. It is never exploited in communi-
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cation with other ITS stations. It is only used to request ATs from the PKI. In the
request, it is applied as the proof to be eligible to obtain ATs. The ATs are exploited
to communicate with other ITS stations. To prevent tracking, they are only valid for
a short time period and changed frequently.
CA certificates are used by the different entities of the PKI to ensure their role. In
the next section the single entities of the PKI and how an IVS obtains its EC and ATs
are described.
A certificate consists of a version information, signer information, subject infor-
mation, subject attributes, validity restrictions, and a signature.
The version specifies the version of the certificate. The signer information defines
the issuer of the certificate. They can be self-signed or contain the hash of the issuing
certificate.
The subject information specifies the type of the certificate. If it is an EC or AT
of an IVS, an CA certificate from an CA or a signer of a Certificate Revocation
List (CRL).
The subject attributes contain the properties of the ITS station. This includes the
keys for signing and encrypting messages, the assurance level, a list of AIDs and a
list of Service Specific Permissions (SSPs) for the referenced AIDs. The assurance
level defines how good the platform and private keys of the ITS station are protected.
Furthermore, it also specifies the confidence of this information. If the certificate is
of type AT, the list of AIDs indicates the applications which can be exploited with
this certificate. If it is from the type EC, it defines the applications an IVS can obtain
ATs for. Whenever the certificate is from the CA type, it defines the applications
these authorities can issue certificates for. The list of SSPs defines the permissions
for each of the applications.
The validity restrictions limit the geographic area and period in time a certificate
is valid. The last part of a certificate is a digital signature over all information created
by the issuer. As signature algorithm ECDSA with the NIST curve P256 is applied.
2.3.3. Public Key Infrastructure
An PKI for C2X communication in Europe consists, as illustrated by Figure 2.7 of a
Root CA, an Authorization Authority (AA), and an Enrolment Authority (EA). The
Root CA is the trust anchor. The EA issues the EC to the IVSs. This is done at time
of production. The AA issues the ATs to the IVSs. This process is repeated regularly.
ATs are only valid for a short period of time.
Different ways actually exist aimed to obtain the outlined ATs in order to send
safety relevant messages over ETSI ITS-G5A. One of the ways was developed by
the C2C-CC [BSS+11]. Another has been standardized by ETSI [ETS12b]. Also
more complex variants offering special features [KJP14] [WWKH13] have been pro-
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Figure 2.7.: PKI applied in C2X communication
posed. However, in all variants the IVS first requests an EC from the EA and later
on applies it to obtain ATs from the AA. We only discuss the former one, as the
concept we propose in Chapter 4 can be seen as an extension. Figure 2.7 illustrates
the single steps an IVS must complete prior to sending safety relevant messages. In
the following these steps are discussed in more detail.
Enrolment Certiﬁcate Request
First, the IVS has to request an EC from the EA. This is done in Step A1, where the
IVS sends an encrypted and signed message with its canonical certificate together
with a certificate request to the EA.
EncEA(SigIV S(canonical cert.,cert. request)) (A1)
Then, the EA validates the request and responses with the encrypted EC (Step A2).
After reception, the IVS decrypts, validates, and stores the EC.
EncEC(EC) (A2)
Authorization Tickets Request
After an IVS received its EC, it requests as illustrated in Figure 2.7 ATs at the AA. To
request ATs, the IVS first generates key-pairs to be certified, signs the corresponding
Anonymous Authenticated Car-to-X Communication 25
2.3 Car-to-X Communication
Public Keys (PKs) with its EC, encrypts the resulting signature and the EC for the
EA, and sends the PKs together with the encrypted payload to the AA (Step B1). The
EC is encrypted in order to hide the identity of the IVS from the AA. Furthermore,
the signature is created and encrypted in order to allow the EA to verify that the PKs
belong to the request and the encrypted EC is not just replayed.
PKs,EncEA(SigEC(PKs),EC) (B1)
Upon reception, the AA calculates the hash of the PKs and sends the hash value
together with the encrypted EC and signature over a secured channel to the EA
(Step B2).
H(PKs),EncIV S_EA(SigEC(PKs),EC) (B2)
Next, the EA decrypts the signature and EC to validate them (Step B3). After-
wards, it sends the result of the validation back to the AA (Step B4 depicted in
Figure 2.7).
OK or FAIL (B4)
If the result is positive, the AA issues the ATs to the IVS (Step B5). Otherwise, an
error is returned.
AT s or Error (B5)
After successful execution of these steps, the AA has knowledge about the ATs
issued to the IVS, but not its identity. On the other side the EA knows the identity
of the IVS, but not the issued ATs. Therefore, the knowledge of both entities is
necessary in order to link an AT to a certain IVS.
Authorization Tickets Usage
After the IVS received the ATs, it can start broadcasting signed messages for safety
applications over ETSI ITS G5A. This is illustrated by Step C in Figure 2.7. When
the validity period of the obtained ATs expires, the IVS needs to request new tickets
from the AA to continue sending valid messages.
An IVS is in possession of multiple ATs which are valid at the same time. To
protect its privacy an IVS frequently changes the AT it applies. Therefore, an attacker
who records the exchanged messages of IVSs is not able to link messages of the same
IVS whenever the AT is changed in between. Because of this feature ATs are also
called pseudonyms. In this thesis bother terms are applied as synonyms.
2.3.4. Messages
The most common messages in European VANETs are the CAM, DENM, and Service
Announcement Message (SAM).
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The CAM [ETS11a] is send periodically, up to 10 times a second. The
frequency depends on the speed and heading of the IVS. It contains gen-
eral status information about the sending IVS like position, speed, and
heading. CAMs are not forwarded if received. They are always single hop
messages.
DENMs [ETS10b] are event based. They warn the IVS about upcom-
ing dangerous situations, like the end of a traffic jam, hazardous weather
events, hard breaking IVSs, or wrong way drivers. The content of the mes-
sage are the event type and areas where the message shall be distributed
and is relevant. These messages can be multi hop messages, which are
forwarded by receiving IVSs.
SAM [ETS10a] messages are sent periodically in order to inform nearby
ITS stations about its services. It contains the list of services, offered by
the sending ITS station.
2.4. Multimedia Broadcast Multicast Service
The current high speed communication standard for mobile networks is
called LTE [3GP13a]. End user devices like smartphones and tablets are
called User Equipment (UE) and connect to the base stations of the mobile
network, called evolved Node B (eNodeB). The eNodeB itself is connected
to the core network of the Mobile Network Operator (MNO).
Over this network it is able to reach the Internet. This communication path is nor-
mally exploited when the UE exchanges data with entities in the Internet. All these
connections are normally unicast, where one UE exchanges data with one server
located in the Internet.
For some use cases unicast is not suitable. Several use cases require the trans-
mission of data to all or a group of UE. Whenever data shall be sent via broadcast
or multicast from a server in the Internet to all or a group of UEs MBMS can be
applied [3GP13b]. In the following we first describe the general working of MBMS,
followed by its architecture.
Each Content Provider aiming in distributing data to a group of or all UEs has to
register a MBMS User Service for each application it offers first. Afterwards, UEs
register for each User Service they are interested in. The data of a User Service is
distributed in one or multiple predefined MBMS service areas. Each of these areas
can consist of multiple eNodeBs. MBMS User Services are not available contin-
uously. Each session is advertised by a service announcement. Before the data is
transmitted a session start indicates that data is ready. A session stop is sent to the
UE when there is no more data to transmit. If a User Service is sent to UEs in multi-
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Figure 2.8.: Architecture of MBMS
ple service areas, different content can be distributed each of these areas. Then, one
session needs to be initialized for each different content. However, these areas can-
not overlap. The data provided by the content provider is sent once to all registered
UEs. MBMS supports traffic classes for background data, like software updates, and
streaming.
Figure 2.8 illustrates the entities involved in the MBMS data distribution and their
connections. These are namely the Broadcast Multicast Service Center (BM-SC),
Mobility Management Entity (MME), and MBMS-Gateway (MBMS-GW) within
the core network of the MNO. Furthermore, a Content Provider is necessary to
provide the data to the core network and eNodeBs which distribute the data to the
UEs.
The Content Provider sends its data to the BM-SC. On reception the BM-SC
processes the data. The BM-SC then sends control information like session start and
stop and the area along with the data to the MBMS-GW. The MBMS-GW splits up
the data and control information. The control information is forwarded to the MME,
which sends it to the responsible eNodeBs. The data is directly forwarded from the
MBMS-GW to the eNodeBs. We assume each eNodeB has an integrated Multicell
Coordination Entity (MCE).
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3 | Related Work
We review the related work in this chapter before proposing our schemes in the fol-
lowing chapters. We describe previous works in the field of anonymous credentials,
key agreement protocols, path hiding, and geocast.
3.1. Anonymous Credentials
ACs are exploited for various use cases. In the sequel we outline vehicular as well
as general applications.
PUCA [FKL16] exploits an AC system to request ATs for safety related commu-
nication from the AA. In the scheme an IVS first obtains an AC from the EA and
uses this AC later on to request unlinkable ATs from the AA. To revoke an IVS, dy-
namic accumulators and periodic no-show credentials are applied. Periodic no-show
credentials can be exploited at almost n times per time period. This prevents an IVS
from requesting more ATs in a time period than allowed by the system. However,
PUCA only changes the way of obtaining new ATs for safety-related communication
and how to revoke them. It does not consider ATs for non-safety applications. An
illustration of the scheme is given in Figure 3.1.
Singh [Sin12] applies anonymous credentials to anonymously authenticate mes-
sages in C2C communication. He utilized idemix for the implementation and pro-
posed two versions. The first one does not support revocation. However, the creden-
tials are only valid for a short period of time. The second version does not require
short term credentials for revocation. Instead, they exploit accumulators for revo-
cation. To ensure the same credential structure for all IVSs, they are obtained from
a central government organization. However, the author applied the scheme only
for safety messages, which are directly exchanged between IVSs. Furthermore, the
overhead to authenticate a message introduces a too large time delay for safety mes-
sages. Moreover, unlinkability between individual messages is undesirable for safety
use cases like intersection collision warnings.
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A protocol to enhance the privacy of electric vehicles communicating with the
charging infrastructure was proposed in [HPSK13] based on ACs and other crypto-
graphic schemes to extend the standardized protocol. The identity is kept private by
exploiting anonymous credentials to store charging contract details like the expira-
tion date.
The privacy-friendly smart environment proposed by Armac et al. [APPR09] also
exploits idemix to build an anonymous credentials system. The system uses a mo-
bile based application to extract user preferences for, e.g., lighting and favorite mu-
sic, when switching between different smart environments like home or hotels. Users
obtain an anonymous credential in order to authenticate for and use the different envi-
ronments. For each visited environment, only the necessary information is disclosed.
Therefore, this approach prevents the tracking of users in smart environments. Re-
quests of the same user at different visited locations cannot be linked.
Aimeur et al. introduced a privacy preserving e-learning system in [AHO08]. It
consists of a set of protocols exploiting anonymous credentials in order to preserve
the privacy in e-learning environments. They propose protocols for, e.g., course
registration or proofs for transcripts and degrees.
Different government funded projects like PRIME [PRI], ABC4Trust [ABC], and
FutureID [Fut] also show possible fields of application. They applied ACs to, for
example, allow an anonymous participation in an online courses evaluation at an
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university or limit the access to information shared within social networks.
3.2. Anonymous Key Agreement and
Authentication Protocols
In Chapter 5 we propose an anonymous authenticated key agreement protocol which
allows two IVSs to agree on a symmetric encryption key and prove their member-
ship of a certain group without revealing their identity. Furthermore, it reduces the
number of necessary ATs. In this section we review the related work.
The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) standard for security
in VANETs [IEE13b] applies ECIES in order to authenticate and encrypt the com-
munication between two IVSs. First the IVSs agree on a symmetric encryption key
by deriving it from their asymmetric keys embedded in the pseudonyms. This key
is then used to encrypt the messages exchanged between the IVSs. If an applica-
tion exploits ECIES, it has its own set of application-specific pseudonyms to agree
on a symmetric encryption key. To prevent tracking, the IVSs have to change all
their application-specific pseudonym at the same time. Therefore, each application
needs the same amount of pseudonyms. If an IVS possesses less pseudonyms for one
application, some of them will be applied with different pseudonyms of other appli-
cations. An attacker can then easily link the two different pseudonyms. An example
for this is given in Figure 3.2. In the upper part the vehicle only changes one of its
application-specific pseudonyms with the pseudonym for safety-related communica-
tion. Therefore, an attacker can easily link Pseudonym 1 to Pseudonym 2 because
they were both used with the same Pseudonym A1 from Application A. Furthermore,
the attacker can also link Pseudonym 3 to the same vehicle, because Pseudonym B2
was used also in combination with Pseudonym 2. When all pseudonyms are changed
at once, as illustrated in the lower part of Figure 3.2, it is not possible to link the
different pseudonyms to the same vehicle. The key agreement protocol proposed
in Chapter 5 reduces the amount of necessary application-specific pseudonyms in
contrast to a simplistic use of ECIES to prevent linking of pseudonyms.
The authors of [LLZ+07] propose ring signatures for anonymous routing in wire-
less ad-hoc networks. Their protocol applies ring signatures to hide the identity of the
entities while agreeing on an encryption key. However, they did not evaluate related
ring building strategies nor the size of the protocol nor multiple own pseudonyms.
In [FRH09] the authors advocate ring signatures in mobile ad-hoc networks for pri-
vacy preserving authentication of neighbor nodes. They did investigate ring building
strategies, but most of their strategies require either a central server or the nodes have
to be a-priori aware of the pseudonyms of all other nodes. In addition, these authors
only considered the case where each node has just one pseudonym and elaborated
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Figure 3.2.: Linkage by unchanged pseudonyms
a general formula to calculate the transmission overhead, but they did not evaluate
their suggestion.
If two parties aim to secretly identify whether they belong to the same group, then
they can use Secret Handshakes [BDS+03]. Secret Handshakes have the property
that even if the handshake fails, none of the communicating parties or an eavesdrop-
ping third party can discover the group of the communicating parties. A third party
is thus never able to identify the group of the two communication entities, even if
the protocol is executed successfully. To prevent an attacker from linking two differ-
ent handshakes, both communicating parties have to use a different pseudonym for
each handshake. Therefore, this scheme is similar to ECIES, but it has the additional
property that a third party is never able to unveil the group. However, group affil-
iation is no secret in C2C communication. IVSs broadcast the groups they belong
to periodically in SAMs to all other IVSs in communication range. The aim of the
protocol evaluated in Chapter 5 is to reduce the number of ATs necessary for each
application. Secret Handshakes are not suitable for this purpose because the same
amount of ATs is necessary as when ECIES is exploited.
When applying Group Signatures [CH91], a set of entities form a group. Each
member of the group has its own private key, which can be used to sign a message
on behalf of the group. In addition, there exists a public group key which can be
used to verify signatures created by group members. The verifier of a signature is
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not able to determine which member of the group created the signature. Each time a
member leaves the group information has to be distributed to all remaining members
of the group. This requirement obstructs the scaling in the considered use case where
vehicles frequently leave the group. In addition, one cannot assume that every IVS
has a constant online connection which is a prerequisite to get this information from
a central entity.
The Enhanced Privacy ID (EPID) from Intel [BL10] extends Direct Anonymous
Attestation (DAA) [BCC04] to anonymously authenticated devices. The system has
three roles: issuer, member, and verifier. The issuer creates the, possible blinded,
keys for the members and delivers it to them. The member applies its key to con-
vince the verifier that he is a member of the claimed group. In order to verify the
membership, the verifier applies a public group key. Therefore, this scheme is similar
to group signatures.
With Matchmaking Protocols [BG85] two members of the same group can authen-
ticate each other without leaking the group they belong to. However, this method
reveals the identity of the communicating entities. We, in contrast, aim to hide the
identity of the partners and not of the groups they are members of. Therefore, this
method is not suitable in our context.
In [KWC14] the authors propose an anonymous authentication scheme for mobil-
ity networks. They assume a mobile user who is registered to a home agent aiming
in exploiting the roaming service of a foreign agent. However, in order to work, their
scheme assumes a pre exchanged secret between the user and its home agent in order
to establish a secure authenticated channel. IVSs in VANETs normally meet IVSs
they never met before and unlikely meet again. Because of the huge number of IVSs
it does not scale to agree on a secret which each possible IVS beforehand. There-
fore, such schemes are not suitable to anonymously establish a secure authenticated
channel in C2C communication.
The authors of [CLLW08] exploit ring signatures and blind signatures to authen-
ticate a client at a server. Their protocol hides the identity of the client to the server,
whereas the server reveals its identity to the clients. However, in our use case both
communication partners aim at hiding their identity.
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) can be used to generate private keys. Ac-
cording to [FPK13] this reduces the amount of necessary secure storage to save the
keys. However, the number of ATs remains the same. In contrast the investigated
protocol in Chapter 5 reduces the number of ATs. This also reduces the amount of
secure storage, because less keys have to be saved. In addition, less ATs have to
be generated by the infrastructure, less have to be sent to the IVSs and less have to
be saved. However, PUFs can be used in addition to further reduce the amount of
necessary secure storage.
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3.3. Path Hiding
Different methods exist to hide the traveled path of entities. In this section we outline
some of these methods.
Pseudonyms as used for safety communication in VANETs can be applied to hide
the identity of a IVS. The IVS then changes its identity on a regular basis. Therefore.
the IVS will feature different identities at the start and end point. An example where
an IVS is driving from Mainz to Rüsselsheim is given in Figure 3.3. The identity of
the IVS is black when it starts in Mainz and is green when it arrives in Rüsselsheim.
It is not possible to link the two identities together. An observer in between would
even record blue or orange as the identity of the IVS. However, this is only effective,
if the attacker does not have access to all data of the IVS. In a scenario where all
data is sent to an IVS, an attacker has access to all data along the traveled route.
Therefore, this data can be exploited to reconstruct the path and sensitive locations
like the home or the workplace of a driver as demonstrated in [Kru07].
The authors of [CGR+11] propose path hiding strategies based on the exchange of
sensor data. They propose different strategies on how to exchange the data. However,
they do only consider participatory sensing applications for smart phones. Therefore,
they do not take the special characteristics of IVS into account. IVSs in a VANET
have a communication range of several hundred meters. The range of Bluetooth used
for direct communication between smart phones is much less. IVSs also move along
roads and meet each other more frequently.
As detailed in [Kru07] spatial cloaking can be used to drop all sensor samples
near sensitive locations. Then, only the data in non-sensitive locations is reported
34 Anonymous Authenticated Car-to-X Communication
to the central server. However, this can be critical in, e.g., residential areas. If all
drivers define their home as sensitive locations, rarely an IVS uploads it collected
data.
In [HG05] the authors consider a traffic monitoring system, where the IVSs pe-
riodically report information like speed and location to a server. To confuse the
attacker, they modify the positions reported by different IVSs in such a way that it
looks like they crossed their path. However, adding an error to the position samples
sent to the service provider is not tolerable for use cases like the collection of pot-
holes or traffic signs. Other methods [HKH10] add Gaussian noise to the reported
location, which also introduces an unacceptable error.
SLICER was proposed in [QWC13] and [QWC15]. It splits each sensor reading
in a number of slides. These slides are then distributed to other participants, which
upload the slides to a central server. If the central server receives at least k slides
of the same sensor reading, it can reconstruct the data. They propose two different
strategies, the first one just slices the data, distributes it to the other participants,
which upload the data. In the second version the originator of the data predicts the
participants it will meet until a given time frame and slices the data accordingly to
meet time requirements and minimizing the total costs.
A system to ensure a minimum k-anonymity for vehicles reporting data to an ICS
is presented in [FLK15]. The authors apply a distributed secret sharing algorithm
with location and time specific keys to accomplish this. They exploit DSRC in or-
der to establish the location and time specific keys. These keys are then reported by
means of a secret sharing algorithm. Whenever k vehicles reported data encrypted
with the same key, the ICS is able to decrypt the data. However, the accuracy of
the location and time of the data to report needs to be reduced in order to reach the
desired indistinguishability. This is not acceptable for high-precision maps. Further-
more, if the accuracy is high enough to uniquely identify a specific sensor event, the
vehicles can aggregate it immediately by exploiting DSRC.
3.4. Geocast
In this section we review the related work on geocast for ITS applications.
In [JRX11] the authors propose a Grid Based Geocasting Scheme (GBGS) for ITS
applications. They divide the surface of the world into tiles in order to define possible
dissemination areas. The size of each tile is adjusted according to the number of IVSs
within. When more IVSs than a threshold value are present in a tile, it is subdivided
into two tiles of equal size. If the number of IVSs in two neighboring tiles drops
below another threshold value, then they are merged. Each IVS is aware of the tile
it is currently in. Every time an IVS leaves a tile, its current position is transmitted
Anonymous Authenticated Car-to-X Communication 35
3.4 Geocast
GMS
Figure 3.4.: Illustration of the GBGS
to a so-called Geo Messaging Server (GMS). On reception, the GMS determines the
new tile the IVS is located in and sends it back to the IVS. Therefore, the GMS is all
the time aware of the position of all IVSs. This procedure is illustrated in Figure 3.4.
An ICS aiming to send a message to each IVS in a geographic area needs to query
the GMS for all IVSs in the dissemination area first. The server then determines and
returns all IVSs located in the corresponding tiles. The disadvantage of this scheme
is clearly the central GMS, which is aware of the coarse position of all IVSs and is
therefore able to track them and thus may infringe their privacy. Furthermore, the
scheme does not scale because each message has to be distributed to each IVS via a
single unicast message. In addition, this scheme does not support the addressing of
a group of IVSs in the first place. However, this feature was later on added as part
of the COmmunication Network VEhicle Road Global Extension (CONVERGE)
project [CON15a]. In the evaluation section for Chapter 6 we compare this scheme
to our Anonymous Geocast scheme for ITS Applications (AGfIA) approach.
In LTE MBMS [3GP13b] can be exploited to distribute data from a content pro-
vider to a group of recipients in predefined service areas by means of multicast. In
order to apply MBMS, each application has to register an MBMS User Service at
the MNO first. An IVS aiming to exploit several applications has to register for each
application separately. MBMS was developed to download a huge amount of data or
to stream audio or video data from a radio or TV station to many recipients. For this
reason, it is based on multicast in order to save bandwidth. Therefore, this scheme
is not well-suited to distribute the rather small ITS messages. In order to support the
distribution of different messages in various service areas, one MBMS session has
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to be initiated for each service area, but this introduces a high complexity. Further-
more, it is not possible to have overlapping service areas. In addition, messages are
not repeated automatically in order to inform IVSs entering the service area. Conse-
quently, the messages have to be sent periodically from the content provider to the
MNO, which spreads them in the service area. Obviously, this method is not very
efficient. We compare this scheme with AGfIA in Chapter 6.
The authors of [CMGK14] analyze the LTE unicast and MBMS transmission
modes for safety-related ITS applications. They further study the configuration of
MBMS for safety-related ITS applications. Their proposed configuration consists of
a central entity which receives all messages. It is accessible by all MNOs and dis-
tributes the messages via all mobile networks covering the dissemination area. The
authors also state that a new data delivery method for MBMS is necessary to ful-
fill the requirements of ITS messages. They conclude that MBMS is more efficient
in terms of resource consumption when compared to unicast messages. However,
this seems obvious, because less messages have to be transmitted in multicast com-
pared to unicast. Furthermore, they do not consider multiple ITS applications with
different subscriber groups.
The transmission of ITS messages via LTE and MBMS has also been studied
in [ACC+13], [ETS12a], and [VRBZ08] but none of these works provides a solution
which fulfills all requirements of ITS applications. Unicast communication via LTE
does, for example, not scale for a large number of vehicles and for MBMS a signaling
overhead to manage all the different receiver groups is introduced.
In [dMdlIZ15] the authors propose a geocasting mechanism where the data to dis-
tribute is sent to only a subset of all vehicles present in the desired region. These
vehicles then further distribute this data to nearby vehicles. However, this mecha-
nism requires a central geoserver which is aware of vehicles present in the desired
region in order to select a subset. Therefore, it is possible to track the movement of
these vehicles.
Three methods of cellular geocast which form the current state of the art were
studied in [JRX11]. In the first method a central server, aiming at the distribution
of a geocast message, sends an inquiry to all clients requesting their location. From
the response, the server selects the relevant clients and sends the message to them.
This method clearly does not scale for a large number of clients and features a con-
siderable delay in message delivery. The second method requires all clients to send
periodical position updates to a central server which stores them in a database. When
a message shall be sent to all clients in a geographic region, the central entity queries
its database and sends the message to the relevant clients. An example scheme ex-
ploiting this method for C2X communication is given in [FWZ12]. This method does
not suffer from the additional delay of the first method. However, it introduces some
blur on the position data, because some clients might have moved away since the last
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Figure 3.5.: Location of the MEC server within the mobile network
position update. In the third method the clients autonomously update their current
location at the central entity when they moved a certain distance. This improves the
accuracy of the positions in comparison to the second method. Nonetheless, it still
has scalability problems as the first two methods. Last but not least, all these meth-
ods do not protect the location privacy of the IVSs. They require regular position
updates from the IVS to the ICS.
ETSI published in March 2016 several specifications for Mobile Edge Comput-
ing (MEC) [ETS16c] [ETS16b] [ETS16a] containing technical requirements and ex-
planatory material. When applying MEC an application server is located directly at
the edge of the mobile network e.g. directly connected to an eNodeB. This placement
is also illustrated in Figure 3.5. The concept of MEC works as follows. Whenever
an IVS detects an event like an accident it generates a message. This message is then
stored directly on the application server at eNodeB level and distributed within the
cell. Vehicles entering the cell can then later on receive this information even if no
other vehicles are present anymore. Furthermore, it is possible to upload aggregated
information to backbone servers. However, currently only a concept is available.
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4 | Attribute Based Authentication
The connectivity of current vehicles allows the driver to use convenience services
and even install applications. These applications might require authentication and
feature access restrictions based on vehicle attributes. A simple mechanism would
be that the marketplace or application knows all attributes of the participating IVSs.
This however harms the privacy of the IVS which aims at hiding the attributes not
necessary for the exploited applications. Therefore, we propose in this chapter a
scheme, which allows an ICS to require certain attributes of subscribed IVSs in order
to successfully authenticate. During the authentication the privacy of the IVS is pre-
served. Furthermore, the scheme is complaint with the standards for C2X commu-
nication. This chapter is a polished and extended version of the publications [BH14]
and [BH16b].
4.1. Motivation
In safety relevant communication over ETSI ITS-G5A an IVS authenticates itself
by signing all messages with an AT. Besides these safety applications, an IVS can
also exploit non-safety applications over ETSI ITS-G5B or cellular communication.
Examples of non-safety applications are parking lot reservation or music streaming.
To authenticate this kind of communication, it is not sufficient to sign all messages
with an AT for safety applications. Some applications may have access restrictions
based on attributes. A possible restriction could be, for example that the IVS is of
a specific brand or that certain sensors or features have to be present. Some ICSs
might also aim at billing the IVS for usage of their application.
Whenever an IVS uses an application with access restrictions based on attributes,
like for sensor data uploads, it aims at hiding its identity and the not necessary at-
tributes to protect its privacy of the identity. This is comparable to a person in the
real world showing its bank or library card. These cards reveal just the necessary
personal information. If the not required attributes are also revealed, an application
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might exploit this information in order to discriminate the driver of the IVS by charg-
ing higher prices for the same service when the requesting IVS is a more expensive
model [HSL+14].
We propose a system that relies on ACs as suggested in [CL01] to issue attribute-
based ATs. We apply the ATs as standardized in [ETS13]. To get these ATs the
IVS needs to prove with its AC that it possesses the attributes necessary to use the
specific application. The proof contains only the attributes necessary to exploit this
application. All other attributes are kept private and thus away from the verifier. Each
AT can be exploited for the requested application only. Therefore, this protects the
privacy of association of the IVS. Furthermore, we describe how the communication
can be secured in order to also protect the privacy of communication of the IVS.
Two different versions of the system are proposed in this chapter. OEMs will
most likely issue the AC for their manufactured IVSs. When verifying the proof of
attributes, it is possible to identify the issuer of the AC and therefore the OEM of the
IVS. When applying the first version it is possible to determine the OEM of the IVS
whenever it requests ATs because the OEM is the issuer. An IVS might, however
intend to hide this information for privacy reasons. In contrast, the second proposed
version prevents a verifier from getting knowledge about the OEM of the IVS. Now
all ACs used to prove attributes are issued by a Trusted Third Party (TTP). To enable
this scheme, the IVS requests from the TTP a second AC with the same attributes as
the one issued by the OEM. Therefore, the verifier of the attributes does no longer
learn the OEM of the IVS. However, this version does not only introduce a TTP, it
furthermore increases the complexity of the system. We compare the pros and cons
of both versions in the evaluation section of this chapter.
Moreover, we show how the IVS can pay with digital money if the application
requires billing. In addition, our approach supports the revocation of an IVS, ATs,
ACs, and single attributes, respectively. The privacy of the IVS to the other entities
always stays protected. We created a prototype implementation and evaluated it
resulting in the fact that the delay introduced by the anonymous credential system
does not affect the usability of applications.
4.2. Entities
We apply the following entities in our system to obtain attribute-based ATs:
Root CA: The Root CA is the trust anchor of the system. It certifies the Enrolment
and Authorization Authorities, TTP, and Service Directory (SD). Every IVS in the
system has to trust the Root CA first in order to trust the other entities.
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IVS Enrolment Authority: The IVS Enrolment Authority (IVS EA) issues the
EC and AC to the IVS. In comparison to the previous work we precede it with IVS.
This is to distinguish it from the EA responsible for ICSs. In order to issue ACs, the
IVS EA maintains a database with all attributes of all IVSs it is responsible for.
IVS Authorization Authority: The IVS Authorization Authority (IVS AA) issues
ATs to an IVS after it has checked its eligibility. The AT allows an IVS to exploit the
application specified in the AT. We precede it, in comparison to the previous work,
with IVS to clarify that it is responsible for IVSs.
ICS Enrolment Authority: The ICS Enrolment Authority (ICS EA) issues ECs to
ICSs. The preceded ICS shall indicate its responsibility for the ICSs.
Trusted Third Party: The TTP is exploited for revocation in the second proposed
version of the scheme. It stores all eligible IVSs.
Bank: The bank is a central entity which issues digital money. This money may
be used by the IVSs to purchase ATs at the IVS AA in order to get access to an
application.
Service Directory: To enable an IVS to search for possible applications and fa-
cilitate an ICS to advertise its applications, the SD manages a list of all available
applications with information such as access restrictions.
ITS Central Station: Each ICS possesses an EC issued by the IVS EA to prove
it is an authorized ICS in the system. An ICS can offer one or several applications
to the IVSs. Applications can have the condition that the IVS using it must have
certain attributes like belonging to a specific brand or presence of a certain sensor.
Furthermore, each application has an assigned unique identifier. An ICS can also
have its own IVS AA to issue ATs. This IVS AA is then used instead of the global
one for the applications offered by the ICS.
ITS Vehicle Station: An IVS requests an EC and AC, containing its attributes from
the IVS EA. Later on, it applies them to obtain ATs from the IVS AA. The IVS
proves its eligibility for using an application by presenting the AT to the ICS.
4.3. System
In the following, we detail the steps which are necessary for an IVS to authenti-
cate for a ICS featuring access restrictions. They are similar to the steps described
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in [BSS+11] because we used them as a foundation of this work. As a prerequisite
besides the establishment of the PKI, the information about the attributes an IVS
possesses must be stored at the IVS EA. Furthermore, the ICS has to provide the
necessary attributes, billing information, etc. to the SD to enable the issuance of
corresponding attribute-based ATs.
When an IVS aims at exploiting an application offered by an IVS, it needs to get a
valid EC, AC, and digital money first. Afterwards it applies them to obtain attribute-
based ATs. These ATs may then be used for authentication at the ICS. We provide
two different versions dealing with how this can be established. They differ in the
way EC, AC, and ATs are obtained and revoked. We apply the following notation for
the single steps: <Phase><NumberOfStep>. If a step is only executed in a specific
version, we append #1 for the first and #2 for the second version to the name of the
step. Furthermore, steps that are only valid for the first version are illustrated with
dotted arrows and steps only valid for the second version are illustrated with dash
dot lines in the figures. We assume an encrypted communication by, e.g., Transport
Layer Security (TLS) between all entities in the backend. When Y is signed by entity
X , it is written as SigX (Y ). Whenever payload Y is encrypted for entity X , it is written
as EncX (Y ).
4.3.1. Enrolment Certiﬁcate and Anonymous Credential
Request
First, the IVS must obtain an EC and AC from the IVS EA. This procedure is illus-
trated in Figure 4.1. The EC is a certificate to prove that the IVS is an authorized ITS
station. It is the same EC as in previous work [ETS12b]. The AC is a certification of
the attributes of the IVS as proposed in [Cha85]. To get an EC and AC, the IVS sends
in Step A1 its canonical certificate and a certificate request signed with its canonical
keys encrypted to the IVS EA.
EncIV S_EA(SigIV S(canonical cert.,cert. request)) (A1)
On reception, the IVS EA checks, whether the IVS is eligible to obtain the EC
and AC. Afterwards, the Steps A2#2 and A3#2 are performed, if the second version
is applied. In Step A2#2 the IVS EA creates a unique identifier and sends it to the
TTP.
identi f ier (A2#2)
There it is saved in an accumulator which stores all valid identifiers and therefore
IVSs. Subsequently, the TTP responds in Step A3#2 if the operation succeeded or
not.
OK or FAIL (A3#2)
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4.3.1 Enrolment Certificate and Anonymous Credential Request
IVS Authorization
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IVS Enrolment
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(A1)
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(A2#2)
(A3#2)
TTP
(A5#2)(A6#2)
Service Directory
IVSBank
Root CA
Figure 4.1.: Procedural steps for requesting EC and AC
If the IVS EA aims later on at revoking the IVS, it needs to ask the TTP to remove
the unique identifier from the accumulator. It is also possible to store one identifier
for each attribute in order to allow revocation of single attributes.
In the next step the IVS EA issues, for both versions, the EC and AC to the IVS.
The AC contains all attributes of the IVS. It also includes a hash of the EC. This
ensures that the AC is also no longer valid, when the EC is revoked and thus replay
attacks are excluded. We describe how the protection works later in Section 4.3.3.
When the second version is applied, the AC contains also the unique identifier stored
in the accumulator to support revocation.
After issuance, the IVS EA sends for both versions the EC and AC encrypted to
the IVS (Step A4). After reception, the IVS decrypts, validates, and stores them.
EncECEA(ECEA,ACEA) (A4)
For the second version the IVS now encrypts the hash of its EC for the IVS EA.
Then, it creates a token containing the attributes of the AC received from the IVS EA,
a witness to prove that it is contained in the accumulator, and a proof for the en-
crypted hash of the EC. This token is then encrypted together with the encrypted
hash and a certificate request for the TTP. Afterwards, it is sent as Step A5#2 to
the TTP. The witness is calculated from accumulator information and needs to be
updated each time the accumulator is modified.
EncT T P(cert. request, token,EncIV SEA(H(ECEA))) (A5#2)
On reception the TTP verifies the token. Furthermore, it saves the encrypted hash.
This hash can later on be exploited to reveal the identity of the IVS. Afterwards, it
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issues a new EC and AC containing the same attributes as the ones from the IVS EA
and, in addition, the hash of the new issued EC to prevent replay attacks. Then it
sends them as Step A6#2 back to the IVS.
EncECT T P(ECT T P,ACT T P) (A6#2)
In general, the verifier of a proof can identify the issuer of the credential. Each
OEM will probably operate its own IVS EA. Therefore, a verifier has the possibility
to obtain the OEM of an IVS, whereas the IVS might be aiming at hiding this infor-
mation. If there exists one central TTP which issues the credentials this is no longer
possible. Accordingly, the verifier learns only that the credentials are issued by the
TTP for all IVSs when the second version is applied.
For simplicity in the remainder EC means ECEA when the first and ECT T P when
the second version is applied. Accordingly, when we mention AC, we mean ACEA
when the first and ACT T P when the second version is exploited.
4.3.2. Money Request
After the IVS received its EC and AC, it may request digital money from the bank
as illustrated in Figure 4.2. This can be done multiple times. Blind signatures might
be applied as digital money [Cha82]. If blind signatures are exploited, the IVS gen-
erates random values, blinds them, and sends the blinded values together with its
authorization to the bank in order to request money (Step B1). The bank then blindly
signs the values, debits the bank account of the driver, and returns the blind signed
values back to the IVS (Step B2).
blinded_values,auth_in f o (B1)
digital_money (B2)
The IVS now possesses digital money from the bank, which may be used to pay
for ATs and thus application usage.
4.3.3. Attribute-Based Authorization Ticket Request
After receiving an EC, AC, and digital money, the IVS is now able to request at-
tribute-based ATs. These ATs are requested from the IVS AA as illustrated in Fig-
ure 4.3. The single steps are detailed in the sequel.
In advance of requesting ATs, the IVS queries the SD for suitable applications
(Step C1). The SD then replies with a list of ICSs providing applications satisfying
the criteria in the query (Step C2).
Query (C1)
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4.3.3 Attribute-Based Authorization Ticket Request
IVS Authorization
Authority
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ICS Enrolment
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IVS Enrolment
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TTP Service Directory
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(B2)
(D1)
IVSBank
Root CA
Figure 4.2.: Procedural steps for requesting money and utilization of ATs
Possible ICSs (C2)
The IVS then selects a suitable ICS and checks if the attributes necessary for the
application are present (Step C3).
Now, the IVS first encrypts the hash of its EC for the IVS EA if the first or for the
TTP when the second version is applied. Then, it derives a token containing the nec-
essary attributes for the ICS and a proof for the encrypted hash from its AC. When
the second version is applied, the token also contains a witness for the revocation
information embedded in the AC. Afterwards, it creates the key pairs to certify. Sub-
sequently, it signs the name of the application and the public keys with its EC. This
signature is then, together with the EC, encrypted for the IVS EA or TTP, respec-
tively. Finally, the IVS sends the application name, the encrypted parts, the token,
the PKs, and the necessary money as given in Step C4 to the IVS AA. The encrypted
hash binds the request to a specific EC. The other encrypted part is applied like in
the previous work to detect replay attacks [BSS+11]. In the first version, it serves
also as a proof that the IVS is not revoked.
EncIV S_EA/T T P(SigEC(app_name,PKs),EC),app_name,PKs,
digital_money, token,EncIV S_EA/T T P(H(EC))
(C4)
For the next three steps the two versions differ. Therefore, we will describe them
independent of each other.
When the first version is applied, the IVS AA sends the encrypted parts together
with a hash over the application name and the public keys to the IVS EA (Step C5#1).
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Figure 4.3.: Procedural steps for requesting ATs
H(app_name,PKs),EncIV S_EA(hash),EncIV S_EA(SigEC(app_name,PKs),EC)
(C5#1)
The IVS EA decrypts everything and checks in Step C6#1 as depicted in Fig-
ure 4.3 if the EC and the signature are valid and if the hash fits this EC. This ensures
that the IVS is not revoked and the applied AC corresponds to the applied EC. After-
wards, the IVS EA returns the result of this validation to the IVS AA (Step C7#1).
OK or FAIL (C7#1)
In case that the second version is applied, the IVS AA does not ask the IVS EA
to validate the request because it cannot determine the IVS EA being responsible for
the IVS. Instead, it sends the parts encrypted for the TTP together with a hash over
the application name and the public keys to the TTP (Step C5#2).
H(app_name,PKs),EncT T P(hash),EncT T P(SigEC(app_name,PKs),EC) (C5#2)
Like the IVS EA, the TTP checks in Step C6#2 whether the EC, signature, and
hash are valid. In this version this ensures that the AC is applied with the corre-
sponding EC, but not that the IVS is not revoked. After a successful check, the TTP
replies with the current state of the accumulator to the IVS AA (Step C7#2). With
this state it is possible for the IVS AA to check if the IVS is revoked.
accumulator state or FAIL (C7#2)
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On reception, the IVS AA validates for both versions the token in order to check
the attributes of the IVS. When the second version is applied, it also checks the
revocation status.
If the validation was successful and the IVS has to pay for the application usage,
the IVS AA forwards for both versions the digital money received from the IVS to
the bank (Step C8). There the money is transferred to the account of the IVS AA.
Because blind signatures are applied for the digital money, the bank is not able to
determine the IVS spending this money. Afterwards, the bank returns whether the
payment was successful or not (Step C9). On a regular basis the IVS AA transfers
part of the money to the ICSs of the issued ATs.
digital_money (C8)
OK or FAIL (C9)
If all previous steps were executed successfully, the IVS AA finally issues the
attribute-based ATs for the application to the IVS (Step C10). Otherwise an error is
returned.
AT sapp_name or Error (C10)
In order to determine for which application an AT is valid, the identifier of the
corresponding application is included. Therefore, the application can check, whether
the AT is eligible to use the application. For the remainder of this thesis we assume
the AID as part of the ATs is exploited for this purpose as for safety communica-
tion [ETS13].
The outlined system supports two different kinds of billing — per request or per
time period. If the IVS has to pay per request, each AT may be applied for one request
only. When the IVS exploits an AT to access an application, the AT is revoked
immediately at the ICS to prevent further usage. The IVS gets as many ATs as it has
paid for. When a per time period billing is applied, the IVS gets ATs, which are only
valid for the time period the IVS paid for.
4.3.4. Application Usage
As soon as the IVS successfully requested ATs from the IVS AA, it is able to start
using the application with the issued ATs as illustrated by Step D1 in Figure 4.2.
The obtained ATs might also be applied in application-specific communication with
other IVSs.
The system supports the case where each ICS operates its own IVS AA. However,
this affects the privacy of the IVS, because the ICS is then in the position to link
multiple ATs to the same IVS.
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4.3.5. Revocation
The outlined system supports different kinds of revocation. It is possible to revoke a
whole IVS from participating in the system as well as single ATs, the whole AC or
single attributes. In the sequel these situations are discussed.
ITS Vehicle Station
In both versions the IVS EA has to revoke the IVS. In the first version the IVS EA
revokes the EC of the IVS in its local database. There is no difference in comparison
to the revocation of an IVS in previous work. When applying the second version,
however, the IVS EA has to trigger the TTP to remove the identifier of the IVS from
the accumulator.
Therefore, the revocation of a whole IVS is supported by both versions. If revoked,
then the IVS is no longer able to obtain new ATs from the IVS AA. Each time
ATs are requested the validity of the EC is checked in the first and the state of the
accumulator in the second version.
Authorization Tickets
When ATs are revoked, the same mechanism is applied for both versions. If an ICS
aims at revoking a single AT for its own application, the ICS may revoke it directly
by locally marking it as invalid. An AT is only valid for one application. Therefore,
it can be no longer applied to exploit the application. If ATs are also applied in appli-
cation specific C2C communication the ICS may, in addition, distribute Certificate
Revocation Lists (CRLs) to its subscribers to notify them about the revocation. If
ATs were issued by accident, the IVS AA can report the affected ATs to the ICS.
There they can be revoked.
Anonymous Credential
The revocation of the AC can be done by revoking the whole IVS. However, the
IVS is then also no longer able to obtain ATs for safety communication. For the first
version the IVS EA can only mark the AC of the IVS as invalid. Then it can reject
all requests for ATs which are not intended for safety communication. When the
second version is applied, the IVS EA can trigger the TTP to remove the identifier
of the IVS from its accumulator. Then the IVS is no longer able to obtain any new
attribute-based ATs too. However, it can still get new ATs for safety communication,
because the TTP is not involved in this case.
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Attribute
To revoke a single attribute of an IVS, it is necessary to have some kind of misbehav-
ior detection. It is necessary to detect which attributes are no longer valid. There is
a need for a central entity which collects misbehavior reports containing the AT and
in which manner the IVS misbehaved. These reports might be created by the ICSs
and trigger the revocation process. Furthermore, this information might be exploited
to trigger a repair at the workshop.
For the first version the identity of the holder of an AT can be revealed by a co-
operation of the IVS EA and IVS AA, like for safety communication. The IVS AA
knows the AT, the IVS EA the corresponding identity and both know the same hash
from the request. After the identity is revealed, the IVS EA can mark the AC of the
IVS as invalid and record the misbehaving attribute. The next time the IVS tries to
request a new AT for an application, the IVS EA detects that the AC is no longer
valid and triggers the IVS to request a new AC. The new AC then has less or other
attributes depending on the misbehavior of the IVS.
When the second version is applied the TTP is in addition to the IVS EA and
IVS AA involved in revealing the identity of the IVS. The IVS AA knows the AT of
the misbehaving IVS. The TTP can link it with the hash of the request to the EC it
issued. Furthermore, it is in possession of the encrypted hash of the corresponding
EC issued by the IVS EA. Therefore, this encrypted hash is then forwarded to and
encrypted by the IVS EA in order to reveal the identity of the AT holder. In addition,
the IVS EA marks the misbehaving attribute in its database. If the accumulator con-
tains a revocation information of this attribute, it is removed by the IVS EA. If not,
the identifier for the whole AC is removed from the accumulator. Whenever a proof
verification for this IVS fails, it might obtain a new AC with changed attributes.
4.4. Implementation
A prototype implementation supporting both versions of the advocated scheme was
done as part of [Azi15]. As the foundation of the anonymous credential subsystem
we exploited idemix [CVH02]. To issue ATs and ECs, we used the Pilot-PKI of
the C2C-CC. All software modules are written in Java. Web services are employed
in order to support the exchange of data between the different components. The
components of the prototype implementation and their interactions are illustrated in
Figure 4.4.
A Graphical User Interface (GUI) called OEMview was created to register IVSs
with their attributes at the IVS EA. The IVS EA stores this information in a local
SQLite database.
Another GUI denoted as IVSview was created in order to evaluate the interactions
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Figure 4.4.: Components of and interactions within the prototype implementation
of the IVS with other components. One part of IVSview allows the enrolment of
the IVS and therefore to get the EC and AC from the IVS EA. The IVS EA also
registers the IVS at the Pilot-PKI and stores the revocation information in its local
database. The IVSview also allows to request digital money from the bank. To
support different money values, the bank applies a different key for each possible
value. The bank also has a local SQLite database, where all exploited bank notes are
stored to prevent double spending.
In a different part of the IVSview, it is possible to request ATs. Prior to creat-
ing the request, it is necessary to select an application and money amounts. In the
prototype implementation the IVSview and IVS AA both have a local copy of the
SD in order to select an application and to verify the necessary permissions. When
executing the request, the user is able to decide which version of the scheme shall be
applied. The IVSview contacts the AA for the ATs, which communicates, depending
on the selected scheme version, with either the IVS EA or TTP. As attributes of the
IVS we applied the brand, production date, and sensors for rain, Bluetooth, and its
position. We defined 20 more sensor attributes in order to evaluate the scheme for
applications with different numbers of required attributes. We created various appli-
cations ranging from some requiring only one attribute to some requiring up to 20.
We did not implement the issuance of the second EC and AC by the TTP. However,
the scheme would operate in the same way, just with another AC and EC.
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4.5. Evaluation
For evaluation purposes we first compare the properties of the two proposed versions
and we then evaluate their performance.
4.5.1. Comparison
Both versions enable an IVS to authenticate at an ICS with their previously obtained
attribute-based ATs. In order to obtain these ATs, the IVS needs to prove to the
IVS AA that it possesses the necessary attributes for this application. However, only
the attributes necessary to exploit the application are revealed. In addition, different
proofs cannot be linked to the same IVS. Therefore, neither the IVS AA nor the
ICS are able to determine the attributes not necessary for the targeted application.
Furthermore, no entity in the system is able to link ATs to an IVS. The IVS EA
respective TTP knows the identity of a requesting IVS but not the issued ATs. On
the other hand, the IVS AA and ICS are aware of the issued ATs, but are not able to
identify the IVS. Therefore, none of the entities knows the identity of the IVS and
issued ATs and is able to link them. Only when the IVS EA and IVS AA cooperate
it is possible to reveal the identity of an IVS. If the second version is applied the TTP
is in addition necessary to reveal the identity.
In case of the first version, the IVS EA validates the request of the IVS. It is
assumed that each OEM will operate its own IVS EA. Therefore, it is possible for
an IVS AA to determine the OEM which manufactured the IVS. The second version
hides this property. There, each IVS requests a second Anonymous Credential with
the same content from a central TTP. This AC is then used to prove the attributes.
Consequently, the IVS AA contacts the TTP to validate the request. Because the TTP
is responsible for IVSs from different OEMs, it is not possible to determine the OEM
of the requesting IVS. A drawback of this version is that each IVS needs a second
EC and AC. Furthermore, it complicates the revocation, because it cannot be done
locally by the IVS EA anymore. The IVS EA needs to contact the TTP when an IVS
is revoked. Furthermore, the witness of the IVS needs to be updated periodically.
When revealing the identity of an AT holder the TTP has to be involved too.
In the first version the AC needs no special protection. An attacker obtaining it
is not able to successfully request ATs. During every request the IVS EA checks if
the requester is in possession of the corresponding EC. In the second version the
AC contains the revocation information. An attacker may exploit this information
to mount an attack aimed to revoke the IVS. Therefore, the AC should be saved in
secure storage, if the second version is used. Furthermore, also the EC obtained from
the TTP needs to be stored there.
This comparison illustrates that the second version safely protects the IVS AA
Anonymous Authenticated Car-to-X Communication 51
4.5 Evaluation
Table 4.1.: Comparison of the scheme versions
Property Version 1 Version 2
Hides unnecessary attributes X X
Hides the identity X X
Hides the OEM - X
No revocation updates necessary X -
Keeps System complexity low X -
Introduces no new entities to trust X -
Minimizes necessary secure storage X -
from obtaining the OEM of the IVS. However, this property comes with a more
complex system, a new entity to trust, periodic updates of the revocation witness,
and the need for more secure storage. Table 4.1 summarizes the comparison results.
It is not necessary that all OEMs employ the same version, they can easily coexist
side by side. Even IVSs from the same OEM might exploit different versions.
4.5.2. Performance
In order to evaluate the overall performance of the proposed scheme, we used the
following setup. The performance measurements of the components running on the
IVS were taken on a NEXCOM VTC6200 CarPC with an Intel Atom D510 Dual
Core CPU operated at 1.6 GHz and featuring 2 GB of memory. The tasks of the
Pilot-PKI were executed on a server, hosted by the operators. The performance
measurements of the remaining entities were taken on a notebook equipped with an
Intel Core i5-3360M running at 2.8 GHz clock frequency and featuring 8 GB of
memory. An overview of the measured times is given in Table 4.2 and depicted in
Figure 4.5. We discuss the measured execution times in more detail as follows.
Enrolment Process
This process is done once for each IVS and includes the registration of the IVS at the
IVS EA and the request of its EC and AC. It takes 279 ms to register an IVS with its
properties at the IVS EA. This value includes 120 ms to register it at the Pilot-PKI.
The registration operation is not time critical. It might be done prior to production.
The complete request to obtain the EC and AC takes 592 ms. This value includes
the request of the EC from the Pilot-PKI (114 ms), the issuance of the AC (314 ms),
and the addition of the identifier for revocation to the accumulator (22 ms). How-
ever, this operation is not time critical at all, since it is being performed during the
assembly of the IVS. Therefore, there is plenty of time to execute.
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Table 4.2.: Execution times of scheme operations
Operation Time
Registration (Complete) 279 ms
Registration (Pilot-PKI ) 120 ms
Request EC and AC 592 ms
Issue EC (Pilot-PKI ) 114 ms
Issue AC 314 ms
Add identifier to accumulator (only version 2) 22 ms
Request money 49 ms
Verify EC at EA (only version 1) 55 ms
Verify request at TTP (only version 2) 56 ms
Cash money 22 ms
Issue AT (Pilot-PKI ) 340 ms
Money Request
This request needs to be executed each time the IVS has not enough money available
in order to exploit a certain application. Therefore, it should be executed it in a
reasonable time. In the prototype implementation it took on average 49 ms, which is
acceptable, but it certainly may be improved by an optimized final implementation.
Attribute-Based Authorization Ticket Request
An IVS needs to request new ATs from the IVS AA each time it aims at exploiting a
new application or it owns no valid ATs for a booked application anymore.
Figure 4.5 illustrates for version 1 the total time necessary to create a proof for
the requested attributes and to request new ATs from the IVS AA depending on the
number of attributes to prove. Furthermore, it also shows the time necessary to create
the proof at the IVS and to validate it at the IVS AA.
The figure clearly indicates that all three times increase linearly with the number
of attributes included in the proof. The total time increases from 2.1 seconds, when
only one attribute is required, over 8.5 seconds, when 10 attributes are required, up
to 15.6 seconds, in case that 20 attributes are needed by the application.
The figure shows furthermore that most of the time is consumed while creating
the proof of attributes. For one attribute it is 70 % (1.5 seconds), for 10 attributes it
rises to 87 % (7.7 seconds), and for 20 attributes finally to 90 % (14 seconds) of the
complete time. The time to validate the proof increases from only 0.1 second for one
attribute up to 1 second for 20 attributes.
The execution time to validate the request differs only by a few milliseconds for
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Figure 4.5.: Execution time of an AT request as a function of the number of attributes
for the first version
the two scheme versions. It takes 56 ms to validate the request at the TPP and to
get the current state from the accumulator. For version 1, it takes 55 ms to validate
the EC at the IVS EA. However, when the witness for the revocation information
of the AC is included as part of the proof generation in the second version, around
additional 570 ms are necessary. The time to validate the proof increases by approx-
imately 50 ms. In order to get the execution time for the proof generation, proof
validation, and complete execution for version 2, these times have to be added to the
numbers displayed in Figure 4.5. The final time further includes the time to cash the
money at the bank (22 ms) and the request of ATs from the Pilot-PKI (340 ms).
If the accumulator applied in the second version also contains revocation informa-
tion for single attributes, the execution time increases further. For each additional
identifier in the accumulator around 570 ms are additionally required for generation
and around 50 ms for validation, respectively. Figure 4.6 illustrate the introduced
overhead for a given number of revocable attributes included in the proof. These
time values need to be added to the values displayed in Figure 4.5 in order to get the
total execution time for version 2 of the scheme. The revocation process needs only
a few milliseconds for both versions.
Obviously, it takes several seconds to generate the proof. An IVS requesting in-
formation from an ICS in general is not likely to wait for such a long time. For
this reason, we apply the anonymous credentials system and the proof generation
only when new ATs need to be obtained. Therefore, an IVS only has to generate a
54 Anonymous Authenticated Car-to-X Communication
02
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
A
d
d
it
io
n
al
 t
im
e 
[s
]
Revocable attributes
Complete
Proof generation
Proof validation
Figure 4.6.: Necessary additional time to execute the second version as a function of
the included revocable attributes
proof whenever it aims in exploiting an additional application or does not hold valid
ATs for the ICS anymore. For the communication with the ICS, it applies the ATs.
It takes just 6 ms to generate a valid signature on the same hardware with a valid
AT [BBH15]. Furthermore, it is expected that production IVSs will feature an ad-
equate hardware acceleration aimed to significantly reduce the signature generation
time.
In case that a new application is envisaged, the process of proving the attributes
might be done in parallel to the download and installation of the corresponding ap-
plication. Therefore, no additional delay will be introduced for the IVS. In case
that the IVS needs to renew its ATs, the operation to request them can be executed
in background prior to an expiration of the old ones. Again, no waiting time will
be introduced. This is however not possible, if the proof needs to be generated for
each single request to the ICS. Last, but not least, please note that our prototypical
implementation was not optimized for low execution time. Thus production grade
implementations can be expected to show significantly decreased execution time.
4.6. Summary
In this chapter we introduced and discussed a novel approach aimed to allow ICSs
to specify attributes an IVS needs in order to use an envisaged application. An IVS
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can prove to the IVS AA by means of an AC that it owns the necessary attributes.
The mandatory proof is done without revealing any attributes not necessary for this
purpose. The IVS AA then issues attribute-based ATs for this application to the IVS.
Afterwards, the IVS can apply these ATs to prove to the ICS that it is eligible for
the envisaged application. Again, this is done without revealing its real identity.
The ICS only learns the attributes necessary to obtain the ATs. We assume a central
billing entity, which supports both request and time based billing. If digital money is
exploited, no entity can link the spent money to a certain IVS. Since all applications
can exploit this billing service, ICSs do not need to create their own procedures.
Therefore, this scheme protects the privacy of the IVSs.
Each AT allows only to exploit one application. Subsequently, it is not possible
to get information about the other application an IVS uses from an AT. Therefore,
the scheme also protects the privacy of association of the IVS. All communication
between the backend entities can be easily secured by e. g. TLS. The IVS knows the
identity of all entities it is exchanging messages with. Therefore, it is also possible
to secure this communication so that the privacy of communication is preserved for
the IVS.
We presented two different versions of the advocated scheme. Both versions sup-
port revocation on different levels. Furthermore, both preserve the privacy of the
IVSs against the different entities. As the main result, no entity can link an AT to the
identity of an IVS. We compared the fundamental properties of these versions. The
first one leaks the OEM of the participating IVS. The second one overcomes this
drawback but features a higher complexity, needs periodic updates of its revocation
information, introduces a new entity to trust, and needs more secure storage. How-
ever, both versions can be exploited simultaneously by different IVSs depending on
their specific requirements.
With the help of a prototype implementation we showed that the proposed versions
differ in terms of the execution time. However, the time delay introduced by the
AC system in both versions does not affect the usage of the application. The time
consuming operations may well be done prior to the requests to the ICS. Hence, the
proposed approach hides the attributes not necessary for a specific application and
consequently protects the privacy of the participating IVSs while not interfering with
the application usage.
The scheme proposed in this chapter generalizes the PKI applied for safety com-
munication in VANETs to non-safety communication. It integrates the proof of at-
tributes to exploit a certain application while maintaining the privacy of the vehicles.
Furthermore, it integrates billing in the existing scheme. All this is applied without
a noticeable delay for the driver.
Open communication architectures like CONVERGE [CON] might exploit the
proposed attribute based authentication scheme. This can increase the user accep-
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tance of the platform. Furthermore, OEMs can integrate the scheme in their ap-
plication market places in order to advertise its privacy protection. Additionally,
decentralized crypto currencies like Bitcoin [Nak08] might be integrated. Hence,
the central function of the bank can be removed. Therefore, this might reduce the
overall system complexity and further enhances the privacy of its users.
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5 | Anonymous Data Exchange
In the previous chapter we presented a scheme that allows an IVS to obtain ATs
which can be exploited to authenticate itself at an application which requires certain
attributes. In this chapter we propose a protocol which applies these pseudonyms in
order to establish an anonymous authenticated confidential data exchange between
two IVS running the same application. This kind of protocol is necessary if, e. g.,
two IVSs aim at exchanging data which is confidential to subscribers of a specific
application. In such a case the data should not be readable by other IVSs.
This chapter is based on the publications [BH15c], [BH15d], and [BBH15]. In
addition to the papers we describe and evaluate how the transmitted data can be
compressed to save bandwidth, how the overall execution time can be reduced, and
how real payload can be exchanged by means of the protocol. Furthermore, we
extended the description of the implementation and evaluation results.
5.1. Motivation
For safety reasons, IVSs in VANETs use broadcast over DSRC to inform other IVSs
in communication range about their current status, including position, heading and
speed. All safety messages are digitally signed to prove the integrity of the message
and eligibility of the sender. They are not encrypted, since every participant shall
receive and interpret these messages with as less processing time as possible. Be-
sides this safety relevant communication, there are other applications where the data
exchanged between IVSs is confidential and therefore needs to be encrypted.
Consider for example an application which offers software updates or up to date
map data to IVSs. In order to save bandwidth over mobile networks like LTE the
operator of the application could decide to distribute the updates only to a subset of
IVSs. These IVSs could then distribute the data via epidemic distribution [LHH08]
over DSRC to other IVSs which did not yet receive the update.
Another application could for example collect by means of its built-in sensor data
like traffic signs or potholes. IVSs thus record the sensor data and report it to the ap-
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Figure 5.1.: Principle of the protocol
plication server, which offers the data to other applications or local administrations.
The ICS may aim at allowing only IVSs with certain sensors to participate in the ap-
plication. This application sounds simple, but it introduces a huge privacy risk. The
data sent to the ICS contains privacy related data like the location of the sensor data
and a coarse time, when it was detected. If all IVSs would simply sent their detected
data to the ICS, then this entity is able to create movement profiles of the IVSs and
therefore hurt their privacy of location and space. Even visited sensitive locations
like hospital, home, or work place may be extracted from this data. This information
can then be exploited to identify a person and therefore violate their privacy of the
identity. In order to preserve the privacy of its users and to advertise the privacy
considerations, the ICS decides to implement a privacy preserving mechanism. This
mechanism requires that the IVSs exchange their collected data between each other
prior uploading. When using this mechanism, the IVSs report sensor data locations
detected by other IVSs too. Therefore, the ICS can no longer determine where a
specific IVSs was driving at the given point in time and can no longer create move-
ment profiles of these IVSs. The ICS could decide to exploit DSRC to exchange the
data between the IVSs, because it is free of charge. In addition, the ICS enforces an
encrypted data exchange policy, so no attacker can record and sell the collected data
next to the ICS and hurt the privacy of communication of the IVS. The exchange of
the encrypted data shall also be privacy preserving. We analyze this privacy preserv-
ing mechanism later in Chapter 6. The basic principle of the protocol is illustrated
in Figure 5.1.
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There are three problems to be considered, when confidential data is being ex-
changed between IVSs:
(1) How does an IVS ensure whether the other IVS is eligible to receive confiden-
tial data?
(2) How do IVSs exchange the key for encrypting the communication data?
(3) How can the first two problems be solved while preserving the privacy of the
IVSs?
For safety-related communications in VANETs each IVS applies a pseudonym
to sign all outgoing messages. To ensure the privacy of the IVS the pseudonym is
changed on a regular basis. This is done in a way that it is not possible to link two
pseudonyms to the same IVS. Of course, an IVS might simply use an own set of
pseudonyms for each application by encoding the application into the pseudonym as
outlined in Chapter 4, and exploit well-known key agreement protocols like ECIES
as standardized for VANETs in [IEE13b] to authenticate against each other and fi-
nally to agree on an encryption key. However, the IVS then needs to change its
pseudonym for the application at hand at the same time as the one intended for
safety-related communication to prevent linking of pseudonyms. This introduces a
cost overhead both for additional secure storage for the private keys and for the data
transmission aimed to obtain new pseudonyms. Therefore, we propose in the sequel
a novel protocol that solves all three outlined problems and at the same time reduces
the number of necessary pseudonyms in comparison to exploiting ECIES only.
To do so we combine ring signatures [RST01] with the ECIES scheme [IEE13b].
In order to address the receiving IVS, we also had to define a message structure the
actual protocol is embedded into.
We evaluated the resulting protocol with respect to the privacy of the IVS. To do
so we analyzed the information different types of attackers might gain and simulated
the protocol in a VANET simulator. Going beyond simulation, we furthermore im-
plemented and empirically evaluated this protocol by means of real vehicles. We
analyzed the message size and further evaluated the implementation regarding the
complete execution time of the protocol, the time necessary to execute the individ-
ual protocol steps, and the execution times of the different protocol phases. We did
this for different ring signature sizes, payload sizes, and vehicle velocities. We also
evaluated the underlying implementation regarding fault tolerance.
5.2. Protocol
An anonymous authenticated key agreement protocol allows two parties, who are
members of the same group, to establish a confidential communication without leak-
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ing their identity. To achieve this goal, both parties have to agree on a session key
to encrypt the exchanged data. The identity of the other party is unknown at the
beginning of the protocol and both parties are not willing to expose for privacy rea-
sons their application-specific identity to anyone. In addition, it shall be possible to
revoke access for single parties and only members of the same group shall be able
to agree on the session key. The protocol shall fail, if one party is not a member of
the group. Not eligible parties shall gain as few information as possible about the
other party. We only consider single-hop connections, because multi-hop connec-
tions are difficult to maintain in VANETs due to frequent topology changes. An IVS
which does not belong to the group shall gain as little information as possible by
eavesdropping the exchanged messages.
In the remainder of this section we first describe how the applied cryptographic
mechanisms of the anonymous authenticated key agreement protocol work together.
Then, the applied notation is explained before the single steps of the protocol are
detailed. Finally, the format of the GeoNetworking messages employed to embed
the protocol and address the destination IVS is described.
5.2.1. Applied Cryptographic Mechanisms
During execution of the protocol two IVSs agree on a symmetric encryption key
to exchange confidential data by applying ECIES as standardized in [IEE13b]. As
only IVSs exploiting a specific application shall be able to agree on the symmetric
encryption key, ECIES is combined with ring signatures [RST01]. This is done
by creating a ring signature with application-specific pseudonyms over the ECIES
parameters. Thus, it is ensured that both IVSs are authorized to use the application.
If one of the IVSs is not authorized for the application, it is not able to create a valid
ring signature over the ECIES parameters.
This generic approach has the advantage that IVSs can apply the safety identities
already known to each other for ECIES and hide the application-specific identity by
means of ring signatures. When applying ring signatures, it is not possible to de-
termine the pseudonym of the signature creator. A ring signature is, as described in
Chapter 2, created by applying n different pseudonyms, whereas for one the signer
must be in possession of the corresponding private key. For all other pseudonyms it
is sufficient to only know the public keys. For a verifier it is not possible to determine
the pseudonym of the signer from the other applied pseudonyms. The verifier can
determine that the identity of the signer is one of the n applied pseudonyms, but not
which. Therefore, pseudonyms can be reused in different ring signatures without be-
ing linked to the same IVSs. As a consequence, less application-specific pseudonyms
are necessary in compare to the pseudonyms applied for safety communication.
When applying the same application-specific pseudonym multiple times it is nec-
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Figure 5.2.: Examples for changing ring members
essary to apply different ring members. Otherwise, the whole ring signature could be
linked to the same IVS. In order to create a ring signature, the IVS needs to create a
pool of valid pseudonyms. Each time a new ring is created, the IVS selects randomly
n− 1 pseudonyms out of this pool. The collection could be achieved by storing
the pseudonyms received from other IVSs while executing the protocol. When an
IVS applies the same application-specific pseudonym in different rings with differ-
ent safety-related pseudonyms, an attacker is not able to link the two safety-related
pseudonyms applied to the same application-specific pseudonym. This is illustrated
in Figure 5.2. On the left side of the figure the upper ring with the own application-
specific pseudonym D is reused in the lower ring without changing the other ring
members. Therefore, an attacker can easily link the two rings to the same IVS. On
the right side of the figure the own application-specific pseudonym D is also reused
in the lower ring. However, all other ring members have been changed. Therefore,
an attacker is not able to link the two rings containing the pseudonym D to the same
IVS. It could be also another IVS including the earlier recorded pseudonym D in its
ring.
We apply the ring signature scheme based on ECs as proposed in [LLZ+07]. We
favor this scheme, since ECs provide the same security level with a much shorter key
and signature length compared to other schemes like Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman
(RSA). Furthermore, ECC is also applied in VANETs to secure the safety-related
communication. Therefore, IVSs in VANETs will feature dedicated hardware to
speed up EC calculations.
We propose two versions of the protocol. When applying the basic version of the
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protocol, only the ring signature is encrypted with the key exchanged by ECIES,
while the second version in addition encrypts the applied application-specific pseu-
donyms and ring signature values necessary to validate it. We denote these versions
the plain and encrypted version of the protocol, respectively.
5.2.2. Notation
The following notation is applied to describe the protocol. SAM denotes the SAM
according to [ETS10a]. V , C and T are the ECIES parameters as standardized for
VANETs in [IEE13b]. V is the public key of the sender, the parameter C is the
symmetric AES key K encrypted by ECIES, while T denotes the authentication tag
of ECIES. CertXn are the n possible application-specific pseudonyms of entity X ,
where one is the application-specific pseudonym of the IVS and the others are the
collected pseudonyms of other IVSs. For each possible signer of the ring signature,
a validation value xXn is necessary. σX denotes the ring signature created by entity
X . When Y is encrypted by the symmetric encryption key K, it is written as EK(Y ).
5.2.3. Protocol Steps
The plain version of the protocol works as follows:
A→ *: SAM
(1) B→ A: V,C,T,CertB1, ...,CertBn,xB1, ...,xBn,EK(σB)
(2) A→ B: CertA1, ...,CertAn,xA1, ...,xAn,EK(σA)
(3) B→ A: EK(payload)
(4) A→ B: EK(payload)
(5) B→ A: ACK
Alice (A) periodically sends a SAM via broadcast to all IVSs in communication
range to indicate that she uses an application which takes advantage of the advocated
protocol.
Assuming Bob (B) who is in communication range and also utilizes this applica-
tion receives a SAM from Alice. Then he generates a random AES key K and calcu-
lates the ECIES parameters V , C, and T . Next, he selects n−1 pseudonyms from his
collected pool of application-specific pseudonyms and his current for this application
in order to calculate his ring signature σB over V , C, and T . Then, he encrypts σB
with the symmetric AES key K. Finally, he sends the resulting ciphertext with the
ECIES parameters V , C, and T , the applied application-specific pseudonyms, and
the additional ring signature values as Step 1 to Alice.
After reception Alice decrypts the AES key K according to the ECIES scheme and
applies it to decrypt the ring signature σB. Afterwards, Alice validates the ring signa-
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ture. On successful validation, she selects n−1 collected and her current application-
specific pseudonym for this application. With this set of pseudonyms, she creates a
ring signature σA over the ECIES parameters V , C and T . Afterwards, she encrypts
the resulting signature with K. Subsequently, she sends the ring signature and every-
thing necessary to validate it to Bob (Step 2).
On reception, Bob first decrypts and validates the ring signature σA. After success-
ful validation, Alice and Bob are certain that the other party is authorized to employ
the application. In addition, both are in possession of the same encryption key K still
without knowing the application-specific identity of the other party. Therefore, Bob
now sends his confidential payload encrypted with the symmetric encryption key
K as Step 3 to Alice. In the following Step 4 Alice responds with her confidential
payload, also encrypted with K.
When all confidential payload is exchanged, the protocol is terminated by Step 5
of the protocol which consists of an acknowledgment sent from Bob to Alice.
Compared to the plain version of the protocol the encrypted version encrypts not
only the ring signature σX , but also the pseudonyms applied to create the ring signa-
ture and the additional ring signature values. Therefore, Steps 1 and 2 of the protocol
look like the following for the encrypted version of the protocol.
(1
′
) B→ A: V,C,T,EK(CertB1, ...,CertBn,xB1, ...,xBn,σA)
(2
′
) A→ B: EK(CertA1, ...,CertAn,xA1, ...,xAn,σB)
When the application-specific pseudonyms are encrypted a potential attacker gets
less information which can be applied to identify the IVS. In Section 5.3 we analyze
the capabilities of different attackers to both protocol versions in detail.
Given that the other party and a potential attacker already know the pseudonym
used for safety messages, the pseudonym applied to execute the ECIES does not give
an attacker any new knowledge. These safety pseudonyms should change on a reg-
ular basis and not be reused. Therefore, they cannot be exploited to track anything.
The considered goal of an attacker is to determine the identity, e.g., application-
specific pseudonym of an IVS since this shall be reused in different ring signatures
and may therefore be used to link different safety identities of the IVS. This may be
done, whenever an IVS exploits the same application-specific pseudonym twice, but
with different pseudonyms for safety communication in VANETs. Then, an attacker
could link, as described in Chapter 4 the two safety pseudonyms to one IVS, because
they are utilized in combination with the same application-specific pseudonym.
We assume that each IVS can have multiple valid application-specific pseudo-
nyms at a time. So, the IVS is able to change their application-specific pseudonym
they use for creating the ring signature regularly with their pseudonyms for safety
relevant communication to avoid being tracked by means of the pseudonym not being
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changed within the ring signature.
Consider that Alice applies the safety pseudonym CertS1 and application-specific
pseudonym CertA1 at the same time. Then, she changes her safety pseudonym to
CertS2, while still using the application-specific pseudonym CertA1. An attacker now
may link CertS1 and CertS2 because they were exploited with the same application-
specific pseudonym.
Multiple pseudonyms confuse an attacker considerably, since each IVS has mul-
tiple identities. In addition, these identities could be applied at the same time in
ring signatures of different IVSs. The impact of multiple parallel pseudonyms is
evaluated in Section 5.4.4.
For the outlined protocol we stick to the same pseudonym format already existing
in VANETs to sign safety messages. However, we bind them to a specific application
as outlined in Chapter 4. We also apply ECC and ECIES, which is already standard-
ized for safety communication between IVSs. Therefore, this protocol fits very well
in the VANET environment.
It is possible to exclude a IVS from successfully executing the protocol by revok-
ing its application-specific pseudonyms. If the pseudonyms of an IVS are revoked
it is no longer possible for the IVS to generate a valid ring signature. Other IVSs
verifying the signature will detect that the pseudonyms are no longer valid and sub-
sequently abort the protocol execution with this particular IVS. The revocation could
be done by, e.g., the distribution of an CRL by an ICS as outlined in Chapter 4.
When applying this protocol, two IVSs are able to prove each other that they are
authorized to exploit a specific application without leaking their identity to others.
At the same time, they agree on a symmetric encryption key to exchange confidential
data.
5.2.4. Message Format
As message format for the outlined protocol we apply GeoNetworking as described
in Chapter 2.3.1 and standardized in [ETS10c]. In the sequel we discuss how GeoNet-
working can be applied to support the protocol execution.
As a first message to announce the protocol a SAM is sent from the initiating IVS.
The message format applied for this message is the same as standardized in [ETS10a]
and detailed in Chapter 2.
For the remaining messages two IVS exchange messages between each other.
Therefore, unicast messages are most suitable for this communication. A unicast
message in GeoNetworking is defined in a GUC as the Extended Header. Fur-
thermore, we apply the BTP as Transport Protocol. It features in comparison to
GeoNetworking-IPv6 (GN6) a smaller overhead and easier handling.
The security profiles for CAM, DENM, and the generic one were not suitable
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Figure 5.3.: Applied message format
for the outlined protocol. The profiles for CAM and DENM contain a hard coded
message type. Furthermore, the generic profile contains like the one for DENMs
a generation location, which is not required in our case because the messages are
generated by an ICS. We therefore defined an own profile. This profile consists
of the signers pseudonym applied for safety communication(SIGNER INFO) and
the generation time of the message (GENERATION TIME) as Header Fields. The
certificate of the signer is exploited to ensure a trustworthy sender as source of the
messages. The generation time of the message is inserted to ensure the freshness of
the message and to detect possible replay attacks. The resulting Header Fields of the
GeoNetworking message with all elements are depicted in Figure 5.3. The overhead
introduced by GeoNetworking is also considered in the empirical evaluation of the
protocol in Section 5.5.
5.3. A-Priori Assessment
In the a-priori assessment we distinguish between passive and active attackers to as-
sess how much information they can gain. A passive attacker is only able to listen
to and record exchanged messages, while active attackers are also able to replay and
send messages under a forged identity. We consider four types of active attackers
that differ in their access to pseudonyms. The least powerful attacker has no ac-
cess to any valid pseudonyms. Another attacker has only access to pseudonyms for
safety relevant communication. The third one has only access to application-specific
pseudonyms, while the most powerful attacker is an insider and has access to both
pseudonym types.
Table 5.1 compares the encrypted and plain version of the protocol regarding the
information the different attacker types can yield. We consider the size of the ring
and the pseudonyms applied by Alice and Bob as critical. When the attacker is able
to obtain the respective information, it is denoted asX, otherwise as -.
Regardless of the applied version of the protocol, all attackers are able to calculate
the employed ring size from the message size. When the plain version is applied,
all attackers can get the pseudonyms utilized by Alice and Bob, since they are trans-
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Table 5.1.: Capabilities of different attackers
Attacker Protocol Ring size Alice Bob
Passive Plain X X XEncrypted X - -
Active without Plain X X X
pseudonyms Encrypted X - -
Active with Plain X X X
safety pseudonyms Encrypted X - X
Active with Plain X X X
application pseudonyms Encrypted X - -
Active with safety and Plain X X X
application pseudonyms Encrypted X X X
mitted in plain text. Therefore, only the capabilities of the attackers regarding the
encrypted version of the protocol are discussed in the sequel.
The passive attacker is not able to get the pseudonyms of Alice and Bob when the
encrypted version is used, since they are encrypted and the attacker cannot derive the
encryption key K just by listening to the exchanged messages.
Without access to valid pseudonyms, an active attacker is not able to successfully
inject any message, since all of them are either signed or encrypted. If the attacker
replays the SAM, she cannot encrypt the first or reply a valid second step, since she
does not know and cannot calculate the encryption key. If she replays the first step,
she is not in the position to decrypt the pseudonyms applied by Alice in Step 2, since
she does not know and cannot calculate the encryption key. Therefore, all active
attackers are not able to get any information by replaying messages.
An active attacker with access to pseudonyms for safety relevant communication
could generate and send the SAM. If she sends the SAM, she cannot replay with the
second step, because she has no application-specific pseudonym available in order to
generate a valid ring signature. However, she could decrypt the pseudonyms applied
by Bob in Step 1 by calculating the encryption key K and therefore can get the
pseudonyms employed by Bob.
An active attacker, who has only access to application-specific pseudonyms, can-
not generate and send a valid SAM, because it is signed with a pseudonym for safety
relevant communication. The same holds for the remaining protocol steps.
If an active attacker has access to both a pseudonym for safety relevant communi-
cations and to an application-specific pseudonym, she is in the position to send and
to answer to all steps of the protocol with a valid message and therefore gets the
pseudonyms applied by Alice and Bob.
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This analysis shows that only the most powerful active attacker is able to unveil
the identities applied by Alice and Bob when the encrypted version of the protocol is
being applied. However, lots of sophisticated work will be necessary to implement
this type of attacker in practice, since the private keys of the pseudonyms are in
general stored on a Hardware Security Module (HSM) inside the IVS. Of course,
if the HSM fails and an attacker is thus able to extract the private keys, she can get
both the valid safety and the application-specific pseudonyms and send valid fake
messages. However, then the attacker could also extract only the private keys of
the safety pseudonyms and link them directly or send valid fake safety messages.
In general, it is possible to detect and revoke the affected IVS. Failed HSMs are a
general problem in VANETs. Therefore, we will not investigate it in more detail.
5.4. Simulation of Privacy Properties
We built a simulation scenario to assess the outlined protocol regarding its privacy
impact in VANETs. We considered different parameters like the strategy on how
to select the pseudonyms applied in the ring signature or how many parallel valid
pseudonyms an IVS carries. All these parameters influence the privacy of the IVSs
in the simulation. We evaluate these parameters regarding a powerful attacker which
tries to identify the IVS. For the simulation we exploited VSimRTI [Sch11] with
SWANS [Bar04] and SUMO [KEBB12]. For a realistic road network, we imported
the streets from Openstreetmap 1.
5.4.1. Scenario
As simulation area we selected the motorway A60 south of Rüsselsheim, Germany.
At each junction of the motorway one IRS is placed. This is a realistic placement
of IRSs. It is considered to be too expensive to deploy a comprehensive network
of IRSs [PHJOZ15]. Therefore, only major intersections and dangerous locations
like the junctions of a motorway will be equipped. There it is possible to inform
lots of passing IVSs about traffic jams, weather hazards, or alternative routes. In our
simulation we assume that these IRSs are under control of an attacker, who is able to
record all messages exchanged in communication range.
The IVSs enter the simulation area at two points: One in the east, for the IVSs
driving westbound, and one in the west of the map for IVSs driving eastbound. The
scenario is illustrated in Figure 5.4
Generally the same IVS take the same commuting route every day during rush-
hour. Because these are ideal conditions for an attacker to link pseudonyms applied
1www.OpenStreetMap.org
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Figure 5.4.: Simulation scenario
at different days to the same IVS, we evaluated the protocol under these conditions.
Other scenarios without recurring ITS Vehicle Stations or IVSs on different routes
make it more difficult for an attacker to link the identities. Furthermore, we assume
an IVS changes its pseudonyms at the beginning of each day.
According to the traffic density categorization in [For05] we applied a high density
of IVSs in one and a low density in the other direction. This is common for rush-hour
when most people aiming towards the city and only a few drive outbound. Three
classes of IVSs are considered in the simulation: The fast ones have a maximum
speed of 130 km/h, the regular ones a maximum speed of 110 km/h, and the slow
ones of 80 km/h. The different classes are equally distributed. The IVSs only drive
the maximum speed if the traffic conditions allow it. They also overtake only if there
is space to do so. Furthermore, only ten percent of the IVSs are equipped with an
application software that utilizes the proposed anonymous key agreement protocol.
This is a typical market share for big car manufactures [Blo14]. More equipped IVSs
would make it even more difficult for an attacker to link the identities. We assume
the pseudonyms of all IVSs have the same validity duration, otherwise an attacker
can exploit this information to identify an IVS.
The envisaged simulation duration is 60 minutes. Since it takes some time until
the simulation is adjusted, we cut 10 minutes both at the beginning and at the end
of the simulation. Due to the long simulation duration for one run, we decided to
run the simulation without considering the different protocol parameters detailed
in Section 5.4.2. Instead, we log which IVSs establish a session key during the
simulation and map all parameters afterwards in the IVSs. We run 50 simulations
to create a sufficient pool of simulation results to choose from. To evaluate more
than 50 days, we randomly select as much simulation results as necessary from the
pool of all 50 simulation runs and map the protocol parameters afterwards into the
simulation.
The elaborated results show that every day each IVS executes the protocol at least
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Table 5.2.: Range of the considered parameters
Parameter Range Default
Ring size 2 - 15 10
One time vehicles 10% - 90% 30%
Starting time deviation 1 min - 10 min 5 min
Ring building strategy all outlined SameDirectionLastDays
Parallel pseudonyms 1 - 15 10
Attack duration 1 day - 360 days 30 days
once in the communication range of each IRS. Furthermore, we assume an attacker
on the plain version of the protocol. Thus, an attacker needs only one IRS under
her control in order to record the pseudonyms applied in the rings of all passing
IVSs. Therefore, an attacker also cannot get more information about the applied
pseudonyms by having control over some of the IVSs. In Section 5.4.3 we describe
the behavior of the attacker in more detail.
5.4.2. Considered Parameters
The anonymity of the IVS is influenced by various parameters when they apply the
proposed anonymous authentication protocol. We considered the following parame-
ters in the subsequent simulation runs. A summary of all parameters and their range
of values is given in Table 5.2.
Ring size
The ring size denotes the number of pseudonyms present in the ring signature. We
varied the ring size between 2 and 15 to assess the impact. Unless explicitly men-
tioned, we apply 10 pseudonyms.
Fraction of one time vehicles
These IVSs apply a set of pseudonyms in their ring that is completely unknown to
the other IVSs. They shall reflect that most IVSs drive the same route each day, but
there are always IVSs that normally do not take this route in rush-hour, e.g., trucks.
We varied this value between 10% and 90% to determine the effect of this parameter.
Unless explicitly mentioned, we consider 30% of such one time vehicles.
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Standard deviation of the starting times
People are driving to work every day at approximately the same time. Therefore, the
starting times of the IVSs are assumed to be normally distributed. The standard devi-
ation has an influence on the potential communication partners. Therefore, we alter
it between 1 and 10 minutes. Unless explicitly stated we use a standard deviation of
5 minutes.
Ring building strategy
When ring signatures are in place, an IVS is one of n possible signers. It is important
to apply a good ring building strategy, because a poor strategy can lead to revealing
of most or even all of the non-signers, so the anonymity of the signer decreases. In
the following we suggest some appropriate strategies to build a ring. We evaluate
these strategies later on in Section 5.4.4.
All: The IVSs collect and save all pseudonyms they receive from other IVSs. When
the IVSs need to build a new ring, they randomly select the required number of
pseudonyms from their pools.
SameDirection: IVSs using this strategy collect and save all pseudonyms they re-
ceive from other IVSs driving in the same direction. The basic idea behind is that
IVSs in rush-hour drive every day at approximately the same time in the same direc-
tion. Therefore, an attacker cannot delete the pseudonyms of the IVSs driving each
day in the opposite direction from the ring. The same ring building strategy as for
"All" is applied.
SameDirectionLastDays: This strategy is similar to "SameDirection". The only
difference is that the IVSs discard pseudonyms they met more than X days ago. The
reason for this is that each day the IVSs collect pseudonyms of one time vehicles they
never met before and unlikely meet again. If an IVS applies such pseudonyms in its
ring, an attacker is able to identify and remove them to get the identity of the victim
IVS. This can be done because they are less used than other pseudonyms. When
limiting the number of pseudonyms by the number of previous days, the influence
of these IVSs decreases. Unless explicitly mentioned, we apply this ring building
strategy. To get the optimal number of previous days, we ran simulations with day
values ranging from 1 to 10 for the various pseudonym pool sizes. Based on the
outcome of these runs, we selected the most appropriate number of days.
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SameDirectionLastDaysDifferentSizes: This strategy works similar to "SameDi-
rectionLastDays", but each IVS applies an own ring size. This strategy is evaluated
later on to assess the influence of different ring sizes on the anonymity of the IVSs.
Number of own pseudonyms
The number of own pseudonyms an IVS possesses at the same time is an important
parameter for the privacy. Each time a ring is being build, the IVS randomly selects
one. We varied the number of parallel pseudonyms between 1 and 15 to assess the
impact. Unless explicitly stated, we exploit 10 simultaneous pseudonyms.
Duration of the attack
The duration of the attack denotes the number of days the attacker listens to the
exchanged messages. We vary the duration between 1 and 360 days to evaluate the
effect of this parameter. Unless explicitly mentioned, we consider an attack duration
of thirty days.
5.4.3. Attacker Behavior
The considered attacker in the simulation is a passive one aiming at the plain version
of the protocol. Furthermore, the attacker has knowledge of all simulation parame-
ters. This attacker type is sufficient, because even the most powerful attacker aiming
at the encrypted or plain version cannot gain more information. The attacker tries to
identify the application-specific pseudonym of an IVS from the ones used in the ring
signature. The behavior of the attacker can be divided into three stages.
In the first stage the attacker records all exchanged messages in order to analyze
them later on.
After recording, the attacker counts how often each pseudonym has been applied.
Then, she selects the relevant pseudonyms. These are the ones which are applied
at least DaysObserving/PseudonymPoolSize times, where DaysObserving denotes
the number of days the attacker recorded the messages and PseudonymPoolSize the
number of valid own pseudonyms each IVS possesses at one point in time, respec-
tively. Thus, only pseudonyms applied regularly are considered. The filtered ones
might be introduced to the communication by IVSs driving only once the observed
street. The pseudocode for the filtering algorithm is given in Figure 5.5.
The third and last stage starts with the identification of unambiguous pseudonyms
and is shown as pseudocode in Figure 5.6. A pseudonym is unambiguous, if it is the
only relevant pseudonym of a ring. Therefore, this pseudonym must be the identity
of the IVS.
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1: // Count pseudonym usage
2: Create hashmap hm for pseudonym usage
3: for each collected message m do
4: for each used pseudonym p in m do
5: if hm.contains(p) then
6: hm.put(p,hm.get(p)+1)
7: else
8: hm.put(p,1)
9: end if
10: end for
11: end for
12: // Select relevant pseudonyms
13: Create list relevantPseudonyms
14: for each pseudonym p in hm do
15: if p > DaysObserving/PseudonymPoolSize then
16: relevantPseudonyms.add(p)
17: end if
18: end for
Figure 5.5.: Pseudonym filtering algorithm applied by the passive attacker
Afterwards, these unambiguous pseudonyms are deleted from all rings of the other
IVSs on this day. By ’delete’ we mean that it is now clear that this pseudonym
does not belong to the IVS and we therefore do no longer need to consider it in the
respective rings.
If each IVS applies an own ring size, unambiguous pseudonyms are also deleted
from the IVSs applying a different ring size in other days. By ’own ring size’ we
mean that not all IVSs apply the same number of pseudonyms to construct their ring
signature. We can delete these pseudonyms, because we know the ring size of the
IVS owning the pseudonym is different.
If any pseudonyms were deleted, the attacker tries to identify new unambiguous
pseudonyms, otherwise the attacker is finished.
Now the attacker has reduced the ring size of the IVSs by excluding pseudonyms,
which cannot be the identities of the IVSs. We evaluate in the sequel by how much
the attacker is able to reduce the ring size and therefore the k-anonymity in presence
of the different parameters.
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1: do
2: reduced = f alse
3: // Identify unambiguous pseudonyms
4: Create list unambiguousPseudonyms
5: for each collected message m do
6: for each pseudonym p in m do
7: if m.relevantPseudonyms == 1 then
8: unambiguousPseudonyms.add(p)
9: end if
10: end for
11: end for
12: // Reduce ring sizes
13: for each collected message m do
14: for each pseudonym p in m do
15: if p ∈ unambiguousPseudonyms ∧ m.day ==
unambiguousPseudonyms.get(p).day then
16: m.delete(p)
17: reduced = true
18: end if
19: end for
20: end for
21: // Handle different ring sizes
22: if di f f erentRingSizes then
23: for each collected message m do
24: for each pseudonym p in m do
25: if p∈ unambiguousPseudonyms∧ p.ringSize! = m.ringSize then
26: m.delete(p)
27: reduced = true
28: end if
29: end for
30: end for
31: end if
32: while reduced == true
Figure 5.6.: Ring size reduction algorithm applied by the passive attacker
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Figure 5.7.: Impact of the ring size to the k-anonymity
5.4.4. Inﬂuence of Considered Parameters
In this section we discuss the evaluation results of the previous introduced parameters
and give recommendations on suitable values.
Ring size
The k-anonymity of the IVSs, calculated according to [Swe02], increases linearly
with the ring size from 1.6 when a ring size of 2 is applied over 7.0 when a ring size
of 10 is used, up to 10.3 when a ring size of 15 is being applied. The values for all
ring sizes from 2 to 15 are illustrated in Figure 5.7. A larger ring size increases the
number of potential signers. Subsequently, it gets more difficult for an attacker to
identify the creator of the signature. Therefore, we recommend using a ring size as
large as possible.
Fraction of one time vehicles
The k-anonymity of the IVSs decreases from 8.6, when only 10 % of the IVSs are
one time vehicles over 5.5, when 50 % of the IVSs are one time vehicles, down to
2.7, when 90 % of the IVSs in the simulation appear only once. The reason for the
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Figure 5.8.: Impact of the number of one time vehicles to the k-anonymity
decrease is that there are more new IVSs and therefore also more new pseudonyms
in the simulations, which are considered by the IVSs during ring building. These
values are also illustrated by Figure 5.8.
Standard deviation of the starting times
An increase or decrease of the standard deviation of the starting times had no notable
influence on the anonymity of the IVSs. However, the starting times of an IVS for
the default standard deviation of 5 minutes and 1000 days is given in Figure 5.9.
Ring building strategy
The influence of the ring building strategy to the k-anonymity is shown in Fig-
ure 5.10. The x-axis displays the month in which the attacker analyzes the messages
since the start of pseudonyms usage. Month 1 is therefore the analysis of the first
month, month 2 of the second month, and so on.
The k-anonymity value decreases over time for the strategies "All" and "SameDi-
rection". The strategies "SameDirectionLastDays" and "SameDirectionLastDaysD-
ifferentSizes" maintain the k-anonymity of the IVSs after the second month.
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Figure 5.10.: Impact of ring building strategies
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For "All" the k-anonymity decreases from 6.4 in the first month down to 1.2 in
the twelfth month. This is because of the potential high number of pseudonyms
from IVSs driving in opposite direction applied in the ring signatures of the IVSs.
Therefore, an attacker is able to exclude them from the list of possible signers.
The average k-anonymity value when using the "SameDirection" strategy is 6.6
in the first month and steadily decreases over time down to 2.8 after twelve months.
This strategy decreases slower than "All" because the IVSs applying it do not include
IVSs from the opposite direction in their ring signatures. However, the attacker is
still able to filter out the applied pseudonyms from one time IVSs.
When applying the "SameDirectionLastDays" strategy, the IVSs have a constant
k-anonymity of 7.0 from the second month on. This is because the IVSs apply only
pseudonyms obtained in the last few days to create their ring signature. Therefore, it
is even more difficult for an attacker to filter out irrelevant pseudonyms. Furthermore,
the number of irrelevant pseudonyms does not increase over time.
For the strategy "SameDirectionLastDaysDifferentSizes" the k-anonymity value
drops from 7.0 to 4.8 compared to the case when the same sizes are used after the
first month. When IVSs apply different ring sizes, it is possible for an attacker to
further reduce the number of possible signers by excluding the pseudonyms applied
in signatures with a different ring size.
These results show that all IVSs should apply the same ring size to keep the k-
anonymity at a high level. If only pseudonyms received in the last few days are
considered, the k-anonymity of the IVSs does not decrease over time.
Number of own pseudonyms and duration of the attack:
Figure 5.11 illustrates the k-anonymity of the IVSs for different numbers of own
pseudonyms as a function of the number of days an attacker records the exchanged
messages. It shows that the k-anonymity value decreases with the number of days
an attacker listens to the exchanged messages. With each additional day the attacker
gets more information to identify new irrelevant pseudonyms and remove them from
the ring signatures. In addition, the k-anonymity value increases with the number
of own pseudonyms. When the IVSs possess less pseudonyms valid at the same
time there are less circulating pseudonyms and it gets easier for an attacker to iden-
tify irrelevant pseudonyms. Depending on the assumed attack duration, either more
pseudonyms have to be used or the pseudonyms have to be renewed more often in
order to maintain a certain level of anonymity.
If the operator of an application aims, for example, at a k-anonymity of at least
5 for its subscribers, the IVSs could apply a new set of 5 pseudonyms every 30
days, a set of 10 pseudonyms every 60 days or a set of 15 pseudonyms every 90
days. This sums up to 60 pseudonyms per year. If we compare this value to the
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Figure 5.11.: Impact of the own pseudonym pool size and attack duration
safety pseudonyms, where the pseudonym should be changed at least with every
trip, we can easily see that the proposed protocol reduces the number of necessary
pseudonyms considerably. The amount and usage duration of pseudonyms also de-
pends on the online connectivity and available storage of the IVSs.
We showed in this section that the k-anonymity of the IVSs can be enhanced by
the protocol. At the same time, it reduces the number of pseudonyms each IVS needs
to store considerably. Furthermore, we showed that parameters like the ring size or
number of parallel pseudonyms have a huge influence on the resulting k-anonymity
of the IVSs.
5.5. Real-World Evaluation
The outlined protocol was also evaluated on vehicles equipped with real-world hard-
ware. We created a prototype implementation to evaluate the size of the ring signa-
ture, size of the transmitted messages, and the time necessary to execute the whole
protocol, each single step, and the different phases. Furthermore, we evaluated how
the prototype implementation is affected by faulty messages, the execution with mul-
tiple IVSs at the same time and the exchange of real payload.
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5.5.1. Implementation
We outline the prototype implementation of the key-agreement protocol in the se-
quel. The implementation was done as part of [Bar15a]. We applied Java as program-
ming language to implement the protocol since we only had access to a GeoNetwork-
ing implementation in Java. For cryptographic operations we applied the Bouncy
Castle2 library. As ring signature scheme we implemented the version proposed
in [LLZ+07]. Message size is an important factor in VANETs because the chan-
nel capacity is very limited. In order to minimize the channel load, we applied EC
point compression [VMA00]. Furthermore, we used the Java Deflater to compress
the pseudonyms applied in the ring signature with zlib3. The required certificates
were issued by the Car2Car Pilot PKI from the C2C-CC, which are compliant with
the corresponding ETSI standard [ETS13]. The pseudonyms applied for signing the
GeoNetworking package contain one key for signing and one for encrypting data
each. Furthermore, the AIDs for CAMs and DENMs were included. This resulted
in a total pseudonym size of 170 bytes. For the application specific pseudonyms
exploited by the ring signature we applied 42 as AID and a key for signing. This
resulted in a total size of 132 bytes for the application specific pseudonyms.
Because of the frequent topology changes in VANETs, IVSs often leave the com-
munication range of temporal communication partners. Therefore, we addressed
such communication losses as follows. If a message was not received by the other
IVS, both partners run in a timeout and the execution of the protocol is stopped.
We did not implement retries, because this could result in an unnecessary channel
congestion due to the fact that the other IVS is most likely no longer in the communi-
cation range. If an error is detected in a message, the execution of the protocol is also
stopped. If the IVSs detect afterwards that they are still in communication range, they
execute the protocol from scratch. If the execution of the protocol fails more than
n times with one IVS, no further attempts to execute the protocol are made. Only
messages relevant to execute the protocol are processed. Other messages like CAMs
are dropped. The protocol is only executed once with each IVS in a configurable
time interval. The corresponding state machine of the protocol implementation is
illustrated in Figure 5.12.
To support the parallel execution of the protocol with multiple IVSs at the same
time, the implementation has a dedicated task to send the periodical SAM. A second
task processes all incoming messages. In a first step it drops the messages not rel-
evant for the protocol execution. Then it checks if the protocol is already executed
with the IVS. In case the protocol is not yet executed, it creates a new state machine
for this IVS and passes the message to it. If the protocol is already executed with the
2www.bouncycastle.org
3www.zlib.net
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Figure 5.12.: State machine of the protocol implementation
IVS, the message is directly passed to the corresponding state machine.
The SAM rate, timeout, and number of failed protocol executions until the execu-
tion is stopped can be configured as a parameter at startup. The implementation also
supports different ring sizes and arbitrary payload. Furthermore, we utilized the first
byte of the payload to indicate the version and protocol step number.
5.5.2. Measurement Setup
The measurement setup for the real-world evaluation consists of multiple develop-
ment vehicles. Each vehicle is equipped with one Application Unit (AU) and one
Communication and Control Unit (CCU). The AU runs the application software. As
hardware for the AU we utilized a NEXCOM VTC6200 with an Intel Atom D510
Dual Core CPU with 1.6 GHz and 2 GB of memory. As operating system Ubuntu
Linux 14.04 was applied. The CCU is responsible to send messages over DSRC to
other vehicles. As CCU we utilized a NEC LinkBird-MX, which has a MIPSel ar-
chitecture and Debian etch as operating system. The messages generated by the AU
are forwarded via a User Datagram Protocol/Internet Protocol (UDP/IP) packet to
the CCU, which sends them on reception over DSRC to all IVSs in communication
range. Once the message is received by the CCU of another IVS, it is forwarded
via a UDP/IP packet to the AU. There, the message is processed and a response
generated. This setup is illustrated by Figure 5.13. In order to keep the evaluation
procedure simple, only two vehicles were used to measure the execution times of the
protocol if not otherwise mentioned.
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Figure 5.13.: Protocol evaluation setup
5.5.3. Signature Size
The signature size needs careful consideration. For the driver it is important to aim
at a ring signature as big as possible and, therefore, to be indistinguishable from as
many other signers as possible. However, each additional signer of a ring signature
increases the size of the ring signature by one pseudonym and one elliptic curve
point. Since we want the maximum possible anonymity for the IVSs, we try to make
the ring as large as possible, but we also have to avoid any message fragmentation at
the Medium Access Control layer if possible [ETS09a]. Therefore, we analyze the
size of the signature depending on the number of ring members first and determine
the maximum feasible message size later in Section 5.5.4.
As described in Section 5.5.1, we exploited the EC ring signature scheme pro-
posed in [LLZ+07] with curve P-256 and pseudonyms from the Pilot PKI of the
C2C-CC. Furthermore, we applied point compression and an AID with SSPs to bind
them to a specific application. The resulting size of each pseudonym is 132 bytes.
The resulting signature size as a function of the ring sizes is shown in Figure 5.14.
The size of the signature increases linearly with every ring member by the size of
one pseudonym Cert (132 bytes) and one EC-Point x (33 bytes), which are in total
165 bytes.
5.5.4. Message Size
Because some messages of the protocol increase with the ring size, we have to deter-
mine the largest message in the protocol and measure its size to determine the maxi-
mum possible ring size while avoiding message fragmentation. The largest message
in the proposed protocol results from Step 1. It contains all ECIES parameters and
a ring signature. However, the pseudonyms applied in the ring signature might be
compressed in order to reduce the overall size of the message.
The size of the complete GeoNetworking packet for the first step of the protocol as
a function of the ring sizes for both versions of the protocol with and without com-
pression is illustrated by Figure 5.15. We observed that the Linux software driver
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Figure 5.14.: Signature size as a function of the ring size
of the DSRC card within the CCU does only support a maximum message size of
2364 bytes when the largest possible Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) is in op-
eration. Therefore, the grey area of the figure indicates the maximum message size
of the applied hardware. These measurements are done on a computer with the same
implementation of the protocol as used later in real vehicles in order to measure
larger messages.
The message size increases linearly with the ring size. In addition to the signature
size evaluated in Section 5.5.3 it consists of the ECIES parameters V (65 bytes), C
(20 bytes), and T (16 bytes), the GeoNetworking information (322 bytes) as well
as the protocol step information (1 byte). It furthermore shows that compression
reduces the message size considerably. However, there is no huge difference between
the message of the plain and encrypted version of the protocol.
The graph indicates that for the maximum packet size of 2364 bytes as for the
utilized hardware a ring size of 11 is feasible if no compression is applied. When
compression is in operation and fragmentation at the Medium Access Control layer
shall be avoided a ring size of 13 is possible for the plain and encrypted version of
the protocol. Although 13 does not denote a large set, we showed in Section 5.4
that even a ring size of 10 is sufficient for the protocol and use case presented in
order to preserve the privacy of the IVSs while reducing the number of necessary
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Figure 5.15.: Message size of the complete GeoNetworking packet for the second
step both versions of the protocol as a function of the ring size with
and without compression
pseudonyms. For the feasible ring sizes between 11 without compression and 13 with
enabled compression the payload of the GeoNetworking package is around 81 % of
the overall message size.
Messages of this size are much larger than safety messages. However, they are
sent at a much lower frequency. Safety messages are sent up to 10 times a second,
whereas the messages in the proposed protocol for the envisaged use case will be
sent only a few times per hour. The messages are also sent on a different channel as
the safety messages and do not have critical time constraints like safety messages.
The envisaged channel is expected to be also applied for Internet browsing, video
streaming or software updates.
The influence of compression for the different ring sizes is depicted in Table 5.3.
It shows that the compression factor increases with the overall message size. For a
ring size of 13 the overall message size is reduced by over 12 % when the encrypted
version of the protocol is applied.
The message size for the plain and encrypted version of the protocol are similar.
They only differ by the padding bytes of AES. We have a closer look to this in the
sequel. Figure 5.16 shows the difference of the largest message of the encrypted
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Table 5.3.: Compressed and uncompressed message size for both protocol versions
in bytes and the gained compression
Ring Size Uncompressed Compressed Compression Gainplain enc plain enc plain enc
2 802 792 793 792 1.12 % 0.00 %
3 967 952 932 920 3.62 % 3.36 %
4 1132 1128 1073 1064 5.21 % 5.67 %
5 1297 1288 1211 1208 6.63 % 6.21 %
6 1462 1448 1350 1336 7.66 % 7.73 %
7 1627 1624 1490 1480 8.42 % 8.87 %
8 1792 1784 1628 1624 9.15 % 8.97 %
9 1957 1944 1766 1752 9.76 % 9.88 %
10 2122 2120 1905 1896 10.23 % 10.57 %
11 2287 2280 2042 2040 10.71 % 10.53 %
12 2452 2440 2175 2168 11.30 % 11.15 %
13 2617 2616 2306 2296 11.88 % 12.23 %
14 2782 2776 2440 2440 12.29 % 12.10 %
15 2947 2936 2575 2568 12.62 % 12.53 %
and plain version in bytes. The negative values indicate that the encrypted version
of the protocol has a smaller message size. When the plain version is applied only
the signature is encrypted. It has a length of 33 bytes and is therefore encrypted
in three AES blocks of 16 bytes, where the last block is padded with 15 bytes to
a multiple of the block size. In the encrypted version of the protocol more data is
encrypted, whereby less padding bytes are applied and therefore the overall message
size is reduced. Therefore, the message size of both versions differ by a maximum
of 15 bytes. For the maximum possible ring size of 13, the message size of the
encrypted version is 10 bytes smaller than for the plain version.
The lengths of the single parts of the GeoNetworking message as function of the
ring size (rs) and payload length (pl) are depicted in Table 5.4 for both protocol
versions and all steps.
Because the encrypted version of the protocol has, as shown in the simulation, a
better protection from attackers and compression enables the usage of a larger ring
size, we apply these features in the following if not otherwise stated.
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Figure 5.16.: Message size as a function of ring size: Size difference of encrypted
and plain message
Table 5.4.: Lengths of the single GeoMessage parts for the different protocol steps
in bytes for both protocol versions without compression
Part Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 / 4 Step 5
BH 4 4 4 4
SP Info 2 2 2 2
HF 183 183 183 183
PF Info 5 5 3 for pl <= 64 35 for pl > 64
CH 8 8 8 8
EH 48 48 48 48
TP 4 4 4 4
Payload 1+101+ 1+192∗ rs+48 1+16∗d pl16e 1plain 192∗ rs+48
Payload 1+101+16∗ 1+16∗
1+16∗d pl16e 1encrypted d 192∗rs+3316 e d 192∗rs+3316 e
TF 68 68 68 68
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5.5.5. Execution Time
We measured the execution time of the complete protocol, of constituent steps, and of
the different phases to assess the feasibility of the protocol in terms of the execution
time. For each measurement, we executed the protocol 550 times. If not otherwise
mentioned, we used a payload length of 1.000 bytes, the encrypted version of the
protocol, compression, a SAM rate of 3 seconds, a timeout of 3 seconds, and a
protocol execution repetition of 5 seconds. We exploited random bytes as the payload
in Steps 4 and 5 if not otherwise stated. Due to code optimizations of the Java Virtual
Machine (VM) at run time, we observed a steady reduction in the total execution time
of the protocol for the first executions of each measurement. Therefore, we dropped
the first 50 measurements of each run.
Complete Protocol
The measurement for the execution time of the complete protocol starts when IVS A
sends the SAM by its AU and ends when the same IVS receives the acknowledgment
of Step 5 by the AU. We measured this time for both protocol versions with com-
pressed and uncompressed pseudonyms and different ring sizes. We also varied the
amount of payload between 100 and 1.500 bytes and the speed of the IVSs between
0 and 130 km/h. The results of these measurements are discussed in the sequel.
Because of the maximum supported message size of 2364 bytes for the exploited
DSRC card we were able to measure the execution times for ring sizes with 13 or
less signers only. The resulting execution time for the protocol increases linearly
depending on the ring size value. For example, a ring size of 2 requires for the
whole protocol execution 188 ms time, while it takes around 412 ms to complete the
protocol for a ring size value of 13.
The increase of the protocol duration for a larger ring size is due to the fact that
for a larger ring size more cryptographic operations have to be executed in order to
create or validate a ring signature. In addition, more transmission time is necessary to
transmit these larger messages. The operations to create and validate a ring signature
are executed twice, i.e., once for each participating IVS. If the time necessary to
create and validate the ring signatures is removed from the overall execution time,
then the execution time increases only a few milliseconds for each additional ring
member. This slight increase is due to the additionally transferred data. The overall
execution time, the time without the ring operations as well as the time necessary to
create or validate the ring signatures are shown in Figure 5.17.
In order to rate the complete execution time of 412 ms when a ring size of 13
is applied, it is necessary to know how long IVSs stay in communication range.
In general, IVSs in a VANET have a communication range of several hundred me-
ters [dB14]. If we assume two IVSs having a communication range of only 100 m
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and a relative velocity of 200 km/h, i.e., the IVSs are driving in opposite directions
each with a speed of 100 km/h, then they stay in their communication range for more
than 3 seconds. Therefore, there is plenty of time to execute the protocol, even under
such harsh conditions.
When the payload transmitted in Steps 4 and 5 is increased, the protocol needs
only a few additional milliseconds to be executed because of the larger message
sizes. Different speed of the IVSs has no measurable influence on the execution
time of the protocol. Furthermore, we did not observe any difference resulting from
executing the encrypted or the plain version with or without compression.
Protocol Steps
We measured how long it takes to execute each step of the protocol. In order to do
so we started the measurement when the message of the previous step is received by
the application software running on the AU until the new generated message is sent
from the Java application to the CCU. Therefore, the duration of each step includes
the verification of the received GeoNetworking package and creation of the sent
GeoNetworking package. We calculated the time necessary to transmit the message
between the IVSs from the information how long each single step takes and from the
complete execution duration.
The results illustrate the influence of the ring signature operations on the overall
execution time as visible in Figure 5.18. Step 1 to 3 consume 80 % of the overall
protocol execution time. Step 1 is dedicated to the creation of a ring signature. In
Step 2 the resulting ring signature is validated and a new ring signature is created.
In Step 3 the verification of the ring signature created in Step 3 is performed. All
other steps, the transmission and other operations take 20 % of the execution time.
A comparison of the execution duration of the protocol steps for different ring sizes
is given in Appendix A.1.
Figure 5.19 shows the time necessary to execute the individual parts of the single
protocol steps. We differentiate between Sending, Receiving, AES, ECIES, Ring
Creation, Ring Verification, and Other. Each step includes Receiving which is the
time to parse the GeoNetworking message and verify its signature. Furthermore,
all steps except the verification of Step 5 consume time for Sending where the new
GeoNetworking package is built and a corresponding signature is generated. AES
and ECIES denote the respective cryptographic operations. Ring Creation is the time
necessary to create a new ring signature while Ring Verification is the time necessary
to verify a ring signature. The remaining operations are grouped in Other.
For all steps Sending always takes between 5 and 6 ms, while Receiving takes
between 10 and 12 ms. The AES operations for encryption and decryption take no
measurable time. The main time consumed in the Steps 1 to 3 is caused by the ring
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Figure 5.18.: Duration of the protocol steps, transmission time, and other operations
signature operations Ring Creation and Ring Verification with at least 70 % in each
step. The execution times of the single parts of the protocol steps for ring sizes
ranging from 2 to 12 are given in Appendix A.1.
Protocol Phases
The duration of the protocol can also be split into different protocol phases, namely
Security, Transmission, Receiving / Sending, and Other minor operations. The se-
curity phase of the protocol cause nearly two third of the overall execution time as
visible from Figure 5.20. The GeoNetworking operations Receiving / Sending take
in total 94 ms, which is nearly a quarter of the whole execution time. These opera-
tions contain the security operations to create and verify the GeoNetworking packet.
We included the security in there, because we assume GeoNetworking, including its
security, as given. Therefore, it is independent of the security the key agreement
protocol introduces. However, in our evaluation setup the security is responsible for
66 ms of the overall 94 ms of the execution time for GeoNetworking. This time
will be reduced considerably in production vehicles. There it will be implemented in
hardware to meet the timing requirements [SAE16b]. The remaining execution time
is shared between Transmission and Other.
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Figure 5.19.: Necessary time to execute the individual parts of the protocol steps
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Figure 5.20.: Duration of Security, Receiving / Sending, Transmission, and Other
times in percent of the total execution time
The security might be further split into Ring Signature operations, ECIES, and
AES as illustrated by Figure 5.21. This shows that the creation and validation of the
ring signatures consume 93 % of all time necessary for security operations. ECIES
takes only 7 % of the security time while the time for AES is negligible. A consider-
able time consumed for security purposes could be reduced either by creating a more
efficient software version or by mapping the algorithms to a dedicated hardware im-
plementation.
5.5.6. Faulty Messages
We created a piece of software, which allows us to inject bit errors in certain parts
of the message or to change the order of the received and sent messages. Thus, we
are now in the position to test the robustness of the implemented protocol. We in-
jected random bit errors in the ECIES parameters, ring signature, payload, or in the
whole secured GeoNetworking packet. The outlined implementation of the protocol
successfully detected all introduced errors during the message processing. Further-
more, it always recovered successfully from the resulting error states by executing
the protocol from scratch.
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Figure 5.21.: Duration of different security operations
5.5.7. Multiple Communication Partners
All previous presented measurements are based on the execution of the protocol
between two IVSs. In a real-world scenario an IVS might not only meet one ITS
Vehicle Station at a time to execute the protocol. It rather may in communication
range of multiple IVSs supporting the protocol. Therefore, it should be possible to
execute the protocol with multiple IVSs at the same time. We tested this by running
our implementation on three hardware setups at the same time. Two IVSs run the
software without sending SAMs. Afterwards the program is started on the third
hardware setup with activated SAMs. As soon as the other two IVSs received the
first SAM, they started sending protocol Step 1 to the initiating hardware setup,
which then responded to both IVSs separately with Step 2. This was also done with
the remaining protocol steps until all steps are transmitted. Therefore, these results
show that it is possible to execute the protocol with multiple IVSs at the same time.
Hence, an IVS is able to confidential exchange data with different IVSs at the same
time by applying the outlined protocol.
5.5.8. Real Payload
In the previous tests random data was applied as payload in Step 3 and 4. We ad-
ditionally exploited an application which utilized the built-in camera of the IVS in
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order to detect and store the passing traffic signs locally [Bre14] as an example ap-
plication to exchange real data between IVSs. The transmitted data included the
detection time, type, and position including the altitude and heading of the traffic
sign. We exchanged the traffic signs without optimizing the representation format.
The traffic signs are serialized by a Java ObjectOutputStream which also serializes
the structure of the class. Hence, the first sign takes 382 bytes while each additional
traffic sign consumed 83 additional bytes. Hence, it was possible to transmit at most
20 traffic signs at once for a maximum message size of 2364 bytes and a GeoNet-
working overhead of 322 bytes is assumed.
5.6. Summary
In this chapter, we proposed and evaluated two versions of a novel anonymous au-
thenticated key agreement protocol which combines ECIES with ring signatures.
The protocol enables two IVSs to authenticate each other and agree on a symmetric
encryption key to exchange confidential data without leaking their identity. There-
fore, the protocol protects the privacy of communication and identity of the involved
IVSs.
We first detailed the single steps of both the plain and encrypted version of the pro-
tocol. Then, we wrapped the messages of the protocol into GeoNetworking packets,
which is a common means in VANETs to address other IVSs.
Furthermore, we analyzed which sensitive information different types of attackers
might gain in terms of possible identities or applied ring size. The results show that
even a passive attacker without any access to valid pseudonyms might get all infor-
mation when attacking the plain version of the protocol. If the encrypted version of
the protocol is applied, only an active attacker with at least access to pseudonyms
applied in safety communication is necessary to get possible identities of the com-
municating IVS. Even if the attacker gets the possible identities, she is not able to
get any attributes of the IVS besides the ones which are anyway necessary to obtain
pseudonyms for the application.
In order to assess the privacy impact of the protocol we set up a realistic simula-
tion scenario. The results show that the anonymity of the IVSs increases significantly
when a larger ring size or good ring building strategy is applied. An attacker cannot
simply link different executions of the protocol by the same IVS and identify often
visited locations. Therefore, the protocol protects the privacy of identity and location
of the involved IVSs. We also demonstrated that the number of pseudonyms each
IVS applies at the same time and the duration of the attack have a clear influence
on the anonymity level of the IVSs. In comparison to safety-related communica-
tion, less pseudonyms for each IVS over time are necessary to maintain a high level
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of anonymity, because they can be reused without the risk of being linked by an
attacker. Therefore, the amount of pseudonyms, which have to be loaded onto the
IVSs, is significantly reduced. This saves storage space and communication over-
head and thus helps to reduce costs. Because only pseudonyms for the particular
application are exploited, the IVS does not reveal its association to other applica-
tions by executing the protocol.
In addition to the simulation, we evaluated the protocol in a real-world test setup
by implementing it into real vehicles. In these tests we demonstrated that the sim-
ulated ring sizes are realistic and could be even increased when compressing the
pseudonyms applied to create the ring signature. One of the main results of this
real-world evaluation consists in the fact that the complete protocol can be executed
in a feasible time under harsh conditions. Even two IVSs featuring a relative speed
of 200 km/h and communication range of only 100 meters are able to complete the
protocol for a ring size of 13 members while in communication range. In addition,
the relative speed of the IVSs has no measurable influence on the overall execution
time. Another interesting result was that the more privacy preserving encrypted ver-
sion of the protocol has a smaller message size and no measurable influence on the
total execution time, even though more data is encrypted. Additionally, we success-
fully evaluated the prototype implementation regarding its robustness to faults in the
exchanged messages. Finally, the protocol was successfully executed by three enti-
ties at the same time and applied to exchange real payload between the IVSs. The
overall execution time of the protocol is dominated by the requirements of security
related operations. This can be significantly reduced by optimizing the creation and
verification of the ring signature.
The novelty of the protocol proposed in this chapter consists in hiding the identity
of an IVS for multiple executions while keeping at the same time the number of
necessary pseudonyms smaller in comparison to existing protocols. We achieve this
by combining different security mechanisms. Therefore, the protocol is more general
than the single applied security mechanism and features new properties. It is also
not limited to IVSs because any two identities aiming for a protocol featuring these
properties can use the outlined scheme.
More and more OEMs are offering over the air updates for software running on
their vehicles [NL08]. However, the distribution of software updates via mobile net-
works is expensive and IRS networks are not likely to be deployed comprehensively.
Therefore, this protocol can be used to save monetary costs for transmission. When
exploiting the scheme, the distributing ICS needs to send the update to only a frac-
tion of all IVSs. These IVSs then distribute the update free of charge via DSRC and
the proposed protocol to nearby vehicles [LHH08].
The proposed protocol is not restricted to VANET use cases, but it is especially
well-suited for VANETs, because in such a context it is both expensive and some-
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times rather difficult to obtain new pseudonyms. In addition, the well-known pseu-
donyms for safety-related communication can be reused by binding them to specific
applications as shown in Chapter 4
Hence, we demonstrated that the protocol enhances the privacy of the IVSs even
against active attackers with access to valid pseudonyms. At the same time, it reduces
the amount of necessary pseudonyms. Furthermore, we showed that the protocol can
be executed in a feasible time on real vehicles.
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6 | Anonymous Data Reporting
Modern vehicles are equipped with a wide variety of sensors such as wheel speed
sensors, Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers, acceleration sensors, radars,
lasers, or cameras. The readings of these sensors are not only of interest for the
vehicle and driver, but for many other parties too.
An ICS which offers information about traffic or road conditions or up to date
map data might for example be interested in these sensor readings. However, if an
IVS just uploads its sensor readings to an ICS sensitive information might be derived
from this data. We show in the sequel that it is for example possible to detect if an
IVS was driving too fast whenever the data was tagged with a geographic position
and time.
To obscure the originating IVS of the reported data and authenticate the com-
municating entities we apply the attribute-based ATs and anonymous authenticated
key agreement between two IVSs presented in the previous chapters. Therefore, the
meaning of anonymity in this chapter is that it is difficult to extract the originating
IVS of the sensor data. To hide the identity of the originating IVS the sensor data
is exchanged between different IVSs exploiting DSRC prior to sending them to the
ICS. By way of exchanging the sensor data it is no longer possible to extract the
origin and therefore create movement profiles or identify speeding IVSs. A similar
scheme has been proposed for smart phones in [CGR+11].
Therefore, we show in this chapter how sensible data might be easily extracted
from reported data, outline our assumptions and the considered attacker model within
the application scenario, detail the proposed concept to hide the origin of the data,
and propose two different strategies on how to exchange the data between vehicles
before sending them to an ICS. For assessment purposes, we compare their efficiency
by the means of simulation and evaluate their results. Furthermore, we give a recom-
mendation on a good exchange strategy. This chapter is based on the paper [BH15a]
and was mainly extended by its motivation and evaluation.
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6.1. Motivation
An operator of an ICS could for example be interested in the data generated by the ac-
celerometer and GPS in order to detect the size and position of potholes [EGH+08],
or the information from wheel sensors in order to detect icy roads. Finally, data
about traffic signs or other data collected by the built-in camera could be applied to
increase the quality of street maps data for automated driving purposes [HER16].
Vehicles collecting these sensor readings use in general cellular networks or C2I
communication in order to forward the data to an ICS. This ICS then processes and
possibly aggregates the data. Afterwards the data is sent in the context of a sub-
scription to other IVSs present in the surrounding in order to improve road safety.
Besides sending the data to IVSs, the operator of the ICS could also sell the data
to other interested parties, e.g., the government, to improve the coordination of road
works, or third-party ICSs which further process the data and possibly merge them
with data from other sources.
However, one should be aware of the fact that all data sent to the ICS is associated
with an individual geographical position, since it is only valid in an area of just a few
meters around the detection point. Therefore, the ICS is aware of the locations visited
by an IVS over time and is thus able to create a movement profile of the IVS. This is
a very critical privacy threat, because position data of IVSs reveal privacy-sensitive
locations such as home, workplace, church or hospital. So, movement profiles are
well-suited to identify the person who drives the IVS [Kru07].
Furthermore, vehicles are driving along streets. Whenever an IVS uploads at least
two sensor readings with an associated location, it is possible to reconstruct the route
of the IVS. Therefore, it is also possible to calculate the traveled distance of the IVS.
If furthermore the timespan between the two sensor readings is known, it is possible
to calculate the average speed of the vehicle between the two sensor readings with
Equation 6.1. With additional data like the maximum allowed speed on the taken
route, it is possible to detect if the vehicle was speeding.
speed =
distance
time
(6.1)
The reconstruction of the traveled path based on uploaded sensor data has been
implemented based on OpenStreetMap (OSM) data as bachelor thesis [Lae15]. First
the positions of the sensor readings have to be mapped to the streets. Afterwards the
route between the two points is calculated. From the route information the distance
between the sensor readings was calculated and together with the timespan inserted
in Equation 6.1 in order to get the average speed of the vehicle.
An example where three traffic signs, limiting the maximum allowed speed to
70 km/h, are detected by an IVS and sent to an ICS is given in Figure 6.1. The blue
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Figure 6.1.: Average Speed reconstruction example
dots are the OSM points where the traffic signs are matched to. The resulting distance
of the street is 514 meter between the right and middle and 552 meter between the
middle and left traffic signs. The timespan between the right and middle sign are
27 seconds and 26 seconds between the middle and left traffic sign. Subsequently, the
average speed of the IVS between the right and middle traffic sign can be calculated
to 68 km/h and 76 km/h between the middle and left traffic sign. In this example
speed limit signs are send as data to the ICS. Consequently, it is easy to get the
maximum allowed speed on this street section and determine that the driver was
speeding between the middle and left traffic sign.
This shows that it is possible to calculate, based on data samples sent from an IVS
to an ICS, if an IVS was speeding. This data might be exploited to harm the driver by
selling it to insurance companies which might increase the insurance contribution.
Depending on the implementation it is also possible to detect if a driver is speed-
ing by having only one data sample, if the real sensor data position, e. g., the exact
position of the traffic sign, is known to the ICS. A regular GPS receiver periodically
outputs the current position in a defined frequency. Common frequencies are 1, 5,
and 10 Hz. Whenever an application on the IVS takes these raw positions and does
not interpolate the sensor readings, it must utilize the previous position or wait for the
next output of the receiver in order to tag the sensor readings with it. Depending on
the speed of the IVS the recorded position might be closer or farther to the real posi-
tion of the sensor event. We assume in the sequel that the application utilizes the last
known position prior to the sensor event. In case the event was recorded immediately
prior to the next position update, the applied position data is up to one second old.
In order to calculate the maximum position aberration for a given position update
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Figure 6.2.: Speeding detection by deviation measurement
frequency and vehicle speed Equation 6.2 can be utilized.
maxDistance =
speed
f requency
(6.2)
If the ICS knows the maximum allowed speed at the sensor recording location and
the position update frequency of the exploited GPS receiver, it is able to calculate
the maximum possible aberration introduced by the speed of the IVS. If the driver is
speeding, the position might be further away.
Figure 6.2 illustrates the maximum aberration for different position update fre-
quencies dependent on the speed. The dotted green line shows the maximum aber-
ration for a position update frequency of 1 Hz, the blue dashed line for 5 Hz and the
yellow dash dot line for 10 Hz. The green circular points are recorded at 1 Hz, the
blue rectangular points at 5 Hz and the yellow triangular points at 10 Hz. In all cases
where the dots have a greater distance than the corresponding maximum aberration
line, the driver of the IVS was speeding. However, this might also be true for some
of the other points in case the tagged position was recent.
Therefore, it is possible to detect if a driver is speeding by only one sensor reading.
However, if the origin of the sensor data is no longer known, it is not possible to link
the data to a specific IVS or driver. An ICS could of course decide to anonymize
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the data received by the IVS, but it is not able to prove the anonymization to its
subscribers. In order to prevent the ICS from creating movement profiles or detecting
locations where a driver was speeding, we introduce path hiding strategies for IVSs
equipped with DSRC as a powerful means to enhance the privacy of the driver. While
traveling along the roads an IVS usually encounters many other IVSs. With the help
of DSRC, IVS create a VANET with other IVSs that allow a direct data exchange.
The advocated path hiding strategies exploit DSRC in order to exchange collected
sensor data between IVSs in communication range prior to contacting the ICS. In
case the sensor readings are exchanged between IVSs before an upload operation,
an attacker at the ICS attempting to create movement profiles is no longer able to
determine the originating IVS of the sensor readings at hand. Thus, no IVS should
upload its own sensor readings to the ICS directly. Moreover, instead it uploads only
received sensor readings of some other IVSs in its communication range.
6.2. Application Scenario
We assume that IVSs are collecting sensor readings of interesting events by means
of their built-in sensors. These sensor readings consist of the position, a coarse time,
and the actual sensor value. The geographical position is necessary because the data
is in general valid only in a small area. An exact timestamp is not necessary in our
context, because most events are valid for a long time period. In the use case where
potholes are detected, for example, it does not matter at which second, minute or
hour a pothole was detected. It is sufficient to know the day or week of its detection.
The same holds for the use case where traffic signs are detected.
We assume that the collected data is digitally signed and sent over cellular net-
works or C2I communication to an ICS. The digital signature is necessary to ensure
the authenticity and integrity of the data. The ICS first aggregates the data. After-
wards, the ICS extracts the interesting information and distributes it to subscribed
IVSs in the region of interest or to other ICSs.
6.2.1. Attacker Model
The considered attacker has access to all data received by the ICS. Due to the digital
signature of the sensor data, the attacker knows which data was uploaded by the
same IVS. Even if the IVSs regularly change their identity, for signing the sensor
data, it is still possible for an attacker to reconstruct the relation between the sensor
data and a specific IVS [WMKP10]. Hence, the attacker is able to take the location
of the sensor readings to reconstruct the paths of the IVSs and thus to get information
about, e.g., the workplace or home of the drivers.
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To prevent the reconstruction of such privacy-sensitive information in the first
place, IVSs should exchange their sensor readings with other IVSs in the VANET. A
non-safety channel should be used not to impair any safety applications. By means
of exchanging sensor readings before the upload operation, the attacker at the ICS is
no longer able to decide on the origin of the sensor readings. An IVS does not send
its own sensor data to the ICS directly, it uploads only the data collected by other
IVSs.
This mechanism, however, introduces new possible attacks. An adversary on the
road could, for example, record the data transmitted between two IVSs and offer
it by its own to other ICSs without doing the work of collecting it. An adversary
could achieve this by getting control over some nodes in the VANET. To make
things worse, an adversary could not only record but also send false messages to
participating IVSs. This can lead to forwarding false sensor readings to the ICS.
Therefore, the protocol aimed to exchange data needs to send the data confidentially.
Protocols exploiting ECIES like the one proposed in Chapter 5 are best suited to be
used in VANETs to meet this requirement. To prevent the injection of messages from
manipulative IVSs and establish trust between the IVSs, mechanisms like remote
attestation [OYN+08] might be exploited too.
Because the newly introduced threats can be solved by existing techniques, we
concentrate in the remainder of this chapter on how to confuse an attacker at an ICS
by exchanging the sensor readings between IVSs before uploading them.
6.3. Scenario
An example for a sensor data exchange scenario is depicted in Figure 6.3. It shows
roads connecting a school, hospital, bank, and cinema. The sensor values Sn of
interesting events are recorded by passing vehicles. Vehicle A is aiming from the
hospital to the bank, while vehicle B takes the way from the school to the cinema
(solid lines). If A and B upload their collected sensor readings directly, the ICS can
easily reconstruct the paths of both vehicles.
In order to enhance the privacy of its drivers, the IVS exchange the collected sensor
values, when they are in proximity. In the example of Figure 6.3 this happens in the
area limited by the dotted circle. Up before reaching this area, A already collected
the sensor data of S1, S2, and S3. Vehicle B collected the sensor data of S5. After
the data exchange both vehicles continue cruising. A will now upload S5 received
from B near the school and the self-detected sensor value S6 near the bank. The
uploaded sensor values by B are the three received from A (S1, S2, and S3) and the
self-collected S4 near the cinema.
If an attacker at the ICS now tries to reconstruct the paths of these IVSs, the data
104 Anonymous Authenticated Car-to-X Communication
Hospital
Bank
Cinema
School
AA
B
B
B
A
S5
S6
S1
S2
S3
S4
Figure 6.3.: Example for a sensor data exchange
will suggest that A was driving from the school to the bank, while B was driving
from the hospital to the cinema (dotted lines in Figure 6.3). It depends on the applied
strategy, e.g., when to exchange the data with other vehicles and when to upload it,
how much an attacker at the ICS can be confused. In the following we propose
possible strategies on how to exchange the collected data between vehicles in order
to enhance privacy.
6.4. Proposed Strategies
The different stakeholders have conflicting requirements on the data exchange. In
general, the ICS requires the data as soon as possible, while in contrast the drivers
are interested in better privacy. Privacy in this context means that the position infor-
mation associated with the uploaded sensor data is far away from the own route of
the IVS and were previously collected by as many other IVS as possible, which is
rather time consuming. Another requirement by the ICS is as less load as possible at
the server to process the data, while in contrast the IVS may aim to upload some data
multiple times in order to confuse a possible attacker. We address these conflicts in
the evaluation detailed in Section 6.6.
We suggest two different strategies which are, in comparison to the ones proposed
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Figure 6.4.: Example of the exchange based strategy
in [CGR+11], optimized for VANETs. The first one is based on the number of
exchanges. If the sensor data has been exchanged n times, it will be sent to the
ICS. The second strategy is based on the distance between the position of the sensor
reading and the position of the own IVS. If the sensor readings collected by other
IVS have at least the distance d from the own route, then the data is uploaded to the
ICS. In the following we discuss these strategies in detail.
6.4.1. Exchange Based
When applying the exchange-based strategy, an IVS decides from the number of
times a sensor reading has already been exchanged, if it has to be uploaded to the
ICS or sent to another IVS. For this strategy a global parameter n is necessary,
which defines the number of times sensor readings have to be exchanged between
IVSs before uploading them. The idea of this strategy is that the more often the
sensor readings are exchanged, the more they are mixed with those of other IVSs.
An example for this strategy employing 3 exchanges is given in Figure 6.4. Vehi-
cle A records the sensor value S1 at position 0. Later it meets vehicle B at location
1, where S1 is exchanged for the first time. B now carries S1 until it meets vehicle C
at location 2, where S1 is exchanged for the second time. Vehicle C stores the sensor
reading until it encounters vehicle D at location 3. After the exchange between C
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Figure 6.5.: Example of the distance based strategy
and D the sensor value S1 is uploaded by D, because it has already been exchanged
3 times.
6.4.2. Distance Based
An IVS applying the distance-based strategy calculates for each received sensor
value the distance to its own route. If this distance is greater than a certain value,
the IVS uploads the data. Otherwise it exchanges it with another IVS. For this strat-
egy a parameter d is necessary, which defines the minimum distance between the
route of the own IVS and the location of the uploaded sensor data. Therefore, this
strategy ensures that all uploaded sensor values have a minimum distance to the own
route. This strategy ensures better privacy, since all sensor readings sent to the ICS
feature a minimum distance to all visited locations.
This strategy is illustrated in Figure 6.5. Vehicle A records the sensor value S1 at
location 0 and stores it locally. When A encounters vehicle B later on, the sensor
data S1 is exchanged. B now checks, if the distance between its own route and the
position associated with S1 is greater than d. In the example it is smaller, so the
vehicle does not upload S1. At location 2 B encounters vehicle C and sends the
sensor data S1. C now checks the distance criterion as well. Because the distance is
greater, C uploads the sensor data S1 to the ICS.
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Figure 6.6.: Simulated street network
6.4.3. Orthogonal Parameters
Both strategies depend on the parameters TimeBetweenExchanges and DataDupli-
cation which are independent from the used strategy. TimeBetweenExchanges de-
notes the time an IVS waits between two exchanges. Otherwise, the originating
IVS may possibly get its own sensor readings back and upload it. For example,
consider three IVSs (A, B and C) being in the communication range of each other.
First, A exchanges its sensor readings with B. B now immediately exchanges the
received readings with C, which now will send the data back to A, which is the ac-
tual originator of the sensor readings. To suppress such unwanted behavior, we use
TimeBetweenExchanges to introduce a delay between two exchanges.
The parameter DataDuplication defines the number of times the detecting IVS
sends the same sensor readings to other IVSs. This parameter is applied to confuse
the attacker, because it actually gets the same sensor data several times from different
IVSs without knowing the origin anymore.
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6.5. Simulation Scenario
For the deterministic simulation we exploited VSimRTI [Sch11]. As a use case
for sensor data upload we focused on the upload of speed-limit traffic signs to an
ICS. The simulation scenario utilized in this chapter is based on the one developed
in [Dah14]. In the scenario, all higher order road data in the area between Groß-
Gerau and Mainz, Germany, was imported from OSM to be used as the geographic
area. Figure 6.6 shows a map, where the imported road data is highlighted. It was
observed that the most speed-limit traffic signs can be found on this type of roads.
Therefore, the precise position information of all speed-limit traffic signs on these
roads throughout the simulation area were collected by means of trips with real ve-
hicles and were added to the simulation. Subsequently, routes for the vehicles in
the simulation were created as follows: From each road that enters the simulation
area and each city within, a route to each road leaving the area and all cities within
the area was defined. Then the traffic density on the routes was defined according
to the annual average daily traffic as documented in [Hes10]. It is further assumed
that ten percent of all vehicles considered in the simulation are equipped with the
sensor application. We implemented both proposed strategies onto the vehicles and
run separate simulations to evaluate them.
6.6. Evaluation
We varied the basic strategy parameters as follows: For the exchanged-based strat-
egy we applied 1, 3, and 5 as the number of necessary exchanges n before an upload
operation. When the distance-based strategy was applied, we used 1.5, 3, 4.5, and
6 km as the minimum distance d between the geographic position associated with
sensor readings and the own route of the IVS. For TimeBetweenExchanges we ap-
plied 60, 120, 180, 240, and 300 seconds. For the parameter DataDuplication we
used the values 1, 3, and 5. Because of the huge simulation area one simulation
run took about 20 hours. Therefore, we were not able to run the simulations with
different route choices or varying random seeds.
6.6.1. Metrics
For the evaluation of the different strategies the following metrics have been applied.
k-anonymity
Describes the number of different IVSs whose sensor readings a certain IVS uploads.
If an IVS sends data of many different IVSs to the ICS, it is more difficult to get the
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identity of a single IVS. Therefore, a higher value of k-anonymity is better.
Spatial obfuscation
Defines the mean distance between the position of the uploaded sensor data to the
route of the IVS. For an IVS it is better to have a larger distance between the up-
loaded sensor values and the own route. Then it is more difficult for an attacker to
reconstruct both the path and the sensitive locations of an IVS.
Upload delay
Describes the time elapsed between the collection of the sensor reading and the point
in time when it is received by the ICS. The ICS wants this value as small as possible,
i.e., up-to-date data.
Additional channel load
Describes how many times the IVS in total exchange sensor data between each other
using C2C communication. This metric is necessary to estimate the additional chan-
nel load caused by the exchange operations.
Amount of uploaded data
Defines the number of sensor readings uploaded to the ICS. The more additional
sensor data is received by the ICS, the more computational effort is necessary to
process the data. Therefore, the ICS aims to receive each sensor reading only once,
while the IVSs might duplicate some sensor data in order to increase their privacy.
Storage
Defines how much storage space on the IVS is necessary to store the sensor readings.
Storage is necessary to buffer the data while waiting for the next exchange with
another IVS or for a connection to the ICS.
6.6.2. Results
In this section we present only the simulation results where the DataDuplication pa-
rameter is set to 3. For other values the results are similar except for the amount of
uploaded data metric, which depends on it. The results for other values of DataDu-
plication are given in Appendix A.2.
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Figure 6.7.: k-anonymity as a function of TimeBetweenExchanges
k-anonymity
Figure 6.7 shows that the k-anonymity value of the IVSs decreases for both strategies
with TimeBetweenExchanges. If it is higher, there are less exchanges between IVSs.
Therefore, an IVS receives data from fewer other participants. The strategy-depen-
dent parameters have no significant influence on the k-anonymity of the IVSs. Please
note that the k-anonymity for the proposed strategies is quite similar. However, it
tends to be slightly better for the distance-based strategy and small TimeBetweenEx-
changes values.
Spatial obfuscation
The spatial obfuscation increases with TimeBetweenExchanges for both strategies
(see Figure 6.8). If IVSs wait longer between two exchanges, then they also travel
further in this time. Therefore, the sensor readings are also carried further from their
origin on average.
For the exchange-based strategy the spatial obfuscation increases with the number
of exchanges. Each time the data is exchanged, it is further carried away from its
origin. For the distance-based strategy it also increases with the minimum distance
d. When the minimum value is increased, it automatically increases the mean value.
For the smallest simulated value of the distance-based strategy the evaluated dis-
tance is higher than for all simulated number of exchanges of the exchange-based
strategy.
Upload delay
This value increases for the exchange-based strategy linearly with TimeBetweenEx-
changes (see Figure 6.9). When the IVSs wait longer between two exchanges, the
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sensor data also needs longer to reach the desired number of exchanges.
For the distance-based strategy the upload delay stays nearly constant. The speed
the IVS move away from the sensor data position is independent of TimeBetweenEx-
changes. The delay for the distance-based strategy is for all simulated distances be-
tween 2 and 7 minutes, while for the exchanged-based strategy it increases to more
than 11 minutes for 3 exchanges and to more than 20 minutes for 5 exchanges.
Safety relevant sensor data like an icy road can be sent in addition to all IVSs in
proximity via DSRC. In this way it is ensured that other nearby IVSs receive this
information without the introduced delay in time. The messages which are received
by the ICS with an additional delay may then also sent to other IVSs located outside
of the DSRC communication range. Therefore, these IVSs can earlier prepare for
the hazardous location.
Additional channel load
This value is almost equal for both strategy and decreases with increasing TimeBe-
tweenExchanges values. The IVSs wait longer between two exchanges and therefore
can execute less exchanges per time unit. Because the IVSs detect a speed-limit traf-
fic sign on average every 93 seconds, they almost execute the protocol immediately
after the waiting period is over. The number of exchanges for a single IVS per hour
are shown in Figure 6.10.
Amount of uploaded data
The simulation results show that the amount of uploaded data is only influenced by
the parameter DataDuplication. This parameter is the only one that actually puts
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additional data into circulation. The amount of uploaded data increases linearly with
DataDuplication.
Storage
The maximum number of sensor data to store at the same time was in all simulation
runs between 14 and 240, which results in less than one Megabyte of storage. This
is no issue, because todays vehicles carry Gigabytes of data for, e.g., navigation.
6.6.3. Recommendations
The spatial obfuscation and k-anonymity is higher for the distance-based strategy.
The distance-based strategy also has a lower upload delay, while both strategies
generate a similar amount of additional channel load.
Therefore, we recommend to use the distance-based strategy, since it ensures a
higher privacy of the IVS. In addition, it uploads the data faster than the exchange-
based strategy. We recommend also a high value of TimeBetweenExchanges, because
it increases the privacy of the IVSs, reduces the additional C2C channel load and
increases the upload delay only slightly.
6.6.4. Real Hardware
Besides the simulation we also considered the prototype implementation of the ex-
change protocol outlined in Chapter 6 in order to evaluate the path hiding strategies.
We ran it on a vehicle which was in addition equipped with a piece of software
to detect and store passing traffic signs [Bre14]. With this setup we successfully ex-
changed the detected traffic signs with other vehicles. We implemented the exchange
based strategy with a parameter to set the number of exchanges prior to sending
the traffic signs to an ICS. In different evaluation runs with different numbers of
necessary exchanges prior to sending the traffic signs to the ICS they were always
exchanged according to the parameter.
6.7. Summary
In this chapter we proposed a scheme to hide the origin of sensor data sent from
an IVS to an ICS. The scheme utilizes DSRC to exchange the sensor data between
IVSs in a VANET prior to sending them to the ICS. As protocol the one outlined
in Chapter 5 was exploited to ensure the communication privacy of the participating
IVSs. We outlined two different strategies on how to exchange the data between the
IVSs before uploading it. One is based on the distance between the uploaded data
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and the own route while the other is based on the number of times the sensor data
has been exchanged.
We created a simulation scenario to evaluate the different strategies. This scenario
contained sensor data collected by real vehicles, a real vehicle density and a real road
network imported from OSM.
We showed by the presented simulation results that exchanging sensor readings
with other IVSs obstructs the creation of movement profiles at an ICS. The data
reported to the ICS by an IVS belongs to many other IVSs too. Furthermore, it is
several kilometers away from the own route, while the introduced time delay for
uploading the data is only a few minutes. The scheme also protects the privacy of
location and identity of the originating IVS.
Compared to previous work we show that the mechanism of exchanging sensor
data prior uploading it to a central server is also well-suited to protect the privacy
of IVSs within a VANET. To archive this, we optimized strategies for exchanging
sensor data between IVSs and built up a realistic evaluation scenario in a simulator
to evaluate them. Furthermore, we outline threats which result from the special
characteristics of IVSs.
The proposed strategies may further be improved by refraining from exchanging
all collected sensor readings at once. Instead they could be divided into smaller
blocks. It is also possible to mix the outlined strategies. The distance-based strategy
may be, for example, extended by uploading the sensor values not only after a certain
distance, but also after n exchanges. Another modification would be to upload the
data after a certain time period even if it is not yet exchanged n times or the distance
is smaller than d.
To authenticate the uploading IVS, all data send to the ICS is digitally signed by
previously obtained attribute-based ATs for the utilized application. Therefore, the
ICS is aware of the AT applied by the uploading IVS. Ring signatures might be
considered to prevent this. In Chapter 5 we showed that an attacker is not able to
resolve the identity of the IVS if ring signatures are applied. Instead the attacker
only gets a set of possible signers part of the application. Furthermore, an attacker at
the IVS does not learn any attributes besides the necessary ones to obtain the AT.
When sensor readings are exchanged between IVSs prior to sending them to an
ICS, an attacker at the ICS is no longer able to identify the originating IVS of sen-
sor data. However, it might be possible to identify the vehicle model by the sensor
reading itself. For example, cameras in some vehicles might always detect the same
wrong traffic sign at a certain location. An attacker might use machine learning
algorithms in order to determine the vehicle model from this information. As coun-
termeasure, an IVS might exploit the information the machine learning algorithm
applies in order to determine the vehicle model. It could change the sensor data in-
formation prior to the upload accordingly. Then an attacker at the ICS is no longer
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able to identify the model of the detecting vehicle.
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7 | Anonymous Geocast
In the previous chapters we presented mechanisms for IVSs to authenticate for spe-
cific applications based on attributes, authenticate each other anonymously and agree
on a symmetric encryption key at the same time, and hide the origin of sensor data
sent to an ICS.
Most information in ITS is only relevant in a certain geographic area. Therefore,
the distribution of data in a defined geographic area is a common use case for ITS
applications. An ICS may have for example received sensor data from IVSs which is
relevant for all other IVSs in the region. A suitable transport mechanism is necessary
to distribute the data to the subscribers of the application located in the target region.
Different methods to distribute data in a certain geographic area exist. However, as
discussed in Section 3.4, none of them is well suited for ITS applications.
Therefore, we propose an anonymous geocast scheme in this chapter, which al-
lows an ICS to distribute messages to all IVSs subscribed to its application and
located within a certain geographic region. To protect the privacy of IVSs, our
distribution mechanism does not store information about the receiving IVSs loca-
tion or subscribed applications. We compare it with state of the art solutions and,
in addition, provide a prototype implementation which has been evaluated on real
DSRC hardware. The remainder of this chapter is a polished and extended ver-
sion of the publications [BH16a] and [BH16c]. We furthermore filed this scheme as
patent [BH15b].
7.1. Motivation
Applications in ITS with content such as map data update and information or warn-
ings on weather hazards, wrong way drivers, traffic jams, or road works ahead re-
quire that the corresponding messages are distributed in a specific geographic re-
gion, called dissemination area. A mechanism that spreads messages in a certain
geographic region is called geocast [NI97].
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If an IVS acts as the origin of such a message, it is typically already located within
the dissemination area, because generated messages are based on locally detected or
triggered events. Therefore, it simply distributes the message to all IVSs in commu-
nication range which are part of the VANET directly exploiting DSRC. The receivers
continue to forward the message in the dissemination area by means of suitable rout-
ing algorithms [Mai04].
Besides of an IVS, an ICS may also be the origin of such messages. An ICS can be
in this case, for example, a Traffic Center or a Service Center operated by an OEM.
It may also have access to a meteorological service or to a database of up-to-date
road works information to generate the messages. Typically, an ICS is stationary and
accesses the ITS network via the Internet, i.e., it is not integrated into geographic
wireless routing mechanisms. Therefore, the messages have to be transported to an
edge of the geographic wireless routing network in the target region first. The final
transmission medium can be part of any wireless communication technology, most
probably mobile networks or DSRC. The IVSs located in the area can then further
spread these messages.
There exist further requirements for a geocast such as receiver subset selection,
data encryption, dynamic overlapping dissemination areas, and message validity pe-
riods. Various ITS applications are addressing a subset of the local IVSs only, for
example paid application subscriptions or all IVSs of a vehicle brand. Hence, appli-
cation data delivery must be restrictable to an IVS target group. Messages of some
applications may further be of a commercial value and therefore require an appropri-
ate protection. Given that an IVS does not have a high computational power onboard,
it makes sense that only the desired IVSs receive and process these messages. The
dissemination area of the messages may also be dynamic. An ICS could, for exam-
ple, warn about distinct weather hazards present in various areas at the same time.
The dissemination area may in addition change over time. Another special require-
ment of messages sent by ITS applications is that they may feature a strict validity
period, in which they should be sent to each IVS entering the dissemination area too.
LTE is the current high speed communication standard for mobile networks. Sev-
eral LTE-based ITS geocast approaches have meanwhile been proposed. However,
none of them satisfies the requirements of the outlined ITS applications because they
either do not scale with the number of recipients or they are not able to automatically
distribute messages to IVSs entering the dissemination area. Furthermore, the proce-
dure becomes rather complicated when different messages have to be distributed in
various frequently changing geographic areas at the same time. In addition, none of
them considers the privacy of the IVSs accordingly. Some hurt the location privacy
by tracking the IVSs in order to determine the ones present in the target area. This
might also reveal the identity of the IVSs. Furthermore, some also require the in-
formation about all exploited applications of an IVS. When exploiting DSRC, IRSs
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within the dissemination area are in principle able to distribute the messages to rel-
evant IVSs. However, DSRC currently does not support an addressing of a group
of IVSs as the only receiver of a message. Therefore, the current mechanisms for
mobile networks and DSRC are not suitable to distribute ITS messages to a group of
IVSs in a given geographic area.
One has to consider the fact that the messages need to be distributed by different
means because it will be rather common that there will be IVSs only equipped with
either a mobile networks connection or DSRC. Furthermore, none of the communi-
cation technologies is perfectly suited to the envisaged application. The coverage
of DSRC is limited because IRS Networks are unlikely to be deployed compre-
hensively. However, they will be most likely deployed at dangerous locations. In
contrast, mobile Networks are widely available and provide a nearly complete cov-
erage, but there is a fee to transmit data over the network. DSRC does not charge
a transmission fee, only the costs for setup and operation. Therefore, a new mecha-
nism is necessary to distribute messages of ITS applications efficiently in a certain
geographical area, preferable via different communication technologies like mobile
networks and DSRC.
These are the main reasons why we propose AGfIA, which enables an ICS to
forward an ITS message to all IVSs subscribed to its application and located in or
entering a certain area. It can handle the distribution of different messages at various,
even overlapping, areas at the same time. The proposed scheme works for a versatile
distribution via both technologies, i.e., mobile network and DSRC. Moreover, it pro-
tects the privacy of the IVSs, whereas no central entity is able to track the exploited
applications of an IVS. This is achieved by minimizing the information on current
application subscriptions of an IVS being stored within the network. Furthermore,
no central entity tracking the locations of the IVSs is introduced.
7.2. Requirements
Different kinds of ITS applications require a geocast mechanism to distribute mes-
sages. To support a wide variety of such applications, a geocast mechanism for ITS
applications must fulfill different requirements. In the sequel we discuss these re-
quirements in detail.
Multiple Applications: A geocast mechanism in general introduces overhead. In
order to minimize it, such a mechanism should be generic enough to be exploited by
quite different applications. This way, applications do not have to maintain a geocast
themselves. The overhead is bundled to a single mechanism and thus minimized.
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Receiver Groups: Usually an IVS does not employ all available applications.
Each IVS does subscribe to the applications it is interested in. In order to trans-
mit the messages only to the subscribers of an application, a geocast mechanism
should support the addressing of a subset of all IVSs present in a given area.
Dissemination Area: Each ITS geocast message has a dedicated dissemination
area. Some applications, like a weather hazard warning, might intend to distribute
messages in a large area like a whole state, while others, like a particulate matter
emission or road works warning, target only a town or just a road section. The
dissemination area can also change over time, for example for moving road works.
An application might further distribute different messages to distinct areas at the
same time. In addition, these areas may overlap. Therefore, a geocast mechanism
should support individual dissemination areas for each message.
Validity Period: Events in ITS are usually temporary. To avoid dedicated cancel-
lation messages, distributes messages should have a validity period. This period may
last several minutes for, e. g., traffic jam ahead warnings, hours for, e. g., weather
hazard warnings, or even days for, e. g., road works warnings. During this validity
period the ITS message should be transmitted to each IVS entering the dissemina-
tion area. Accordingly, a geocast mechanism needs to support the transmission of
messages to all IVSs entering the dissemination area.
Content Type: ITS messages are small and thus need to be handled differently
compared to large data streams. Therefore, a geocast mechanism does not need to
support the transmission of a huge amount of data but it should be optimized for
small messages. This simplifies flow management and buffer design of involved
entities and reduces the system complexity.
Scalability: An ITS application may be exercised by quite many IVSs. Conse-
quently, a geocast mechanism should be able to scale for a large number of receivers.
End-to-End Delay: Some ITS applications like a wrong way driver warning re-
quire a real-time delivery of the messages in the dissemination area. Otherwise,
the validity period of urgent messages may be expired when the messages arrive at
the receivers. Therefore, a geocast mechanism should have an as small as possible
end-to-end delay.
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Efficient Transmission: In order to avoid unnecessary load within the communi-
cation network at hand, ITS messages should be transmitted in an efficient way. This
covers mechanism and message overhead as well as message duplication.
7.3. Scheme
ITS applications, like a weather hazard warning, require a geocast to distribute rele-
vant messages to all IVSs located in a specific geographic area. As communication
technologies we consider LTE for mobile networks and IRS Networks for DSRC. In
LTE, the clients are connected to an eNodeB which is linked to the core network of
the MNO. We assume a Mobile Network Central Station (MN CS) as part of the core
network to handle all incoming ITS geocast messages. An IRS Network consists of
one or multiple IRSs, which are connected to one IRS Central Station (IRS CS).
Like the MN CS for mobile networks the IRS CS handles all incoming ITS geocast
messages. In case that the network consists of only one IRS, the IRS CS may also
be part of this IRS. IVSs communicate with the IRS Network if they are in its com-
munication range. Both, the MN CS and the IRS CS, are connected to the Internet.
AGfIA can be exploited for mobile networks like UMTS and LTE as well as for
IRS Networks. The mechanisms to register for ITS geocast messages as well as the
way how the messages are distributed are described for LTE and IRS Networks in
the sequel. Furthermore, a suitable message format for both communication tech-
nologies, a possible usage-based billing mechanism, and an example are detailed.
We show that our novel mechanism firstly satisfies all requirements outlined in Sec-
tion 7.2 and secondly protects the privacy of each IVS.
7.3.1. IVS Registration
To initiate the geocast mechanism, each IVS has to register at the central station of
the network operator first. This registration is independent from the exploited ITS
applications. For the two network types different mechanisms need to be applied.
They are detailed as follows.
LTE
Registering for geocast messages in LTE is similar to joining an MBMS User Ser-
vice [3GP13b]. There devices join MBMS User Services in order to receive mes-
sages belonging to these applications. In comparison to MBMS not only one ap-
plication utilizes this User Service. Instead, all ITS applications are handled by the
same MBMS User Service. Therefore, each IVS has to join only one User Service,
independent of the number and types of ITS applications it runs. This protects the
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privacy of the IVSs because the MNO does not learn the applications an IVS ex-
ploits. Therefore, the subscribed IVSs of an application remain anonymous to the
MNO.
Furthermore, we assume a continuous MBMS service to minimize the time over-
head for setting up an MBMS session. A time sequence diagram detailing the regis-
tration scheme is depicted in the upper part of Figure 7.2.
IRS
For IRS Networks no registration is necessary because of the ad-hoc characteristic of
the network. As a consequence, the operator of an IRS Network is not able to track
the IVSs subscribed to a certain ITS application. Therefore, the receiving IVSs stay
anonymous.
7.3.2. Message Distribution
Whenever an ICS aims in distributing a message in a geographic area, it has to look
up the present mobile and IRS Networks in the area first. To find relevant networks,
the ICS requires a coverage map of all mobile and IRS Networks it has a contract
with. We assume that there exists an ICS which provides this information [PW12].
After relevant networks have been identified, the ICS passes the message to the cen-
tral station of each network, including meta-information about the dissemination
area, a distribution frequency, an expiry time, and an AID. The dissemination area
defines the region in which the message shall be spread. To distribute the message
also to IVSs entering the dissemination area, it is repeated at the given distribution
frequency until the expiry time. The AID uniquely identifies an ITS application
responsible for the message. Therefore, it is necessary for an IVS in order to deter-
mine if the particular message is relevant or not. The message distribution by the
different network types as discussed in the sequel is illustrated in Figure 7.1 and the
corresponding sequence diagram is presented in the lower part of Figure 7.2.
LTE
Each time an ICS aims at distributing an ITS message in a certain area, it passes the
messages to the MN CS. Its functionality is similar to the BM-SC and MBMS-GW
in MBMS and can therefore be integrated to these entities. It first identifies the
relevant eNodeBs to distribute the message. This is done with the help of a database,
containing the position, communication range, and address of each eNodeB within
the network. Then, the geocast message is forwarded to these eNodeBs by means of
Xcast [BFI+07]. Upon reception the eNodeB stores the message locally. All locally
stored messages are then sent at the given frequency to all IVSs in the communication
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Figure 7.1.: Message distribution in AGfIA
range belonging to the ITS MBMS User Service until they expire. Furthermore, the
eNodeB is aware of all connected IVSs which are member of the User Service for
ITS applications. Therefore, it could also send a unicast message to this new IVS
immediately after connecting instead of periodically repeating the message on the
broadcast medium to all IVSs. This might be even more efficient [SZ11].
This mechanism protects the privacy on subscribed applications of the IVSs since
each IVS which is a member of the ITS MBMS User Service for ITS applications
receives the message. Therefore, the MNO is not able to determine which IVS pro-
cesses the messages and consequently cannot identify the applications exploited by
an IVS. Furthermore, the IVS does not periodically send its position to a new central
entity. This prevents tracking attempts.
IRS
For AGfIA on top of DSRC, the geocast messages are passed from the ICS to the
IRS CS. The IRS CS has access, like the MN CS in LTE, to a database containing
the position, communication range, and address of each of its IRSs in order to select
the relevant ones for distribution. After selection, the messages are forwarded like
in LTE via Xcast to these IRSs. There the message is stored locally and sent period-
ically according to the given frequency to all IVSs in communication range until it
expires.
Considering that the IRS does not get any feedback which IVS in communication
range processes the received message, no entity is able to determine the applications
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exploited by a certain IVS. Therefore, the distribution of geocast messages over IRS
Networks also protects the privacy of the IVSs.
7.3.3. Message Format
We aim at the GeoNetworking message format as standardized in [ETS14a] and
described in Section 2.3.1. This format was developed to exchange messages by
means of DSRC between IVSs or between IVSs and IRSs. Therefore, it is well-
suited for a geocast over an IRS Network. However, the exploited message format
can be also applied for LTE.
GeoNetworking supports unicast, anycast, and broadcast messages. For the out-
lined scenario it is necessary to support the addressing of a group of IVSs too. Hence,
we provided support for multicast messaging by adapting the GBC/Geographically-
Scoped Anycast (GAC) header. All GeoNetworking messages are secured by cryp-
tographic mechanisms in order to protect their content.
Besides of the adapted header aimed to support multicast, we apply the message
format as denoted in [ETS14a] and exploit BTP [ETS14b] as the transport protocol.
The detailed format of the header supporting multicast is illustrated in Figure 7.3.
The changes compared to the original GBC/GAC header are as follows. We first
removed the location of the source, because it is an ICS whose location is not relevant
for the receiving or forwarding IVSs. Additionally, we utilize the reserved octets
124 Anonymous Authenticated Car-to-X Communication
7.3.3 Message Format
32 Bit
0 7 8 1516 2324 31
SN AID
GEOAREAPOS_LATITUDE
GEOAREAPOS_LONGITUDE
DISTANCE_A DISTANCE_B
ANGLE FREQUENCY
EXPIRY_TIME
Figure 7.3.: Detailed message format of the geographically scoped multicast
to encode the AID (AID) into the message and add fields to embed the frequency
(FREQUENCY) and expiryTime (EXPIRY_TIME) of the message. The multicast
routing is added by encoding the AID into the message. An IVS which does not
support the corresponding application drops the message without further processing.
The frequency indicates how often the message shall be distributed to the IVSs in
communication range by either an IVS, IRS, or eNodeB. The message is valid until
the point in time encoded in expiryTime. After this point in time, all entities will
drop and no longer distribute the message. All other fields are applied as in the
original GBC/GAC message according to [ETS14a]. The sequence number (SN)
indicates the index of the sent packet and is utilized to detect duplicate GN packets.
The remaining fields are applied to describe the geometric shape of the dissemination
area.
This message format can be applied for both LTE and IRS Networks to deliver
geocast messages to a group of IVSs. When they are distributed over mobile net-
works, the GeoNetworking message is the payload of the Internet Protocol (IP) con-
nection. For DSRC, the GeoNetworking message is also used within the Network
and Transportation Layer, respectively, to deliver the message. In both cases the
receiving IVS parses the GeoNetworking message by its DSRC stack. To check
the relevance of a message, the IVS compares the included AID to its list of sub-
scribed AIDs and its current location with the area embedded in the message. Fig-
ure 7.4 illustrates the location of the GeoNetworking message in the Open Systems
Interconnection (OSI) layers for LTE and DSRC, respectively. Since the creation of
this work a new version of the standard on how to secure a message has been pub-
lished [ETS15]. This version includes the AID of the message in the Header Fields.
When applying the new version, it is therefore no longer necessary to embed the AID
in the extended header.
Due to the presented unified message format, it becomes quite simple for the ICS
and IVS to handle messages. The ICS needs to create only one message and can
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then forward it to all networks. The IVS can parse the message in the same way,
independent of the applied communication technology. Furthermore, an IVS can
simply forward a message received by LTE to other IVSs via DSRC without the need
to convert it. Therefore, the applied message format enables significant architectural
simplifications.
7.3.4. Overhead
When messages are transmitted in a wireless way, all entities in communication
range receive the message. Messages are dropped at the network layer when MBMS
is applied and the receiver is not part of the corresponding MBMS User Service. In
the proposed scheme, each IVS will receive the messages of all ITS applications, ne-
glecting weather it is subscribed to the application or not. This introduces a certain
overhead because all received messages need to be forwarded to the DSRC stack.
There the messages are dropped if they are not relevant. Whenever messages are re-
ceived via DSRC, all incoming messages are checked for relevance at network level.
This analysis includes an inspection of the messages geographic region. Therefore,
this check needs to be extended in order to drop messages from not supported appli-
cations at network layer.
Subsequently, there is no overhead introduced when messages are received via
DSRC. For LTE each message needs to be forwarded to the DSRC stack. However,
these messages are only distributed a few times per minute and have a size of less
than 3 Kilobytes. Furthermore, it is not expected that several dozens of messages
are valid in the same region at the same time. Therefore, AGfIA clearly does not
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introduce a significant overhead.
7.3.5. Billing
For economic reasons, it must be possible to bill the network usage of geocast mes-
sages. In the outlined scheme, an ICS may pay a basic amount for the service pro-
vision by the operators. Furthermore, the ICS might be billed by the number of
messages it sends, depending on the size of the dissemination area, sending fre-
quency, and validity period of the messages. Therefore, the network operators do
not need any information about the IVS exploiting the messages or even the number
of receivers of a message. Accordingly, it is not necessary for the network operators
to track the IVSs by exploiting a certain ITS application for billing. Therefore, this
scheme protects the IVSs privacy.
7.3.6. Example
We illustrate the advantages of the described geocast scheme using the example in
Figure 7.5. The figure shows the two hazards Hazard1 and Hazard2 like an icy
road and ongoing roadworks. The rectangles depict the dissemination areas of pos-
sible warning messages. Furthermore, the eNodeBs and IRSs covering the area are
depicted together with their communication range. When exploiting the proposed
scheme, only the eNodeBs and IRSs covering the respective dissemination area by
their communication range distribute the message to the IVSs.
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In the example IRS1, IRS2, eNodeB2, and eNodeB3 cover the dissemination area
of Hazard1, while IRS2, eNodeB3, and eNodeB4 cover the area of Hazard2. Since
IRS2 and eNodeB3 are covering both areas, they distribute both messages. The
eNodeBs and IRSs not covering any dissemination area do not forward any geocast
message. Therefore, the messages are only disseminated by the relevant eNodeBs
and IRSs. Moreover, only the IVSs depicted in black exploit the application warning
of Hazard1, while the white ones utilize the application that distributes information
about Hazard2. The gray ones illustrate IVSs exploiting both applications. Only the
IVSs applying the corresponding application process the warning messages, all other
IVSs discard the message. The selection of the relevant IVSs is done without having
any knowledge on which IVS exploits any specific ITS application at the network
level, nor knowing which IVSs are located within the dissemination area. Therefore,
the privacy of each IVS present in the dissemination area is well preserved.
7.4. Implementation
The implementation consists of two Java programs running on the IRS and each
IVS, respectively, and was done as part of the work documented in [Bar15b]. Both
programs utilize a GeoNetworking stack written in Java. The program running at the
IRS gets as input the distribution information from an ICS. As its output it distributes
the message via DSRC to the IVSs in communication range.
A screenshot of the GUI running on the IRS is given in Figure 7.6. It displays a
list of messages to distribute. It is possible to specify the name, area, AID, repetition
interval, expiry time, and payload of a message. Furthermore, it contains a map
which shows the targeted dissemination area. For debugging purposes, the GUI also
displays a log containing all sent messages. The screenshot shows a basic evaluation
scenario which was applied to test if only the messages valid at its current position
are considered by the IVS.
As input, the program running on the IVS uses the AID of the running ITS appli-
cations, the current position of the IVS, and the received messages. On reception, it
parses the messages and checks their relevance. There are three criteria which must
be satisfied to consider a message to be relevant: Firstly, the IVS has to be located
inside the relevance area. Secondly, it must support the AID. Thirdly, the message
at hand must not be expired. The relevance area is encoded into the message and
denotes the actual warning region of the event. In general, this area is smaller than
the dissemination area.
A screenshot of this program is given in Figure 7.7. It shows the list of AIDs
the IVS supports, a list of received messages with their validity state, a log which
displays all received messages, and a map containing the IVSs current position and
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Figure 7.6.: Screenshot of the program running on the IRS
all received messages are displayed. The color of the messages changes with their
state. Whenever a message has an AID supported by the IVS and the IVS is located
within the relevance area of the message, it is highlighted in green. If the AID is
not supported, but the IVS is in its relevance area, it is displayed in yellow. If the
receiver is outside of the relevance area of the message, it has a white background.
All expired messages are depicted in grey.
7.5. Evaluation
The goal of AGfIA is to distribute messages efficiently in a limited geographic area
and in addition preserve the privacy of the participating IVSs. Substantial require-
ments, as discussed in Section 7.2, are the support for multiple applications, receiver
groups, small message transmission, dynamic dissemination areas, validity periods,
scalability, a small end-to-end delay, and an efficient transmission.
To check, if those requirements are satisfied, we analyze if they are fulfilled by the
proposed scheme. In addition, we compare them, the privacy, system complexity,
and supported network types of AGfIA to GBGS [JRX11] and MBMS [3GP13b] as
reviewed in Section 3.4. Furthermore, we applied the outlined implementation of
AGfIA for IRS Networks to evaluate its properties on top of real-world vehicles.
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Figure 7.7.: Screenshot of the program running on the IVS
Table 7.1.: Privacy evaluation of the geocast schemes MBMS, GBGS, and AGfIA
MBMS GBGS AGfIA
Position updates MNO MNO and GMS MNO
Utilized applications of IVS Yes Yes No
Subscribed IVSs of application Yes Yes No
7.5.1. Privacy
In order to compare the privacy of the different schemes, we analyze which entities
are getting positions updates and if it is possible to get the utilized applications of an
IVS or all IVSs subscribed to an application. The results of the evaluation are shown
in Table 7.1 and discussed in the sequel.
In each scheme the MNO is able to track the IVSs. To enable a steady connection
for clients, the MNO must perform mobility management. This covers packet rerout-
ing and handover management between cells. Therefore, the MNO must know the
location of each IVS. However, schemes like Privacy Augmented LTE as proposed
in [AKS13] are aimed to prevent tracking by the MNO.
For the grid based geocasting scheme the central GMS is, in addition to the MNO,
aware of the positions of each IVS. This is a major privacy drawback compared
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Table 7.2.: System Complexity evaluation of the three geocast schemes
MBMS GBGS AGfIA
Registration Per application Per application Once
New area Additional session Receiver lookup eNodeB lookup
Additional network 1 additional Nothing 1 additionalmessage message
IVS position update Nothing Inform Nothingcentral entity
to the other two schemes. In case that AGfIA is applied for distribution over IRS
Networks, a tracking of the IVSs is technically impossible.
An attacker may aim at identifying all IVSs subscribed to a certain application or
at all applications exploited by an IVS. Both GBGS and MBMS maintain a central
subscriber database. For MBMS the MNO hast knowledge on which IVS is sub-
scribed to a specific service. When exploiting GBGS the GMS is thus aware of the
applications an IVS utilizes. Therefore, an attacker with access to these databases is
able to yield the sought information.
In contrast, AGfIA does not maintain such a database. The relationship between
the IVSs and applications is not stored anywhere. Therefore, it is not possible to
identify the IVSs subscribed to a certain application or to all subscriptions of an IVS.
The MNO is only able to determine all IVSs exploiting ITS applications. However,
this is not a privacy threat at all since the MNO knows anyway from its contracts
which entities are IVSs.
7.5.2. System Complexity
To assess the complexity of the schemes we compared four significant procedures:
application registration, geocasting a message in a new area, utilizing an additional
network to distribute the messages, and updating the position information of the IVS
within the network. The results of the complexity evaluation are shown in Table 7.2.
We analyze the case an IVS wants to register for or unregister from an applica-
tion. In MBMS and GBGS the IVS must inform a central entity. There, the relation
between the IVS and application is either created or deleted. This is not necessary
in AGfIA, because each IVS registers itself only once for all ITS applications and
not for each application separately. For this use case, AGfIA reduces management
overhead and system complexity significantly while preserving the privacy.
For typical ITS applications an ICS must frequently change or add geocast dis-
tribution areas. For MBMS, message distribution to new areas requires that a new
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session is created. This therefore increases the complexity of the system. When ap-
plying GBGS all IVSs in the new area have to be selected at the GMS. This may
result in a considerable effort. AGfIA only requires a lookup of all relevant eNodeBs
and IRSs in the area. Therefore, AGfIA has a lower complexity than both MBMS
and GBGS when messages shall be distributed in a new area.
Messages are distributed via different networks in order to archive a better cover-
age. When MBMS or AGfIA is applied one additional message needs to be sent for
each network. No additional message is necessary when GBGS is applied. There
the messages are sent to each IVS individually, independent of the network the IVS
is registered at. However, this cannot compensate the overhead introduced by the
unicast scheme applied in GBGS and analyzed in the next section.
Due to their high mobility, IVSs frequently change the eNodeB they are connected
to. These position updates are handled automatically by the mobile network for all
schemes. However, when applying GBGS the IVS has to report its position to the
central GMS regularly. Therefore, AGfIA and MBMS have a lower system com-
plexity than GBGS when the position of the IVS changes.
The evaluation shows that AGfIA has a lower complexity than the other schemes.
For all four use cases it has the lowest complexity.
7.5.3. Scalability
An ITS geocast message usually addresses a large number of receivers. Therefore, it
is important that the applied geocasting scheme does scale with respect to the num-
ber of receivers. Hence, we compare the outlined scheme with MBMS and GBGS
regarding the number of messages the ICS needs to send to the network operator,
the amount of messages within the network of the network operator, the number of
messages received by the IRS or eNodeB, and the number of messages sent from
the network to the IVSs. The results of the scalability evaluation are shown in Ta-
ble 7.3, whereas U stands for unicast, M for multicast, and X for Xcast messages,
respectively.
For MBMS, the ICS has to pass one message to the network each time a message
shall be sent to the IVSs. For the grid based geocasting scheme one message needs
to be sent to the network for each IVS at each point in time a hazard message needs
to be distributed. Hence, MBMS performs better than GBGS in terms of scalability.
When AGfIA is applied, only one message for each hazard needs to be sent to the
network no matter of how often it has to be forwarded to the IVSs. Therefore, AGfIA
scales better than the other schemes.
For the distribution of the messages within the network, MBMS applies multicast,
whereas almost one message is processed by each router. In contrast, one message
per receiver is sent in case of GBGS. AGfIA does exploit Xcast to distribute the
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Table 7.3.: Scalability evaluation of the three geocast schemes
MBMS GBGS AGfIA
ICS to network 1 per message 1 per message and 1 per hazard(Unicast) receiver (Unicast) (Unicast)
Within network 1 per router 1 per receiver 1 per router(Multicast) (Unicast) (Xcast)
To IRSs / eNodeBs 1 per eNodeB 1 per receiver 1 per eNodeB / IRS(Multicast) (Unicast) (Xcast)
To IVSs 1 per eNodeB 1 per receiver 1 per eNodeB / IRS(Multicast) (Unicast) (Multicast)
messages within the network and needs accordingly almost one message per router.
However, the applied Xcast features a larger message header compared to multi-
cast. Therefore, both MBMS and AGfIA scale much better than GBGS within the
distributing network.
After the messages are distributed within the network, they are forwarded to the
eNodeB or IRS, respectively. In case MBMS or AGfIA is applied, one message is
forwarded. When GBGS is applied, one message per receiver is sent to the eNodeBs
and IRSs of the network. This results in considerably more messages compared to
the other schemes.
If MBMS or AGfIA is applied the messages are distributed by means of multicast
from the eNodeBs and IRSs of the network to the IVSs. For the GBGS the messages
are distributed by means of unicast to each receiver, which requires more messages
compared to multicast.
This evaluation shows clearly that MBMS and AGfIA do scale better than the
GBGS with respect to the number of receivers. In these schemes the number of
messages does not depend on the number of receivers, but only on the size of the
geographic area and on the numbers of eNodeBs and IRSs located within. For AGfIA
a larger message header is applied within the network to enable Xcast in comparison
to MBMS. However, AGfIA requires only one message per event from the ICS to
the MNO. For MBMS the message has to be sent periodically to the MNO, which
has to redistribute it in its network in order to reach IVSs entering the area.
7.5.4. Supported Networks
If a scheme is able to support different kinds of networks, it can have a better cov-
erage and therefore it can reach more IVSs in the dissemination area. Furthermore,
an ICS might have a better choice of networks to utilize for message distribution.
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Table 7.4.: Supported networks of the three geocast schemes
MBMS GBGS AGfIA
Mobile Networks Yes Yes Yes
IRS Networks No GN6 only Yes
Table 7.5.: Comparison of the fulfilled requirements
MBMS GBGS AGfIA
Multiple Applications o + +
Receiver Groups o o +
Content Type o + +
Dissemination Area - o +
Validity Period o o +
Scalability + - +
End-to-End Delay + o +
Efficient Transmission + - +
Our analysis shows that MBMS can be applied to LTE networks only, because there
is no support for IRS Networks. GBGS can be utilized for transmissions over LTE
and IRS Networks if the IVS and IRS Network do support GN6. In contrast, AGfIA
enables the transmission over both LTE and IRS Networks without the limitation on
GN6 support. A summary of this comparison is given in Table 7.4
7.5.5. Requirements
We evaluate which of the previously outlined requirements for ITS applications are
fulfilled by the different schemes and discuss the results in the sequel. A summary
is presented in Table 7.5.
Multiple Applications: All three schemes are able to handle multiple applications.
For MBMS there is a bigger effort necessary to support additional applications be-
cause a new MBMS user service has to be created first. When employing the other
two schemes no such costly operation at the infrastructure side is necessary.
Receiver Groups: Different receiver groups are supported by all these schemes.
In case of MBMS and GBGS all interested IVSs must explicitly subscribe in order
to be part of the group. For AGfIA no such action is required by an IVS in order to
join a group.
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Content Type: GBGS and AGfIA are well suited to transmit small ITS messages.
MBMS was designed for long-tailed traffic, e. g. multimedia streams. This causes
substantial overhead in the ITS scenario featuring short messages. However, a deliv-
ery method for short ITS messages may be defined to improve things.
Dissemination Area: For GBGS the dissemination area can be specified for each
message. However, the actual distribution area depends on the size of the grids. Ac-
cordingly, the area might be much greater than specified. When applying MBMS it
is not possible to define the dissemination area in the same granularity. The areas
are limited to predefined service areas. Furthermore, it does not support overlap-
ping service areas for the same application. Therefore, messages with overlapping
dissemination areas have to be distributed in all service areas covering the dissem-
ination area. In contrast, AGfIA allows to specify the dissemination area for each
message separately.
Validity Period: AGfIA repeats the ITS messages in the dissemination area at a
given frequency until they expire. Therefore, IVSs arriving in the area also receive
older, but still relevant messages. When applying MBMS and GBGS the messages
are not repeated in the first place. However, an ICS might either send a message
in the desired distribution frequency to the MNO or query the GMS. Then, new
arriving IVSs would get the message too. Nonetheless, this introduces unnecessary
overhead. To reduce the overhead for the GBGS the ICS can cache the IVSs located
in the dissemination area and send the message only to the new IVSs returned by the
GMS.
Scalability: As outlined in the previous section, MBMS and AGfIA do scale better
than the GBGS.
End-to-End Delay: The end-to-end delay of the distributed messages is smaller
for AGfIA and MBMS than for GBGS. In the first two schemes the messages are
directly forwarded to the network operators, which distribute the messages to the
IVSs. When employing GBGS the geo messaging server introduces an additional
delay by identifying the relevant IVSs. Furthermore, one unicast message has to be
generated and transmitted for each IVS.
Efficient Transmission: The message transmission scheme applied by GBGS is
not very efficient because messages are transported by means of unicast, which in-
troduces more load within the communication networks than Xcast or multicast as
applied by MBMS and AGfIA.
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Figure 7.8.: Basic evaluation scenarios
7.5.6. Experimental Evaluation
For the real-world evaluation we utilized the outlined implementation to integrate
the proposed scheme into IRS Networks consisting of one IRS and of development
vehicles equipped with DSRC. We evaluated the software prototype in several sce-
narios.
Measurement setup
The evaluation setup consists of two IRS Networks featuring one IRS each. The IRS
also runs the IRS CS. Each IVS and IRS consists of an AU and a CCU. The AU runs
the application software, whereas the CCU is responsible for sending and receiving
DSRC messages. Both units are connected via Ethernet.
Results
Within the outlined setup we evaluated several basic and realistic scenarios. The
principles of the basic scenarios are depicted in Figure 7.8. Scenario A consists
of a message from Application 1, which is outside of the IVSs route, whereas in
Scenario B the message from Application 2 is on the route of the IVS. Scenario C
contains messages from different applications, whereas not all are on the envisaged
route of the IVS. The reception and processing of multiple overlapping messages
from different applications is addressed in Scenario D.
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We ran several different tests on these basic scenarios to evaluate the prototype
implementation. We varied the AIDs an IVS supports from those applications not
applied in the scenario up to all AIDs of the messages. To evaluate the message va-
lidity check we ran tests with valid messages, expired messages, and messages that
will be valid in the future. The evaluation of the different scenarios and configura-
tions showed that the IVSs running the particular application consider a message as
relevant only in case that they are within the relevance area of the message and the
message is still valid.
As an example for a realistic and complex evaluation, a scenario around Rüs-
selsheim, Germany is depicted in Figure 7.9. This scenario features two IRS Net-
works, IRS1 and IRS2, respectively. A possible route of an IVS is drawn in red
aiming from Rüsselsheim city towards a motorway.
In this scenario three messages denoted as message1, message2, and message3
are distributed to the IVSs, each with a different AID. The relevance area of the
messages is indicated by a filled shape surrounding the message name. The larger
frame indicates the dissemination area of the messages. message1 exemplifies an icy
road an icy road warning. Therefore, its shape is enclosing the icy. The dissemination
area has the same shape but covers a much larger area in order to inform approaching
IVSs before they reach the hazard. Only IRS1 is located within the dissemination
area. Therefore, only this IRS is distributing the message. message2 located in the
center of the city represents a notification about road closures due to a public street
festival. To inform all IVSs reaching the center, the dissemination area covers the
whole city. Because of the large dissemination area, message2 is in reach of both
IRSs and is therefore distributed by all of them. message3 warns about a traffic jam
eastbound on the highway located south to the city. Therefore, the dissemination
area is only extended towards west, where the IVSs reach the traffic jam. Only IRS2
is located within the dissemination area of this message and distributes it.
This scenario clearly demonstrates one of the main advantages of AGfIA: Only
the IRSs and eNodeBs located within the dissemination area of a certain message
distribute this message. In contrast, even IRSs or eNodeBs in overlapping areas dis-
tribute all relevant messages. In addition, only the IVSs exploiting the corresponding
application process the message. All other IVSs drop the messages at network layer.
To sum up, we demonstrated that AGfIA works well on both real devices and in a
complex traffic scenario.
7.6. Summary
In this chapter we proposed AGfIA, an AGfIA. This scheme exploits various com-
munication technologies in order to send messages from an ICS to all IVSs which
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Figure 7.9.: Example of a real-world evaluation scenario
belong to a distinct group, like subscribed to a specific application, and are located
in a certain area. Hereby, the message receivers stay unknown for privacy reasons.
Moreover, no entity is able to determine the applications exploited by a certain IVS or
to identify all IVSs subscribed to a specific ITS application. Furthermore, the same
message format can be applied for rather different communication technologies. We
detailed on how the scheme works in terms of registration, message distribution,
billing, and how the proposed message format looks like.
As message format we took GeoNetworking as standardized for DSRC and ex-
tended it to support multicast aimed to efficiently address a group of IVSs. In com-
parison to other geocast schemes, the presented AGfIA approach protects the privacy
of the IVSs. An attacker is not able to discover the applications exploited by an IVS
or to identify all IVS subscribed to a certain application. Furthermore, this scheme
does not rely on a central entity, which may track the location of the IVSs. Therefore,
the scheme protects the privacy of association and location. By not tracking the IVSs
nor storing their identity somewhere the privacy of the identity is also protected. Fur-
thermore, AGfIA reduces the system complexity compared to other known geocast
schemes. By exploiting AGfIA it is simple to register for ITS applications, to dis-
tribute a message in a new area, or to disseminate the message via a new network.
Furthermore, no additional effort is necessary, if the location of an IVS changes.
AGfIA scales in addition for a large number of receivers or for huge dissemination
areas. Moreover, messages can be distributed by means of different communication
technologies like LTE or DSRC. Its major advantage is that it fulfills substantial
requirements of ITS geocast applications. To secure the communication the ICS can
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authenticate the messages with its certificate. Furthermore, it might distribute an
encryption key to all subscribed IVSs in order to ensure the confidentiality of the
transmitted data.
Additionally, we created a prototype implementation of the scheme for DSRC,
set up experimental IRS Networks, and evaluated the prototype software on top of
real IVSs. The presented results show that the AGfIA system is well-suited for an
efficient distribution of ITS messages to a group of IVSs located within a certain
area. At the same time AGfIA protects the privacy of the IVS.
In comparison to existing geocast schemes the one proposed in this chapter is well
suited for ITS applications. Its novelty is that it is optimized for small messages,
scales for a large number of receivers, features a low end-to-end delay, supports
dynamic dissemination areas, and protects at the same time the privacy of the IVSs.
Existing schemes do not fulfill all these important properties for ITS applications.
Most properties of the proposed scheme are achieved by caching the messages at the
edge of the network and applying a single multicast group for all IVSs.
The proposed anonymous geocast scheme might be exploited in two different sce-
narios. Either an ICS is distributing information to the IVSs or it is requesting data
from the IVSs. Data distributed to the IVSs might be for example map data updates
for automated driving or warnings about weather hazards. Requests for sensor data
in a certain region might be applied to, e.g., validate weather information or changed
street conditions. Moreover, it might be extended to support further communication
technologies. The outlined scheme allows message dissemination via DSRC and
LTE. However, it might be extended to support other technologies like consumer
WLAN.
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8 | Conclusions
8.1. Summary
Connected vehicles and automated driving are two current trends in the automotive
industry which will change the future driver experience. Connected vehicles ex-
change data for e.g. convenience or entertainment applications with central servers
or other vehicles. Automated driving vehicles require up-to-date high-precision map
data in order to fully utilize all benefits. Therefore, this data needs to be also ex-
changed with central servers. All this data, from connected and automated driving
vehicles might reveal sensible private information about the driver.
We investigated in this thesis four different vehicular communication scenarios.
In all of these scenarios challenges resulting from different requirements originating
from vehicle and application operators needed to be solved. The application requires
in general reliable, accurate, and fresh data while the operator of the vehicles aims
in preserving its privacy. For each scenario we proposed a solution to solve these
challenges. The investigated scenarios include the authentication of a vehicle at a
central station, the upload of sensor data from a vehicle to a central station, the
secure privacy preserving communication between vehicles, and the distribution of
information form a central server to vehicles located in a geographic region.
The first scheme allows a vehicle to anonymously authenticate at a central server
based on properties. When an operator creates a new application, he has to specify
the properties the vehicles need to possess in order to use the application. To exploit
the application, the vehicles first needs to obtain a ticket from a central entity. This
ticket can then be exploited to authenticate for the application. To get this ticket,
the vehicles proofs without revealing any other properties to the central entity that it
possesses the necessary properties. Therefore, the central stations do learn only the
necessary properties. Furthermore, it is not possible to determine all applications ex-
ploited by a certain vehicle or to link a ticket to a specific vehicle. Subsequently, this
scheme protects the privacy of the vehicles. Additionally, we detailed how billing
can be integrated into this scheme and the communication between the different en-
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tities can be secured. Furthermore, we showed by a prototype that the scheme does
not introduce any noteworthy delay, even with limited computational power on the
vehicle side.
The second contribution is a protocol to establish a secured communication chan-
nel between two vehicles. The protocol enables two vehicles eligible for the same
application to authenticate and agree on an encryption key without leaking their iden-
tity. This key can then be exploited to exchange confidential data. To proof the eligi-
bility, the vehicles authenticate each other with tickets obtained by the first proposed
scheme. These tickets neither leak the identity, attributes, nor all associations of the
vehicle. In order to preserve the communication privacy of the vehicles and establish
a secure connection, we rely on a special signature scheme which hides the creator
of a signature and a mechanism to derive an encryption key from public available
information, respectively. Accordingly, this protocol enables two vehicles running
the same application to exchange confidential application specific data without ex-
posing their identity to anyone. We showed by simulation that the applied signatures
enhance the privacy of the vehicles. An attacker is not able to link different execu-
tions of the protocol to the same vehicle, even when the exploited tickets are reused.
Furthermore, we implemented the protocol on real vehicles and exchanged real sen-
sor data. The evaluation of the implementation also shows that the protocol can be
executed within a small time frame. Therefore, we also demonstrated that the proto-
col works well on real devices. Thus, the proposed scheme enables two vehicles to
secure exchange data while preserving their privacy.
The third contribution focuses on preserving the privacy of vehicles which send
enhanced sensor data to a central server. Sensor data collected by vehicles is usually
only valid in a small area and short period of time. Therefore, the data sent from
a vehicle to a central server usually contains this information. However, this infor-
mation might be exploited to harm the privacy of the vehicle. The proposed scheme
protects the privacy of the vehicle by exchanging the sensor data with other vehicles
prior to sending it to the central server. For the exchange, we apply our proposed
protocol which preserves the privacy of the participating vehicles. By exchanging
the sensor data, an attacker at the central server is no longer able to identify the vehi-
cles. We proposed different strategies on how to exchange the data between vehicles.
Furthermore, we showed by simulation that this scheme hides the identity of the ve-
hicle collecting the sensor reading. The results show that the scheme obfuscates the
spatial information embedded into the reported data. In addition, it also obscures the
identity of the reporting vehicle. At the same time, this scheme introduces only a
short temporal delay. Furthermore, all reported data is authenticated. Therefore, this
scheme is well suited to hide the origin of sensor readings when they are sent from a
vehicle to a central server. Subsequently, it protects the vehicles privacy.
Fourthly, we developed a scheme to send a message to all vehicles subscribed to a
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specific application and located in a certain geographical area. This message distri-
bution is done without knowing the vehicles present in the target area. Furthermore,
in contrast to the state of the art solutions, it is not possible to get information of the
used application of a vehicle. Therefore, this scheme protects the privacy of the ve-
hicle. In addition, it scales better and has a lower system complexity than state of the
art solutions. Moreover, it supports secure communication via different technologies.
We created a proof of concept implementation for one communication technology in
order to show that the scheme works in real world scenarios. Hence, the proposed
scheme is well suited to send a message to all vehicles located in a specific area and
exploiting a certain application while preserving their privacy.
All four schemes developed in this thesis have been implemented and tested on
real hardware like development vehicles. Therefore, we demonstrated that all pro-
posed schemes also work on real world devices. In addition, we run simulations
for some of the schemes in order to evaluate the privacy aspects. We showed for
each presented scheme that it protects the privacy of the vehicle on the considered
communication scenario. At the same time, they do not introduce a disadvantage
in its usability. They also do not violate any important demands of the vehicle or
central server. Furthermore, all schemes are complaint with the current standards for
vehicular communication. Therefore, it is easy to exploit the scheme in production
vehicles.
The proposed schemes might not only be applied separately. Moreover, it is pos-
sible to employ several or even all of them at the same time in order to protect the
different communication scenarios of an application. Some of the schemes even
require the others in order to exploit all their features.
8.2. Future Work
The communication scenarios considered in this thesis are only a subset of all. There
exist other scenarios which might introduce additional security challenges to the
communication system. One of these scenarios is the request of data in a certain
region. From the spatial information in the request a central server might be able to
determine the coarse location of the vehicle and therefore track its movements.
Currently there are no practical mechanisms to detect misbehaving vehicles. This
includes the collection of the information necessary to make a decision, ensuring the
made decision is valid, and to prevent further communication of the vehicle.
The security of the applied mechanisms might decrease over time when new at-
tacks are developed or attackers have more computational power. Therefore, pro-
cesses to introduce new security mechanisms in vehicles which might be more than
ten years old and have very limited hardware capabilities need to be developed. It is
Anonymous Authenticated Car-to-X Communication 143
8.2 Future Work
unlikely that all vehicles can be updated at the same time, therefore mechanisms are
necessary which ensure the interoperability between older and newer vehicles.
All these issues need to be addressed in future research in order to make the whole
system more sustainable.
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A | Additional Evaluation Results
A.1. Anonymous Data Exchange
Figure A.1 compares the different protocol steps, transmission, and other operations
for ring sizes from 2 to 13. The higher execution times for larger ring sizes are mainly
caused by the additional time necessary to create and validate the ring signatures.
The Figures A.2 till A.12 illustrate the time necessary to execute the individual
parts of the protocol steps for ring sizes from 2 to 12.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Step 1 35 41 48 53 60 65 73 78 84 91 96 103
Step 2 54 64 75 85 94 103 114 122 132 143 150 161
Step 3 26 31 34 37 40 44 48 52 54 59 63 67
Step 4 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17
Step 5 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
Validation Step 5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Transmission 13 15 15 16 17 17 19 19 20 21 21 23
Other 17 16 16 17 17 18 16 17 18 15 17 15
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Figure A.1.: Comparison of the protocol steps for different ring sizes.
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Figure A.2.: Necessary time to execute the individual parts of the protocol steps for
a ring size of 2.
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Figure A.3.: Necessary time to execute the individual parts of the protocol steps for
a ring size of 3.
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Figure A.4.: Necessary time to execute the individual parts of the protocol steps for
a ring size of 4.
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Figure A.5.: Necessary time to execute the individual parts of the protocol steps for
a ring size of 5.
Anonymous Authenticated Car-to-X Communication 149
A.1 Anonymous Data Exchange
Receiving
10 ms
(17%)
ECIES
6 ms
(10%)
Ring Creation
37 ms
(62%)
AES
<1 ms
(<1%)
Sending
5 ms
(8%)
Other
2 ms
(3%)
Receiving
11 ms
(12%)
ECIES
13 ms
(14%)
Ring 
Verification
23 ms
(25%)
Ring Creation
37 ms
(39%)
AES
<1 ms
(<1%)
Sending
6 ms
(6%)
Other
4 ms
(4%)
(a) Step 1 (b) Step 2
Receiving
11 ms
(27%)
Ring 
Verification
23 ms
(57%)
AES
<1 ms
(<1%) Sending
5 ms
(13%)
Other
1 ms
(3%)
Receiving
11 ms
(65%)
AES
<1 ms
(<1%)
Sending
5 ms
(29%)
Other
1 ms
(6%)
(c) Step 3 (d) Step 4
Receiving
11 ms
(69%)
AES
<1 ms
(<1%)
Sending
5 ms
(31%)
Other
<1 ms
(<1%)
Receiving
10 ms
(>99%)
Other
<1 ms
(<1%)
(e) Step 5 (f) Step 5 validation
Figure A.6.: Necessary time to execute the individual parts of the protocol steps for
a ring size of 6.
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Figure A.7.: Necessary time to execute the individual parts of the protocol steps for
a ring size of 7.
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Figure A.8.: Necessary time to execute the individual parts of the protocol steps for
a ring size of 8.
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Figure A.9.: Necessary time to execute the individual parts of the protocol steps for
a ring size of 9.
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Figure A.10.: Necessary time to execute the individual parts of the protocol steps for
a ring size of 10.
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Figure A.11.: Necessary time to execute the individual parts of the protocol steps for
a ring size of 11.
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Figure A.12.: Necessary time to execute the individual parts of the protocol steps for
a ring size of 12.
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A.2. Anonymous Data Reporting
Figure A.13 shows the resulting k-anonymity, spatial obfuscation, upload delay, and
exchanges per vehicle in one hour of the simulation for a DataDuplication value of
1 and Figure A.14 for a value of 5.
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Figure A.13.: k-anonymity, spatial obfuscation, upload delay, and the number of
exchanges per vehicle in one hour as a function of TimeBetweenEx-
changes for a DataDuplication value of 1.
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